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ABSTRACT 
The federal government has called for the creation of a Culture of Preparedness. 
A literature review confirms a variety of studies have found that citizens are woefully 
unprepared for disasters.  Citizens are no more prepared now than prior to Hurricane 
Katrina.  The thesis identifies two major hurdles for a Culture of Preparedness: (1) 
changing government itself to embrace citizen preparedness as a forward deployment of 
assets and to provide the necessary leadership and funding for preparedness efforts, and 
(2) changing the behavior of the American people to embrace and act upon the message 
of preparedness.  
The thesis reviews numerous federal documents highlighting the importance of 
citizen preparedness and juxtaposes stated policy to actual federal budget numbers.  Lack 
of formal policy by state and local government is identified as a concern. 
Defining and measuring citizen preparedness have yet to be accomplished.  A 
persuasive campaign to change human behavior has yet to be created that incorporates 
social marketing, cause marketing, psychology and sociology.  Case studies including 
seatbelt usage and breast cancer awareness are identified as models.  Israel is discussed as 
a Culture of Preparedness.   
Several recommendations and suggestions for developing a Culture of 
Preparedness are provided.  Areas of further study are identified. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The events of September 11, 2001, changed America in many ways.  As our 
country accepted and embraced a new era, filled with uncertainty and fear of terrorism in 
major urban areas, surprisingly few citizens took personal responsibility for making sure 
they and their families have the skills, education, and supplies to survive on their own for 
a minimum of three days following a catastrophic event.  Citizen preparedness and 
education is vital to our nation’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from acts 
of terrorism, catastrophic events, or natural disasters.  An engaged and educated citizenry 
understands instructions, follows orders, and is less prone to panic.  An educated and 
prepared citizenry has managed expectations following a major event.  A prepared 
citizenry can take care of itself for the first seventy-two hours post-disaster, allowing 
local government and first responders to focus on the most acute rescue needs, addressing 
mass casualties, keeping order, and restoring lifelines prior to the arrival of significant 
outside assistance.   
Efforts to increase public preparedness and education have not penetrated deep 
into the American psyche, although national efforts have been made by organizations 
such as the American Red Cross, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others. 
Despite 9/11, the constant reminders of the instability of the world we live in and 
recognition of the devastation Mother Nature can cause, post-Katrina studies show 
Americans are no more prepared now than they were prior to this cataclysmic event.  In 
comparing pre-Katrina and post-Katrina surveys, Professor Paul Light of New York 
University (NYU) found that Americans remain woefully unprepared for a catastrophic 
event and government is doing little effective work in preparing and educating the 
citizenry.1  Studies conducted by the Council for Excellence in Government and 
                                                 
1 Paul C. Light, Preparing for the Unthinkable: A Report on the State of Citizen Preparedness, (New 
York: New York University Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, undated). Reports results 
of national survey conducted July 2005. 
 2
American Red Cross have found that Katrina has had little influence in changing the 
American citizenry’s lack of active commitment to preparedness.2  
Citizen preparedness has been referred to as “a national imperative.”3  In 2004, 
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge stated: “We cannot secure America from inside 
the Beltway.  Neither can we prepare citizens from an office or a boardroom.  Homeland 
security must be a priority in every home, every city and every neighborhood across 
America.”4  More recently, White House Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, 
in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned (herein referred to as 
the Townsend Report), clearly recognized the need to reassess the country’s efforts with 
regard to citizen education, involvement, and preparedness.   The Townsend Report calls 
for the creation of a “Culture of Preparedness,” transforming homeland security in a 
“profound and enduring” manner.5  The report recognizes and underscores the fact that 
this transformation depends upon significant involvement of citizens in the overall 
preparedness efforts of the country.   
Numerous studies show that Americans understand the threat of terrorism. They 
pay attention to government information regarding terrorism and disasters, and they were 
definitely impacted by Katrina.  
Americans were clearly paying attention to the event.  According to the 
Pew Research Center’s News Interest Index, Katrina was one of the most 
watched events of the past quarter century.  Seventy percent of Americans 
were paying very or fairly close attention to the hurricane and its 
aftermath, placing it only behind the Challenger accident, the September 
11th attacks, and the 1989 San Francisco earthquake, and tying it with the 
Los Angeles riots that followed the acquittal of the officers in the Rodney 
King case…The question is what Americans learned in watching the 
                                                 
2 Peter D. Hart and Public Opinion Strategies, The Aftershock of Katrina and Rita: Public Not Moved 
to Prepare (Washington, D.C.: Council for Excellence in Government and the American Red Cross, 
December 2005). 
3 Staff, “Secretary Ridge to Encourage ‘Public Readiness Index’ for Communities, More Than 100 
Homeland Security Leaders Voice Support,” U.S. Newswire, January 27, 2005, www.nexis.com (accessed 
October 22, 2005). 
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 U.S. White House, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” foreword by 
Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 23, 2006), 79. 
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Katrina catastrophe unfold…Indeed, pre- and post-Katrina surveys 
conducted by New York University suggest that Americans are no more 
prepared after Katrina than they had been before.6 
The NYU studies made another significant finding: two-thirds of respondents 
stated that they pay a great deal, or fair amount, of attention to news stories or 
information distributed by the organizations in their local community, or the federal 
government, on how to prepare for a terrorist attack.7  This raises the obvious question:  
If two-thirds of Americans are “paying attention” to messages and information, then why 
are the preparedness numbers so abysmal?  Given the Pew Center’s finding that 70% of 
Americans were paying attention to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, nagging 
questions remain. What gets people to act in their own best interest to prepare for survival 
after a disaster?  What motivates people to act for their own safety?  Efforts at the 
national level to urge citizens to prepare are admirable but lacking in effectiveness, as the 
majority of Americans are not taking action and changing their behavior.   
The Townsend Report was issued February 23, 2006.  At the end of 2007, much 
still remains to be done in preparing Americans for disaster and creating a culture of 
preparedness.  This effort requires a major shift in the behavior of the American people; 
even more important is changing the attitude of government – at all levels – toward the 
issue of citizen preparedness.   
No longer can government view citizen preparedness as a “feel good” issue, 
relegated to an aside for funding, focused on only sporadically or once a year during a 
“preparedness month” press conference.  Bold statements in speeches, reports, and 
national strategies can no longer refer to the priority and importance of citizen 
preparedness without serious augmentation of funding and a dramatic new approach to 
programs.  Citizen preparedness has been woefully neglected and under-funded as part of 
the federal budget.   Citizen preparedness – where urban areas are filled with persons 
skilled in surviving disaster and homes and communities prepared with a minimum of 
                                                 
6 Paul C. Light, The Katrina Effect on American Preparedness: A Report on the Lessons Americans 
Learned in Watching the Katrina Catastrophe Unfold (New York: New York University Center for 
Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, undated). Results of national survey conducted October 2005, 1. 
7 Paul C. Light, Preparing for the Unthinkable, 4. 
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seventy-two hours of supplies – must be viewed by homeland security officials and the 
traditional first responder community as a force multiplier and a forward deployment of 
assets.  A serious, well-crafted, well-funded, and sustained effort can create a culture of 
preparedness which will be an essential life and death component to response and 
recovery efforts in the critical first seventy-two hours following the onset of a disaster.   
Government needs to alter its view of citizen preparedness and make a long-term 
commitment to this vital asset – the prepared citizen and resilient community.  
Government must act in its own best interest in re-assessing its attitude toward citizen 
preparedness.  Even in the post-Katrina environment, with FEMA on the mend, the 
federal government has stated its position clearly: localities are on their own for a 
minimum of seventy-two hours.  Thus, the forward deployment of relief assets in homes 
and communities, and training and educating citizens to augment the first responder 
community as a force multiplier, should take on substantial importance.  Sadly, budgets 
and programs do not reflect this most urgent mission for government – at any level.   
A.  THE RESEARCH QUESTION, DEFINING THE PROBLEM, AND THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Studies have shown that Americans are unprepared for disaster and unprepared 
for the psychological impact of terrorism.  Funding remains woefully deficient for a 
serious and sustained preparedness effort in our country.  Preparedness and education 
efforts have not resonated with the American public in urban areas.  Urban areas must 
revolutionize the way in which they approach preparedness in order to create a social 
contagion leading to a culture of preparedness.  Major urban areas cannot use a one-size-
fits-all approach, given the complexities of socio-economic factors, large immigrant 
populations, and various cultural sensitivities.   
There are several efforts afoot to address the issue of citizen preparedness.  The 
country needs to realistically evaluate whether America can indeed create a culture of 
preparedness and what it will take to accomplish “profound and enduring” change.  
Given the ravages of Katrina, the possibility of further terrorist attacks upon the United 
States, and the certainty of other natural disasters occurring, what new methods and 
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strategies need to be implemented beyond what has already been tried? What successful 
models for issue awareness and education, leading to proactive measures and changing 
human behavior, have applicability to citizen preparedness efforts? What is the key that 
will finally unlock the puzzle of how to get the American public to actively embrace 
preparedness? How can concepts in the fields of marketing, sociology, and psychology be 
employed to create a social contagion of preparedness and effectuate a cultural change in 
the American public?  Will government take citizen preparedness seriously and change 
its view of preparedness programs as “feel good” measures to recognizing the importance 
of the forward deployment of assets and creation of force multipliers in response and 
recovery efforts? 
This thesis looks at many studies and polls that have taken place since 9/11 
involving the issue of citizen preparedness – or lack thereof.  There are many silos of 
research in the country that are looking at this phenomenon, all performing great work, 
but not necessarily working in concert to create a unified effort.  The first issue to address 
with these disparate groups and authors of studies and articles is what constitutes 
preparedness.  What are the goals of preparedness efforts and what is a culture of 
preparedness in that context?  To some, preparedness is the storage of food and water, 
flashlight, radio, and batteries; to others it is these items plus an emergency plan.  Many 
of the surveys use this as the sign of preparedness.  What is lacking is the educational 
component – knowing what to do when disaster strikes – which is equally important.  
Some measurement tools to determine preparedness have been or are in the process of 
being developed.  The research suggests that a common definition of preparedness should 
be established for consistency and for measurement, but recognizes there is no current 
agreement on the definition of preparedness and, further, that it is not an easy task to 
establish consensus on this issue. 
A true culture of preparedness exists in Israel.  If America desires to create a 
“profound and enduring” change to a culture of preparedness, is Israel the model?   
Israelis believe in talking about terrorism with children and accepting terrorism as a part 
of life.  Israeli citizens are considered “psychologically” prepared for terrorism and the 
Israeli government stresses the concept of resiliency in all preparedness efforts.  Is 
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America willing to go that far? In looking to create a culture of preparedness and resilient 
communities throughout the United States, should preparedness include psychologically 
preparing for terrorism? 
This research seeks to identify the factors that motivate citizens to get prepared 
and evaluates several factors that seem to motivate individuals to take action (such as 
fear, sense of civic pride or civic duty) and whether sustained efforts centered on specific 
motivating factors will create a transformation in preparedness.  Barriers to action are 
also addressed.  Central to this research is an evaluation of several concepts from 
sociology, psychology, and marketing which can be used to effectively motivate 
Americans to action.  In constructing a national effort, a “one-size-fits-all campaign” will 
not work in the urban areas of America.  For example, using fear based messages have 
been shown to work with some groups, while other groups may react poorly to these 
types of messages. The use of fear in messaging requires a delicate balance and a full 
understanding of the impact of fear as a motivator.  The concept of mortality salience is 
important, as human beings tend to avoid upsetting issues.   
Given the high number of immigrants, socio-economic factors, and educational 
differences in a large urban population, finding a single motivating factor is difficult.  
The research identifies effective means of reaching/influencing large segments of a major 
American city, and reveals that significant further research is needed in this area.  This 
thesis also evaluates methods by which the country can create a culture of preparedness 
by assessing other effective cultural changes implemented in the past twenty years and 
leading to behavior modification or other pro-active conduct on the part of citizens.  This 
includes case studies in the area of social marketing and cause marketing, including those 
aimed at increasing seat belt usage and breast cancer awareness, which resulted in 
measurable changes in human behavior and a marked cultural shift.  In seeking to 
identify the elements of a model program, the research looks at the applicability of social 





recently released a new study which develops a new “Personal Behavior Change Model 
for Disaster Preparedness.”8  This is also discussed in the context of successful 
campaigns to change human behavior. 
The types of messages and the need to identify appropriate and effective 
messengers are also studied. Faith in government is a critical component of the overall 
citizen preparedness effort.  Understanding the audience and who is best equipped to 
address that audience is the key to success.  The research suggests that government may 
not be the right messenger.   The research also recognizes that a preparedness gap exists, 
based on socio-economic differences, which presents a particular challenge to 
preparedness efforts. 
This research reviews what needs to be done in creating a model for urban areas 
in structuring effective, robust and multi-layered public education and preparedness 
efforts.  The research concludes that creating a culture of preparedness faces two 
immense obstacles: (1) finding an effective message to reach the citizenry (to motivate 
citizens and to overcome barriers to preparedness) and developing programs that change 
human behavior in a sustainable way; and (2) changing the attitude of government, at all 
levels, toward citizen preparedness from that of an under-funded aside to a vital link in 
the forward deployment of assets to provide assistance in the seventy-two hour gap 
before meaningful outside assistance arrives, and viewing prepared citizens as partners 
and a force multiplier in response and recovery efforts.  Despite myriad government 
reports and strategies calling for a focus on citizen preparedness, budgets, staffing, and 
funding do not reflect a serious commitment to this most important issue. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND PRESENTATION 
The research presented here consisted of a variety of sources, including the 
personal experience of the author as an emergency manager in a large urban area, 
participation on national committees involving citizen preparedness issues, interviews 
                                                 
8 ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, Office of Community Preparedness,  Office of 
Grants and Training, Department of Homeland Security, “Citizen Corps Personal  Behavior Change Model 
for Disaster Preparedness,” Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness 
Research, Issue 4 (Fall 2006). 
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and discussions with subject matter experts, substantial literature review, and analysis of 
textbooks, studies, polls, preparedness campaigns, budgets and policy documents, as well 
as case studies of past successful persuasion campaigns to change human behavior.  
In approaching the question of whether America can create a culture of 
preparedness, a variety of issues were encountered.  The research revealed that before 
any program can have any success, two substantial issues need to be addressed.  First, 
government (at all levels) must take the issue of citizen preparedness seriously. Second, 
substantial research will need to be conducted on the best way to reach the American 
people, looking to social marketing, cause marketing, sociology and psychology (among 
other fields and areas of study) as well as finding the right messages and messengers. 
Current efforts are not working to create profound and enduring change.    
The thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter I introduces and 
establishes the importance of the research question and the need for dramatic change in 
current efforts with regard to policy priorities, funding, and the vision needed to create a 
culture of preparedness.  If the public remains unprepared for disaster, the images of 
thousands of desperate citizens stranded after Hurricane Katrina will likely be repeated 
with the next major event, as an overloaded  first responder community struggles during 
the acute seventy-two hour phase of response and recovery, prior to the arrival of outside 
assistance.  
Chapter II addresses the question of whether government at all levels takes citizen 
preparedness seriously.  It begins with the stated importance of citizen preparedness at 
the federal level in national strategies, directives, and the Townsend Report, speeches and 
presentations by senior DHS officials over the last several years and the narratives that 
accompany each fiscal year budget, the Budget-in-Brief, appearing to set citizen 
preparedness as an important goal.  A comparison of funding for citizen preparedness 
programs versus funding for other homeland security priority programs offers clear 
evidence that the rhetoric of speeches, strategies, and reports emphasizing the importance 
of citizen preparedness does not match with the abysmal funding provided to citizen 
preparedness programs each year.  The research also demonstrates that official 
organizations representing local, state, and county governments (National Governors 
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Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and National Association of Counties) do not 
have official policy statements prioritizing citizen preparedness, or endorsing the creation 
of a culture of preparedness.   
Myriad studies conducted over the past several years all arrive at the same general 
conclusion: Americans are woefully unprepared for disaster.  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
did little to change things.  Chapter III analyses a variety of studies and reports (a 
modified literature review) and examines the reasons Americans cite in not preparing for 
disasters.  The research in this chapter supports the thesis by providing overwhelming 
evidence demonstrating the problem: current efforts to increase citizen preparedness are 
largely ineffective.  Effectively engaging the public on preparedness issues is a complex 
and challenging endeavor, requiring significant further research and substantial 
investment. 
Chapter IV explores the need for clarity in defining and measuring preparedness.  
Research shows there is no consistent or generally accepted tool for measuring 
preparedness and no consistent definition of preparedness.  Three entities have suggested 
measuring tools and definitions; each is at a different stage of development and each is 
explored and discussed in this chapter.  This research also raises an important concern: is 
the country preparing for the psychological impact of terrorism through preparedness 
programs (largely absent from “all hazards” preparedness discussions), and is there a 
need for programs to embrace this issue to create a resilient population, placing 
psychological preparedness within the definition of what it means to be prepared. 
Chapter V provides insight on one model for a culture of preparedness: Israel.  A 
variety of sources are utilized, including some powerful statements by Israeli citizens 
which exemplify the internalization of a culture of preparedness, with a sense of 
resiliency and the psychological preparedness for terrorism.  This chapter provides some 
applicable “lessons learned” and policy considerations for developing a culture of 
preparedness in America. 
Chapter VI addresses what it will take to reach the American public.  As a result 
of this research, there are several issues discussed in developing general ideas for 
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effective campaigns.  First and foremost is the need for consistency of message and a 
fusing of information and disciplines and industries – from academia to marketing to 
behavioral sciences – to arrive at a comprehensive program.  There are pockets of success 
and excellent work occurring throughout the country, but not as a unified whole, backed 
by strong vision, strong funding, and strong academic and scientific assistance. This has 
led to the inevitable situation where dedicated persons and groups are working in 
stovepipes and silos to solve an extremely complex issue. A variety of successful 
behavior change programs are examined through case studies and the applicability of 
social marketing and cause marketing concepts to citizen preparedness programs 
(including the successful efforts to improve seatbelt usage and the pink ribbon campaign 
to promote breast cancer awareness) is evaluated.   
Chapter VII applies the concepts presented in the book Blue Ocean Strategy to the 
issue of citizen preparedness.  This best selling book suggests a strategy for looking at 
challenges in an entirely new way, one that can be applied to both sides of the research 
question.  First, the concept of retooling and overhauling how we reach the American 
people, in creating new customers of the preparedness message, is informative.  Second, 
Blue Ocean Strategy is instructive in how to effect a change in government mindset (at 
all levels) to embrace citizen preparedness as a critically important component of 
response and recovery efforts and to see citizen preparedness as a forward deployment of 
assets.  The research examined in this chapter also underscores the absence of defined 
roles for federal, state and local government in preparing citizens for disaster. 
In conclusion, Chapter VIII provides several areas for further study.  Based on the 
findings of the thesis research, the conclusion provides important steps in creating a 
foundation upon which to build a culture of preparedness and summarizes major changes 
that must occur before the creation of a culture of preparedness is possible. 
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II. GOVERNMENT VIEWS CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS AS 
ESSENTIAL BUT DOES IT TAKE IT SERIOUSLY? 
A. CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS: RECOGNIZED IN NATIONAL REPORTS, 
NATIONAL STRATEGIES, DIRECTIVES, AND KATRINA’S LESSONS 
LEARNED AS ESSENTIAL 
Citizen education and citizen preparedness is a significant issue and a part of the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security.9  The central question is whether this area of 
homeland security has been truly embraced as a national effort, even though it has been 
identified time and time again as a critical part of the nation’s ability to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism or other catastrophic events.  The Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 
Report) recognized that individual citizens need to take responsibility for their survival 
should a disaster strike.10  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 calls for citizen 
preparedness.11  The Target Capabilities List identifies Citizen Participation and Citizen 
Preparedness as an essential capability.12   
The Townsend Report represents the first time a federal report has positioned 
citizen preparedness and education as a true focal point and full partner in creating a 
“national state of preparedness.”13  This report identifies “two immediate priorities for 
this transformation: (1) Define and implement a comprehensive National Preparedness 
System; and (2) Foster a new, robust culture of preparedness. ”14 
                                                 
9 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 2002).    
10 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2004), 318. 
11 United States, White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ HSPD 8: National 
Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 17, 2003). 
12 United States Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List (version 2.0), 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005). 
13 Townsend Report, 66. 
14 Ibid. 
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The Townsend Report identifies citizen preparedness as a key to the 
transformation of homeland security. 
Leadership at all levels will be essential in helping transform citizen 
preparedness.  First, responsible public officials at the Federal, State, and 
local levels as well as prominent national figures should begin a public 
dialogue that emphasizes common themes regarding the importance of 
citizen preparedness.  DHS should continue to build upon those programs 
and institutions that already work…But more needs to be done…15 
A robust, multi-faceted citizen preparedness effort was a “lesson learned” in this report. 
The Federal government, working with State, local, NGO, and private 
sector partners, should combine the various disparate citizen preparedness 
programs into a single national campaign to promote and strengthen 
citizen and community preparedness.  This campaign should be developed 
in a manner that appeals to the American people, incorporates the 
endorsement and support of prominent national figures, focuses on the 
importance of individual and community responsibility for all-hazard 
disaster preparedness, provides meaningful and comprehensive education, 
training and exercise opportunities applicable to all facets of the American 
population, and establishes specialized preparedness programs for those 
less able to provide for themselves during disasters such as children, the 
ill, the disabled, and the elderly.16 
In recognizing that “more needs to be done” a clear understanding of who is and 
who is not prepared – AND WHY – is essential to any further national efforts.  The 
“lessons learned” in Katrina with regard to citizen preparedness and education generated 
seven recommendations.17  The national effort to improve citizen preparedness must look 
carefully at the sociology, psychology, marketing, and messaging that went into the 
successful or model campaigns cited in the Townsend report as examples to follow, 
identifying the key factors of success.  Pinpointing the “tipping point” for the successful 
campaigns leading to societal change (Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, seat belt usage, 
etc.) is a critical factor in effectively using these models for citizen preparedness efforts.   
 
                                                 
15 Townsend Report, 80.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid., 121 (Recommendation numbers 119-125).  
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B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE PRIORITIZING 
CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS 
In the wake of 9/11 President Bush made citizen preparedness a priority, as 
evidenced by an executive order issued November 9, 2001.18  In a variety of contexts, 
Secretary Ridge referred to citizen preparedness as a priority:   
That’s why, when we laid down our key priorities for the department, they 
were public priorities, they were goals, aspirations and we wanted the 
world to know what we were seeking to achieve.  Those priorities 
included more prepared and better prepared communities…we’ve nurtured 
a culture of citizen preparedness.19   
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff has 
addressed the importance of citizen preparedness as well.  In June of 2006, while 
addressing the Brookings Institution, he concluded his remarks by emphasizing citizen 
preparedness.   
A last plea on a personal level, preparedness at the end of the day, no 
matter how well it’s done at the government level, or at the community 
level, or at the business level requires individual contribution.  It is an 
article of faith among people in emergency management that people ought 
to be prepared to sustain themselves for 48 to 72 hours until help comes.  
It’s an article of faith that you ought to have a plan so if a family is 
separated when an event happens you know where to go.  It’s an article of 
faith that when people tell you to evacuate, local officials, you should take 
that instruction and act upon it. 
If able-bodied people don’t take care of themselves, then what they’re 
going to do is distract the responders who would otherwise be out in the 
field helping those who couldn’t help themselves either because they were 
too poor, or they were too sick, or they were too infirm.  And therefore, 
I’ve kind of made a plea that it is a civic responsibility for the able-bodied 
to make sure that they have done what they need to do to prepare so that  
 
 
                                                 
18 President George W. Bush, Citizen Preparedness in War on Terrorism Executive Order 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, November 9, 2001). 
19 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security 
Tom Ridge at the Council for Excellence in Government,” Press Release, January 28, 2005, www.dhs.gov 
(accessed March 15, 2007). 
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we can turn in the first instance to those who can’t help themselves and 
who have therefore a right to expect government will step in to assist 
them.20 
DHS views the country’s preparedness as requiring individual contribution from the 
citizenry.  It is viewed as an article of faith that able-bodied persons should be prepared 
and to know that it is their civic duty and responsibility. 
In September of 2006, Under Secretary for Preparedness George Foresman 
addressed the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations.  In his 
statement he describes citizen preparedness efforts at DHS.   
We have made considerable progress as a Department in strengthening 
and uniting the pieces that collectively encompass what must become a 
“culture of preparedness.” To many, preparedness is simply a name on an 
organizational chart, or a step in the cycle of emergency management. It 
must be more. Secretary Chertoff said in announcing the Second Stage 
Review that in the broadest sense, preparedness is the full range of 
capabilities in the Department of Homeland Security. This guides our 
efforts working every day to internally connect the full capabilities of the 
Department better, including with our external partners. But there is more 
to be done. For starters, individual responsibility is a big piece to this big 
picture. 
The Department approaches individual responsibility from the ground up 
and the top down. The Citizen Corps program, established under the USA 
Freedom Corps initiative shortly after 9/11, operates in every state and all 
6 U.S. territories at the community level to empower every American to 
take responsibility for his or her safety and security—as well as that of 
their neighbors. This is important. A better prepared America will be 
achieved when government, the private sector, and the American people 
each do their part. 
In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security and the Advertising 
Council launched Ready, a national public service advertising campaign 
designed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to 
emergencies including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks. The 
goal of the campaign is to get the public involved and ultimately to  
 
                                                 
20 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security 
Michael Chertoff at the Brookings Institution,” Press Release, June 1, 2006, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 
10, 2007). 
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increase the level of basic preparedness across the nation. We understand 
that government is expected to act decisively in the face of adversity. The 
American people must as well.21 
The concept of citizen preparedness as an individual’s responsibility is reinforced 
and the importance of citizen preparedness is emphasized as a large part of the whole 
picture of preparedness.  The Ready campaign is viewed as a way to help Americans “act 
decisively” in the face of adversity.  
In addressing the issue of citizen preparedness, DHS has looked at the great 
progress of Citizen Corps in establishing thousands of councils across the United States 
and a substantial number of partnerships with other organizations to reach the American 
public.  In addressing the Subcommittee, testimony was provided to show the progress of 
citizen preparedness efforts, measured by the department as of June of 2006. 
This past June, a study conducted by the Ad Council on behalf of the 
Department’s Ready Campaign recorded significant positive increases in 
preparedness behaviors by individual Americans. It found: 
• From 2005 to 2006, the proportion of Americans who said they have 
taken any steps to prepare for an emergency rose 10 points, from 45% to 
55%  
• 91% of respondents said it is “very” or “somewhat” important for all 
Americans to be prepared for emergencies  
There were also several notable increases in key preparedness behaviors 
from 2004 to 2006: 
• Put together an emergency kit: 44% in 2004 to 54% in 2006 
• Created a family emergency plan: 32% in 2004 to 39% in 2006 
• Searched for info (sic) about preparedness: 28% in 2004 to 40% in 2006. 
While there is still a long way to go to ensure that all Americans have 
taken steps to prepare, there are strong indications of progress. Mr.  
 
                                                 
21 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Statement of George W. Foresman Under 
Secretary for Preparedness before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on 
Appropriations,” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, September 7, 2006) www.dhs.gov 
(accessed March 5, 2007). 
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Chairman, as buoyed as we are with the progress we have made among the 
American people, we recognize that our nation’s preparedness is a shared 
national responsibility.22 
Citizen preparedness surveys throughout 2004, 2005, and 2006 are not consistent 
with these findings, particularly in the area of Americans placing “importance” on the 
issue of preparedness.  Numerous surveys indicate something less than “a strong 
indication of progress,” as do statements by FEMA Director Paulison in November of 
2006 and March of 2007, infra.  While Ready, Citizen Corps and the Ad Council are 
engaging in laudable and worthwhile efforts, study after study reveals that Americans are 
not preparing.  As discussed in Chapter III, a variety of other studies indicate that levels 
of preparedness fall far short of these numbers.  In addition, as discussed in Chapter IV, 
there is no defined or agreed upon definition of preparedness by which to measure 
success.   
In speaking at the National Grants and Training Conference, Secretary Chertoff 
again reiterated the importance of citizen preparedness in his closing remarks. 
Let me conclude by saying something which I know you all know:  
Preparedness is not at the end of the day just a government responsibility.  
The government does not own most of the assets in the country.  We don’t 
operate a business, and we don’t employ most of the people.  That’s why 
it’s a civic duty and a personal responsibility for individuals and private 
businesses all across the country to do their part in personal preparedness.  
We have to continue to promote a culture of preparedness through Citizen 
Corps, which has at this point close to 2,100 councils in every state and 
which is training hundreds of thousands of people in communities all over 
the country in preparedness… 
We also have to continue to promote preparedness through a robust media 
campaign known as our Ready Campaign.  I want to tell you that the 
Ready Campaign has generated almost $600 million in donated media, and  
the website has received more than 1.9 billion hits and 24.3 million are 
                                                 
22 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Statement of George W. Foresman Under 
Secretary for Preparedness before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on 
Appropriations,” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, September 7, 2006) www.dhs.gov 
(accessed March 5, 2007). 
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unique visitors.  That is getting the message out so people can do what 
they have to do to put themselves in a position to deal with emergencies.23 
As stated in the introduction, the Pew Research Center’s News Interest Index 
found that Americans were paying great attention to Katrina; other surveys show they 
also pay attention to information provided by government.  But while surveys and studies 
show Americans may be listening and paying attention, most are not taking action to 
prepare. Much has been accomplished and many efforts are afoot in the area of citizen 
preparedness. However, actual budgets – as opposed to valuation of donated media and 
late night public service announcements – are a better indication of what the federal 
government is spending on the issue of citizen preparedness.  This is discussed more 
thoroughly in this Chapter, Section C, infra.   
In November of 2006, FEMA Director Paulison24 appeared before the National 
Press Club to discuss improvements to FEMA and a new vision for the organization.  In 
his remarks, he highlighted citizen preparedness as an “urgent need” and also highlighted 
the importance of creating a culture of preparedness. 
I believe many Americans have little awareness of citizens’ personal roles 
and responsibilities, along with state and local jurisdictions, in the 
emergency management process. 
Now, part of this is our fault. We in FEMA simply haven’t done as good 
a job as we should explaining our roles and responsibilities, managing 
expectations and communicating the urgent need for personal 
preparedness. Although FEMA can—and will do a better job of framing 
our respective roles and responsibilities within an emergency management 
context, I want to make it crystal clear that every American has a part to 
play in achieving national preparedness. [Emphasis added.] 
…The extent to which any one of us is victimized by disaster is 
determined, at least in part, by how well—or how poorly—we personally 
prepare ourselves and our loved ones for disaster…So, what does personal 
                                                 
23 Michael Chertoff, “Keynote Address by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff to the 
2006 Grants and Training National Conference,” Washington, D.C., November 28, 2006, www.dhs.gov 
(accessed March 2, 2007). 
24 This was prior to the restructuring of the Department of Homeland Security and the change in 
position of the Director of FEMA to Administrator status.  
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preparation mean?  This means having a plan, understanding that plan, and 
exercising that plan; and, It (sic) also means having adequate homeowners 
and flood insurance to recover after disasters strike. America must 
continue to develop a culture of preparedness.25 [Emphasis added.] 
DHS senior officials again stress the importance of personal preparedness, framing the 
issue as one of civic duty and responsibility.  
In February of 2007, Secretary Chertoff addressed the issue of citizen 
preparedness before the National Emergency Managers Association.  In concluding his 
speech he reiterated the importance of citizen preparedness. “Finally, as you all know, 
we’re going to have to still bang the drum for preparedness in all of our communities – at 
the family level, at the business level, and at the individual level.  Everybody 
understands, everybody in this room sure understands, that help is not going to be there in 
the first hour.  … So this is what I call civic responsibility, and I think it’s one which we 
want to continue to emphasize.”  During the question and answer phase, Secretary 
Chertoff responded to a question about citizen preparedness and offered his thoughts on 
what emergency managers should be telling citizens on the issue of individual 
preparedness: 
This is actually a very complicated question, because it’s a balance 
between giving them information that is important, and not so overloading 
them that they throw their hands up in despair and therefore don’t do 
anything… 
A second really important part is the planning piece, getting people to 
understand they’ve got to make their own plans, like where to meet if 
we’re separated; where do we go if our house is somehow inaccessible to 
us… 
You know the basic things you need to have, in terms of radios and 
whatnot.  The hardest piece, I think, is going to be this – and it’s 
particularly true if we get something unusual like a pandemic flu – we’re  
 
 
                                                 
25 United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
“Director Paulison Lays Out Vision for a ‘New FEMA’,” speech given at the National Press Club, 
Washington, DC, November 30, 2006, www.fema.gov (accessed March 5, 2007). 
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going to have to get people conditioned, but also work with the media to 
get a responsible chain of public communication about what steps to take 
in the case of an emergency…26 
The statement “we’re going to have to get people conditioned” may be the first glimpse 
of moving from citizen preparedness as a “civic duty” to citizen preparedness as 
“resiliency” and “psychological preparation” for widespread disaster (pandemic flu) and 
terrorism. 
One of the more recent statements from senior DHS officials regarding the 
importance of citizen preparedness was made on March 9, 2007, by FEMA Director 
David Paulison, Under Secretary for Federal Emergency Management, before the House 
Appropriations Committee on Homeland Security.  In discussing the mission of FEMA, 
citizen preparedness was framed as an integral part of disaster preparedness and response.  
FEMA’s mission, Director to Paulison stated, “is to help protect the nation from disasters. 
We help America mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all-hazards 
disasters. [But] FEMA cannot and does not do this alone.”  Director Paulison went on to 
point out that the National Response Plan (NRP) is a map, directing federal, tribal, state, 
and local activities before, during and after and disaster.  The NRP “is built on the 
assumption that incidents should be managed at the lowest possible geographic, 
organizational, and jurisdictional level possible.”  For this reason, Paulison argued, 
“Individuals and our partners at all levels of government must be part of the effort.” 
Each individual citizen and family has a role to play in their own response  
In the past, senior DHS and FEMA leaders have, essentially, been mocked 
for the regular emphasis we placed on telling people to prepare themselves 
and their homes. We have repeatedly stressed the need to have water, 
rations, battery powered radios and other emergency goods on hand and to 
develop a family plan for evacuation. FEMA needs to get back to this 
basic message. When roads are flooded, bridges destroyed and the 
environment is, frankly, dangerous, people need to remember the old Boy 
Scout motto: “Be Prepared.”  
                                                 
26 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff at the 
National Emergency Management Association Mid-Year Conference,” Press Release, February 12, 2007, 
www.dhs.gov (accessed March 1, 2007). 
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There will always be some who are physically or financially unable to 
make these preparations – and this is where government must move 
quickly to fill the gap. However, most Americans need to be educated on 
the steps they can take to avoid relying on the government for short term 
essentials….Ladies and gentlemen, too many Americans still do not 
plan for disaster. 
According to a poll conducted for a major news magazine last summer, 
only 16% of Americans say they are personally “very well” prepared 
should a natural disaster or public emergency strike their community.  
More than half said they had taken no preparations such as those 
recommended by former Secretary Ridge and which my family makes 
every year. Even those who lived through Katrina personally are not 
learning all they could from their experience, with 24% saying they are 
not prepared for another disaster. 27 
These numbers are more in keeping with the numerous nationwide assessments and 
surveys showing dismal numbers for citizen preparedness, and may signal recognition by 
DHS that citizen preparedness numbers have not improved since Katrina.28 
In addressing the Committee, FEMA Director Paulison outlined a “new day” for 
FEMA and the changes made at the agency in the wake of Katrina. “FEMA has learned 
from the past and is prepared to move forward… Before Katrina and Rita, FEMA 
focused on preparing our own resources to respond to a disaster,” Director Paulison 
admitted. “We did not focus on preparing communities to make plans and preparations 
before disasters strike nor on the role of tribal, State and local governments afterwards. 
This was a mistake that will not be repeated.”29 This shift in focus is an important first 
step in preparing communities.   
                                                 
27 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Opening Statement of R. David Paulison, 
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Under Secretary for Federal Emergency Management, 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security before the U. S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security,” Friday March 9, 2007, 2, emphasis in original, 
www.dhs.gov (accessed March 15, 2007). 
28 The numbers cited by Director Paulison were from a TIME Magazine poll conducted by telephone 
between August 9-10, 2006 among a national random sample of 1,003 adults, age 18 and older, throughout 
the United States. 
29 Paulison, “Opening Statement,” 4. 
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According to the testimony, as part of the changes at FEMA and the DHS, a new 
Directorate of National Preparedness was established within FEMA.  There are two 
divisions under National Preparedness:  Readiness, Prevention and Planning (RPP) and 
the National Integration Center (NIC).  Citizen Corps, once within the Office of Grants 
and Training, was transferred to RPP.30  The Ready campaign was not discussed as part 
of the remarks.  The Ready campaign was not transferred to FEMA in the restructuring of 
the department.  It is housed in the Office of Public Affairs, a separate DHS entity with a 
separate reporting structure.  The efficacy of housing Citizen Corps and Ready in separate 
areas is discussed infra at Chapter VI, Section B, Stovepipes and Silos.  
Many improvements at FEMA are highlighted as part of the statement to the 
Committee.  They range from disaster operations, improved disaster assistance, major 
changes in logistics and business processes, to communications issues.  In looking toward 
a large increase in the FEMA budget, the FEMA Director stated:  “The Nation needs a 
strong FEMA; but that cannot be achieved without purposeful new investments.”31  The 
funding for FY 2008 is described as an “unprecedented budget”32 as “FEMA will have 
budget authority over more than $9 billion.”33 
However, in discussing the value of the new FEMA programs and the budget to 
carry out bold new initiatives and major reform efforts, there were only two statements 
referring to the need to create a culture of preparedness.34  In setting forth the core 
competencies that FEMA will build in its bold new vision, the following are enumerated: 
(1) Incident Management, (2) Operational Planning, (3) Disaster Logistics, (4)  
 
 
                                                 
30 Paulison, “Opening Statement,” 10.  According to DHS officials interviewed on January 29, 2008, 
FEMA is now its own agency within the Department of Homeland Security, headed by an Administrator.  
The National Preparedness Directorate has four divisions: Preparedness, Policy, Planning and Analysis, the 
National Integration Center, Community Preparedness (which houses only Citizen Corps), and the 
Technical Hazards Division. 
31 Ibid., 12. 
32 Ibid., 15. 
33 Ibid., 16, emphasis in original. 
34 Ibid., 15 and 17. 
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Emergency Communications, (5) Service to Disaster Victims, (6) Continuity Programs, 
(7) Public Disaster Communications, (8) Integrated Preparedness, (9) Hazard 
Mitigation.35   
Citizen Preparedness – or creating a “national culture of personal preparedness” – 
is mentioned, but not highlighted as a major budget item, despite the extensive opening 
remarks focusing on the importance of citizen preparedness.   Citizen preparedness and 
building this “national culture of personal preparedness” appears to be grouped under the 
core competency of “Public Disaster Communications” with $1 million in funding for 
this and other significant efforts. 
… nearly $1 million will be set aside for Public Disaster Communications. 
FEMA will assume a leadership position as coordinator of all hazards 
messaging to the American public during peacetime and disasters, leading 
the national campaign for greater personal and community preparedness. 
Specifically, the funding requested will support FEMA’s efforts to 
strengthen interagency incident communications systems and capabilities 
to ensure coordinated public information efforts across all hazards. By 
working one-on-one with State, local, and major urban area jurisdictions 
to build knowledge and capability for public information efforts and 
conducting planning, training, and exercises to ensure integrated crisis 
communication strategies and messaging FEMA will facilitate public 
discourse, outreach, and adoption of a national culture of personal 
preparedness and mitigation that will have a direct impact on reducing 
the loss of life and property. Through effective public communications 
and outreach programs, FEMA will ensure the general public is 
provided with and has access to vital disaster preparedness and 
planning information including those with special needs and 
multilingual and multicultural populations.36 [Emphasis added.] 
Embracing citizen preparedness and the need to create a “national culture of 
personal preparedness” will require the same “purposeful new investments” needed to 
build a strong FEMA, far exceeding the current budget request of $15 million for Citizen 
Corps.37  In addition, although not part of FEMA, the Ready campaign FY 2008 budget 
request of $2.12 million, down from an enacted budget of $3.63 million in FY 2007, 
                                                 
35 Paulison, “Opening Statement,” 10. 
36 Ibid., 17, emphasis added.  
37 See Table 1, infra. 
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represents a substantial decrease from the previous fiscal year.38  Budgets and their 
impact are discussed more thoroughly in Section C, infra. 
Despite addressing the issue of citizen preparedness as a priority in a number of 
venues and speeches, poll after poll shows that Americans remain unprepared.  DHS has 
chosen September as Preparedness Month for the country to coincide with the 
remembrance of the 9/11 attacks.  Focusing on preparedness as part of one calendar 
month each year is not an effective effort in preparedness for the nation.  A sustained 
effort is required.   
DHS has set forth its Ready preparedness campaign which has done an excellent 
job with minimal staffing and funding.  The Ready website contains interesting and 
useful items for citizens, parents, businesses and municipalities to use.  The website has 
impressive numbers for unique visitors and Ready has also done some excellent 
advertising campaigns in concert with the Ad Council.  However, as of summer 2007, 
there are only two staff members assigned to Ready for the entire nation and Ready 
operates on a minimal budget. 
Citizen Corps has been working to evaluate national studies and to develop the 
key motivators that move people to action.   
Citizen Corps is determined to understand what motivates and hinders 
people from taking action toward personal preparedness, and to have the 
information necessary to develop messages and programs that will 
effectively increase awareness and household/community preparedness. 
The determination to unravel this complex subject has created a strong 
demand for innovation.39 
A “demand for innovation” in the way in which we approach citizen preparedness is 
essential.  Current efforts are clearly not penetrating into the American psyche.  As a result of 
poor funding, evidencing a lack of serious commitment to the issue of citizen preparedness, 
there is no electrifying force driving citizen preparedness at the national level, no unifying 
                                                 
38 See Table 2, infra. 
39 ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, Office of Community Preparedness, Office of 
Grants and Training, Department of Homeland Security, “Methodological Considerations and Key 
Findings in Preparedness Research,” Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen 
Preparedness Research, Issue 1 (Summer 2005).  
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effort to make individual preparedness a top priority for Americans, and no visible, 
concerted national effort to create a sustained and steady stream of preparedness 
messages and programs aimed at making preparedness a part of the social fabric of 
America. We are not creating the social contagion that leads to the “profound and 
enduring” change needed to establish a culture of preparedness.   
C. DO BUDGETS AND BUDGET REQUESTS REFLECT ACTUAL 
PRIORITIES? 
As Citizen Corps moves toward new models in creating a culture of preparedness 
and recognizes the “demand for innovation,” funding for such efforts appears to be 
heading in the opposite direction.  Citizen preparedness is not on a level playing field 
with other pressing needs in preparing the country for disasters and terrorism.  Citizen 
preparedness is on the losing end of the budget year after year. Yet, during that crucial 
time gap from the onset of a major event and the arrival of federal assets, the forward 
deployment of relief assets in homes and communities, and cadres of trained citizens 
assisting fellow citizens, will prove invaluable.   
A review of the Citizen Corps budget from the inception of DHS in March of 
2003 through the FY2008 budget request (February of 2007) provides an interesting 
glimpse into the priority placed by DHS on citizen preparedness.  For a massive, 
nationwide effort to create a culture of preparedness, minimal funding has been given to 
the effort of citizen preparedness, compared to the overall budget for DHS.  In 2003, 
Citizen Corps received $20 million from an overall DHS budget of $31.18 billion. In 
2004, Citizen Corps received $40 million from and overall budget of $36.54 billion.  In 
2005, the program received $15 million from an overall DHS budget of $38.51 billion.  
In 2006, Citizen Corps received $20 million from an overall budget of $40.3 billion, and 
in 2007, the program received only $15 million from a budget of $42.8 billion.  Most 
telling, for FY 2008, only $15 million was requested for the upcoming fiscal year, the 
lowest amount ever requested for the program, and despite much higher requests in 
previous years.  In 2007, for example, $35 million was requested, and $50 million was 
requested in both 2005 and 2006.  An average of only 37% of requested funding for 
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Citizen Corps for FY 2005, 2006, and 2007 budgets was enacted.40   Thus, if recent 
trends hold true, it is conceivable that only $5.55 million (37%) of the current $15 million 
request will be enacted, signaling the lowest funding for citizen preparedness to date. 
(See Table 1, infra, for a year to year funding comparison for Citizen Corps.) 
Similarly, the Ready campaign will reach its lowest funding point ever in the FY 
2008 budget.  The Ready campaign began with its website and received funding from the 
Working Capital Fund (WCF) to support these efforts.  Ready does not have a line item 
in the budget and cobbles its budget together from three places: the Working Capital 
Fund, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (to support Ready business), and the Office 
of Public Affairs.  The funding from the Office of Infrastructure Protection will not 
continue going forward into FY 2008, leaving a $1.4 million gap in the Ready budget for 
FY 2008 and beyond.  This loss of funding represents an enormous loss (38%) to an 
overall yearly budget of approximately $3.6 million. (See Table 2, infra, showing year to 
year funding for Ready.)41 
The “Budget-in-Brief” document sets forth each year’s key accomplishments as 
well as the goals for the department in submitting its budget to Congress.  As with all 
budgets, the actual allocations and final budget are different than those in the proposed 
funding request.  A table at the end of this section shows the budget requests made by the 
department and the final allocation from Congress.  In addition, it compares Citizen 
Corps allocations to the overall Preparedness Grants Budget for state and local 
preparedness efforts provided by DHS (including the State Homeland Security Grant 
Program, Urban Area Security Initiative Program or UASI, Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program or LETPP and Metropolitan Medical Response System or MMRS) 
as well as a comparison of Citizen Corps to the overall DHS Budget.42 
                                                 
40 A cumulative $135 million was requested over the three fiscal years of 2005, 2006 and 2007 and a 
total of only $50 million – or 37% of overall requested amounts -- was enacted. 
41 Budget numbers derived from interview with Kristin Gossel, Director, Ready campaign, United 
States Department of Homeland Security, April 3, 2007. 
42 It should be noted that Citizen Corps was created in 2002 by the President as part of the USA 
Freedom Corps.  It was part of FEMA until October of 2003, when it was transferred to the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness.  It has now been transferred back to FEMA as part of the reorganization of the 
Department of Homeland Security.   
 26
1. The FY 2008 Budget Goal: Building a Nimble and Effective 
Emergency Response System and Culture of Preparedness – What 
about Citizen Preparedness? 
Despite the fact that Hurricane Katrina occurred on August 29, 2005, and the 
release of the Townsend Report occurred in February of 2006, it has taken until the FY 
2008 budget preparation cycle in Spring of 2007 to embrace the actual words: “Culture of 
Preparedness.”43  Unfortunately, in a word search of the 2008 Budget-in-Brief, developed 
and issued by DHS, Citizen Corps is never mentioned (in a 124 page document, outlining 
an overall DHS budget of $46.4 billion).44  The Ready campaign is mentioned twice in 
footnotes, one setting forth its move to Public Affairs, and the other with reference to its 
budget ($1.5 million).45   
The 2008 Budget-in-Brief begins with the highlights of the department’s 
accomplishments – which are many and impressive – of the prior year and looks toward 
the same goals in future years.  There are five major goals set forth:  Continue to Protect 
our Nation from Dangerous People, Continue to Protect our Nation from Dangerous 
Goods, Protect Critical Infrastructure, Build a Nimble and Effective Emergency 
Response System and Culture of Preparedness, Strengthen and Unify DHS Operations 
and Management.    
Under the goal of “Build a Nimble and Effective Emergency Response System and 
Culture of Preparedness,” DHS looks to many accomplishments of the past year, 
particularly at FEMA, and at its new and aggressive goals for NIMS integration, 
improved response time (to twenty-five hours after a disaster), improved recovery 
assistance, and improvements in other significant capabilities (such as logistics).  Citizen 
preparedness efforts are not mentioned under this goal and are not highlighted.  The 
                                                 
43 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet:  U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Announces Eight Percent Increase in Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request,” February 5, 2007, 
www.dhs.gov (accessed March 3, 2007).  See also Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief 
Fiscal Year 2008, pages 4, 13, 70, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 5, 2007). 
44 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008. 
45 Ibid., 130 and 87. 
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highlights and accomplishments are followed by a description of $2.6 billion for 
preparedness grants from the previous year as follows: 
DHS Awards $2.6 Billion for Preparedness: Included in this total, 
approximately $1.9 billion in Homeland Security Grant funds has been 
awarded to State and local governments for equipment, training, exercises, 
and various other measures designed to increase the level of security in 
communities across the Nation. Over $300 million in grants was awarded 
to strengthen the Nation’s ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, 
and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies 
that could impact this country’s critical infrastructure. Almost $300 
million was also distributed in fire grants to fire departments and EMS 
organizations to enhance their response capabilities and to more 
effectively protect the health and safety of the public and emergency 
response personnel with respect to fire and all other hazards.46 
Citizen preparedness is most likely part of this overall funding. Some Urban Areas may 
be developing citizen preparedness programs with federal UASI dollars and others may 
be using State Homeland Security Grant Program funding. However, this most important 
capability is not being treated as a separate, important, and pressing issue or priority.   
In the 2008 Budget-in-Brief, in looking prospectively at the goal of “Build a 
Nimble and Effective Emergency Response System and Culture of Preparedness,” it 
describes the importance of the goal: “maintaining a high state of readiness is crucial to 
the Department’s ability to deter and respond to acts of terror or other disasters. The 
following funding requests will strengthen the Department’s ability to build an effective 
emergency response system and culture of preparedness.”47  As part of the funding 
request the Department describes some critical factors in addressing this goal: 
• An increase of $100 million is requested for FEMA’s Vision Initiatives 
that will enable the agency to intensify and speed the development of core 
competencies that are central to achieving its disaster readiness, response 
and recovery mission. A combination of staffing increases, new 
technologies, and targeted investment in equipment and supplies, will 
increase FEMA’s mission capacity in the areas of Incident Management,  
 
                                                 
46 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008, 4, bold and italics
  in original.
       47 Ibid., 13.
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Operational Planning, Continuity Programs, Public Disaster 
Communications, Hazard Mitigation, Disaster Logistics, and Service to 
Disaster Victims.  
• A total of $3.2 billion will be available for state and local preparedness 
expenditures as well as assistance to firefighters in FY 2008...48  
A more detailed description of the efforts of DHS in creating a “national culture 
of personal preparedness” can be found under the 2008 initiatives for FEMA.  These 
efforts mirror exactly FEMA Director Paulison’s testimony before Congress in 
highlighting the $1 million for the core competency of “Public Disaster 
Communications” (cited in this chapter, Section B, supra.).  Here again, DHS is looking 
toward building a “national culture of personal preparedness” without significant 
funding.   
Reports prepared for Citizen Corps and DHS during 2005 and 2006 all underscore 
the enormity of the lack of personal preparedness in the country.49  The Townsend Report 
was emphatic about citizen preparedness as a priority in reshaping and revamping the 
emergency management structure in America.  Despite the repeated calls for prioritizing 
citizen preparedness, changing America in a “profound and enduring manner” and calling 
for a “demand in innovation” in the way in which the country approaches citizen 
preparedness, the lack of budget priority for citizen preparedness is clear.   Citizen Corps 
is at it lowest request for funding in the FY 2008 budget since the inception of the  
 
 
                                                 
48United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008, 13, emphasis in 
original.  
49 See ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, “Methodological Considerations” Citizen 
Preparedness Review: A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research, Issue 1 (Summer 2005); 
ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, Office of Community Preparedness, Office of Grants 
and Training, Department of Homeland Security, “A Post-Katrina Assessment,” Citizen Preparedness 
Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research, Issue 2: Spring 2006; ORC Macro, Macro 
International for Citizens Corps, Office of Community Preparedness, Office of Grants and Training, 
Department of Homeland Security, “Patterns in Current Research and Future Research Opportunities,” 
Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research, Issue 3 (Summer 
2006); ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, “Citizen Corps Personal Behavior Change 
Model for Disaster Preparedness,” Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen 
Preparedness Research, Issue 4 (Fall 2006).  
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department, and Ready stands to lose 38% of its funding, placing it at its lowest funding 
point since FY 2004. (See Tables 1 and 2, infra, for funding amounts for Citizen Corps 
and Ready.)   
2. The FY 2007 Budget:  Citizen Preparedness and Citizen Corps are 
Highlighted 
The 2007 Budget-in-Brief was released on February 6, 2006, seeking a $42.7 
billion budget request, just as the Townsend Report and other Congressional reports were 
emerging.  The concept of a culture of preparedness had not yet made its way into the 
priorities of DHS: 
The proposed budget request supports Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff’s agenda for a department that is organized around 
mission, eliminates duplication, and disciplined in risk management. 
Central to the department’s budget are five themes:  increasing overall 
preparedness, and strengthening the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA); strengthening border security and reforming 
immigration; enhancing transportation security through more efficient and 
secure system controls; improving information sharing; and strengthening 
the department’s organization in order to maximize performance.50  
In contrast to the 2008 Budget-in-Brief, this document recognizes the 
accomplishments and importance of the Citizen Corps, and the efforts of the Ad Council 
and Ready campaign as “key accomplishments.”  It should be noted that at this point in 
time, citizen preparedness programs fell under the Preparedness Directorate which 
existed “to spearhead the execution of a common preparedness mission.”51   
Community and Individual Preparedness. The Department’s Ready 
campaign, one of the most successful campaigns in the Ad Council 
history, topped $465 million in cumulative donated media support and 
more than 1.9 billion web site hits. The Department’s Citizen Corps 
program, which promotes grassroots community preparedness, expanded  
 
                                                 
50 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Announces Six Percent Increase In Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request,” February 6, 2006, 
www.dhs.gov (accessed March 10, 2007). 
51United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2007, 69, 
www.dhs.gov (accessed March 5, 2007). 
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its service to more than 69 percent of the total population to ensure that 
citizens are prepared and capable of handling disasters or threats of all 
kinds.52 
Under the accomplishments for the Preparedness Directorate, Grants and Training 
is highlighted, which does include (though not spelled out) monies for citizen 
preparedness. 
Grant funding awarded in 2005 totaled nearly 2.837 million [sic] including 
$885 million for high-density urban areas, $1.1 billion for basic formula 
grants, $386 million for law enforcement terrorism prevention grants, and 
$174 million for emergency management performance grants. Once FY 
2006 funds have been awarded, DHS will have provided nearly $18 billion 
in assistance to our nation’s emergency first responder communities since 
9/11.53 
Citizen Corps is set forth as a highlight and accomplishment for the Preparedness 
Directorate: 
Citizen Corps had tremendous growth at both the national and local levels 
in FY 2005. There are Citizen Corps Councils in 55 of the 56 states and 
territories. At the local level, Councils now serve nearly 70% of the U.S. 
population, and there are almost 2,050 Community Emergency Response 
Teams (CERT) programs nationwide.54 
In looking at the prospective budget year, under the goal of “Increase overall 
preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events either natural or manmade and 
strengthen FEMA,” the following bullets describe the planned activities. It is notable that 
the “general public” is mentioned in preparedness efforts:   
• A total of $50 million is requested for the National Preparedness 
Integration Program to execute Medical Preparedness 
Coordination, Catastrophic Planning, Emergency Communications 
Improvements, and Command and Control Alignment. 
                                                 
52 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2007, 4, bold and 
italics in original. 
53 Ibid., 71.
       54 Ibid.,  72. 
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• An increase of $294.6 million for the Targeted Capability 
Grants, for a total of $1.4 billion, will further the Department’s 
National Preparedness Goals. DHS has integrated additional risk-
based criteria into its grant-making formulas and created a standard 
for allocating future grants to state and local partners. Any federal, 
state or local entity that receives a homeland security grant must 
demonstrate how that funding contributes to the national 
preparedness goals and enhances specific abilities of the region 
and the nation. The Department will work with Federal, State, 
local, and tribal entities, their private and non-governmental 
partners, and the general public [emphasis added] to achieve and 
sustain risk-based target levels of ability to prevent, respond to, 
and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on 
lives, property and the economy.55 
Despite the highlighting of the importance of citizen preparedness and successes in the 
cited programs, in FY 2007 only $15 million (of $35 million requested) was allocated to 
Citizen Corps for this most important mission and $3.64 million was allocated to Ready 
from an overall DHS Budget of $42.8 billion.   
3. The FY 2006 Budget: A Good Year for Citizen Preparedness? 
In the 2006 Budget-in-Brief, citizen preparedness appeared to have a definite 
priority.  The FY 2006 budget request of $41.1 billion56 revolved around five major 
themes: Revolutionizing the Borders; Strengthening Law Enforcement; Improving 
National Preparedness and Response; Leveraging Technology; and Creating a 21st 
Century Department.57  In reviewing two full budget cycles since the department was 
established in March of 2003, DHS highlights “unprecedented levels of funding and 
resources to state, local and private sector partners to protect and prepare America’s 
                                                 
55 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2007, 6, emphasis in 
original, bold emphasis in original. 
56 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security FY 2006 Budget Request Includes Seven Percent Increase,” February 7, 2005, www.dhs.gov 
(accessed March 8, 2007). 
57 Ibid. 
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communities and individual citizens.”58 [Emphasis added.] In the furtherance of the 
budget goal of “Improving National Preparedness and Response” the Department states:  
No DHS effort has a greater scope, reach and impact upon the citizens 
across the U.S. than our efforts to prepare the nation to respond to major 
acts of terror or natural disaster. This Budget continues to support the 
President’s homeland security directives that establish the processes, 
methods, and means by which our nation prepares for and responds to 
critical incidents. Since its establishment, the Department has, and 
continues to provide, an unprecedented level of financial support to the 
state, local, and tribal governments and to certain private sector entities. 
The Budget builds on these efforts and proposes significant resources to 
provide direct financial assistance to our nation’s first responders, 
emergency managers, and citizen volunteers.59 [Emphasis added.] 
Most telling with regard to the prioritization of Citizen Corps is the line item in 
the proposed FY 2006 budget for Citizen Corps:  $50 Million.60  In proposing this large 
increase, “a 233 percent increase, or $35 million increase over FY 2005 enacted level of 
$15 million” the department stated “Citizen Corps will continue to work with local 
communities to prepare Americans for acts of terrorism and other major emergencies 
through the education and training of citizens.”61  The enacted funding for Citizen Corps 
for FY 2006 was only $20 million, and Ready received $3.9 million in the overall DHS 
budget of $40.34 billion. 
4. The FY 2005 Budget:  Citizen Corps Viewed as Priority for Funding 
The 2005 Budget- in-Brief requests $40.2 billion (inclusive of Bioshield) for 
DHS.  The goals of the department focused on Strengthening Border and Port Security, 
Enhancing Biodefense, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Improving 
Aviation Security, Support for State and Local Governments and First Responders, 
Enhancing Immigration and Enforcement, Eliminating the Immigration Backlog, 
                                                 
58 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2006, 1, 
www.dhs.gov (accessed March 8, 2007). 
59 Ibid., 10. 
       60 Ibid., 82. 
       61 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2006, 82.  
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Increasing DHS Preparedness and Response Capability, Strengthening the National 
Incident Management System.  This budget request called for $50 million to Citizen 
Corps, an “increase of $10 million for a new funding level of $50 million, which is a 25% 
increase over FY 2004 enacted level. Citizen Corps will continue to empower local 
communities to respond to threats of terrorism through education and training of the 
individual citizen.”62  The actual enacted funding for Citizen Corps was $15 million for 
FY 2005, and Ready received $3.41 million from an overall DHS budget of $38.5 billion. 
5. The FY 2004 Budget:  Citizen Preparedness Highlighted 
The Department of Homeland Security was created in March of 2003 and the 
budget increased exponentially from the previous year.  The budget request provides for 
$36.2 billion, “7.4 percent more than the 2003 level and over 64 percent more than the 
FY 2002 level for these activities.”63  The budget goals track the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security with highlighted goals: Securing the Nation’s Borders and 
Transportation Systems, Securing the Nation’s Ports and Ensuring Safety in Our Waters, 
Preparing for and Responding to National Emergencies, Advancing and Harnessing 
Science and Technology, Improving Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, 
Improving Immigration Services, Ensuring Non-Homeland Activities, Decentralizing 
Execution, Centralizing Leadership.  Under the “Budget Highlights” for the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness, of a $3.5 billion budget (representing more than twelve times the 
enacted 2002 level), the budget request calls for:  
$2.5 billion is requested for state domestic preparedness grants to provide 
equipment, exercises, strategic planning, and support to the national 
training and exercise program, of which up to $181 million will support 
the Citizen Corps activities [emphasis added] – local efforts to engage 
individuals in helping communities prevent, prepare for, and respond to 
disasters of all kinds, including terrorist incidents.64 
                                                 
62 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2005, 58, 
www.dhs.gov (accessed March 7, 2007). 
63 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2004, www.dhs.gov 
(accessed March 7, 2007). 
64 United States Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2004, 9.  
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It is not clear whether this actual request was made, but the enacted funding allocation for 
Citizen Corps for FY 2004 was $40 million, and Ready received $3.95 million from an 
overall budget of $36.54 billion.  
6. FY 2003 Budget:  The Creation of Citizen Corps -- Citizen 
Preparedness Recognized as a High Priority 
In Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation, which was issued by the 
President to set forth the agenda for homeland security, four “Budget Initiatives” were set 
forth:  Supporting First Responders, Defending Against Bioterrorism, Securing 
America’s Borders, Using 21st Century Technology to Secure the Homeland.  There are 
also five enumerated “Additional Budget Priorities”:  Transportation Security, Federal 
Law Enforcement, Citizen Corps, Department of Defense Intelligence Community, 
Protecting our Critical Infrastructure.65 
In this document, the President refers to the terrorist threat as a “permanent 
condition to which America and the entire world must adjust.”  He refers to homeland 
security as a “new national calling” involving “new and expanded efforts by State and 
local governments, private industry, non-government organizations, and citizens.”66  
[Emphasis added.] In looking toward a prepared country, the President states: “The 
American people should have no doubt that we will succeed in weaving an effective and 
permanent level of security into the fabric of a better, safer, stronger America.”  This may 
be the first effort to frame the concept of a culture of preparedness as part of the “fabric” 
of our nation. 
The importance of citizen preparedness is highlighted as a major priority in 
setting forth the budget for the Office of Homeland Security.  The fact that Citizen Corps 
rated as one of the top priorities for the homeland security agenda was an important 
moment in citizen preparedness:  “The President’s Budget for fiscal year 2003 requests 
$144 million in matching funds to support the formation and training of local Citizen 
                                                 
65 United States, White House, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening Our Nation,” n.d., 
www.dhs.gov (accessed April 10, 2007). 
66 United States, White House, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening Our Nation,” 3.  
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Corps Councils...”67  In addition, “The President’s fiscal year 2003 Budget provides more 
than $230 million for these efforts”68 to support and/or create Citizen Corps programs 
including: Volunteers in Police Service, Medical Reserve Corps, Operation TIPS 
(Terrorist Information and Prevention System), Community Emergency Response Teams 
(CERT), Neighborhood Watch Programs, and development of a Citizens’ Preparedness 
Guidebook.69  It is unclear whether the large requests were made, but funding enacted for 
Citizen Corps for 2003 was $20 million.  (With regard to the Ready campaign, budget 
numbers prior to FY 2004 are not available and Ready in FY 2003 essentially consisted 
of the website only.)   
7. Year-to-Year Comparison of Requested and Actual Budgets:  Does 
the Stated Importance of Creating a Culture of Personal 
Preparedness in Strategies, Reports, Speeches and Documents Match 
Federal Funding for Citizen Preparedness Efforts? 
Table 1 below shows the progression and regression of Citizen Corps funding 
from 2003 through the current proposal for the FY 2008 budget.   Despite increases 
averaging $3 billion each year in the overall DHS Budget, Citizen Corps funding has 
declined.  Despite an infusion of early dollars in 2003 and 2004, funding requests in 
2005, 2006, and 2007 have averaged 37% of the requested funding.  In 2005, $50 million 
was requested and $15 million was enacted; in 2006, $50 million was requested and $20 
million was enacted; and in 2007, $35 million was requested and $15 was million 
enacted.  For FY 2008, only $15 million was requested, down substantially from previous 
requests.70  If the recent trend holds true, at 37% of requested funding, Citizen Corps will 
be at an all time low when DHS officials are placing the importance of citizen 
preparedness at an all time high in speeches and appearances.  The data presented in this 
table was provided on March 15, 2007 by a reliable Department of Homeland Security 
official who asked not to be referred to by name.  According to this official, the data is 
                                                 
67 United States, White House, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening Our Nation,” 24.  
68 Ibid.    
69 It is unclear in the budget as to what exactly went forward as a request.  FY 2004 enacted allocation 
to Citizen Corps was $20 million.   
70 See Table 1. 
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derived from the Presidents’ budget and appropriations for DHS for each of those years.  
This same official verified and qualified the data as of November 11, 2007.  According to 
this same official, with regard to final 2008 enacted budget numbers, the 2008 budget had 
yet to be enacted and DHS was operating under a Continuing Resolution that funds 
critical operations at the 2007 level until Congress passed and the President signed the 
2008 Appropriations Bill.  In addition, Citizen Corps data was verified on April 2, 2007 
as accurate by another reliable Department of Homeland Security official, who also asked 




Table 1.   Comparison of Citizen Corps Budget (Proposed and Enacted) with the Overall 


































     
















































































































































































   

























































Table 2 shows funding for the Ready campaign.  The Ready budget is cobbled 
together from three sources: the Office of Public Affairs, Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (IP) and the Working Capital Fund (WCF) which provides funding for the 
website.  The IP funding was directed at Ready Business and the funding was limited to 
four years only.  This funding terminates with the FY 2008 budget cycle, leaving Ready 
with an approximate 38% reduction in funding. 
 




OPA Funding  IP Funding WCF Funding  Total Funding 
2004 $2,153,371 $1,287,461 $511,000 $3,951,832 
2005 $1,574,663 $1,332,522 $505,800 $3,412,985 
2006 $1,933,508 $1,379,160 $595,000 $3,907,668 




$1,500,000 $0 $618,000 $2,118,000 
Table 2.   Ready Campaign Funding for FY 2004 through 200871 
It should be noted that under guidance provided for state Homeland Security 
Grants and under the Urban Area Security Initiative and other programs, funding may be 
used for citizen preparedness efforts, but there is no requirement to use funding for this 
purpose.72  Citizen preparedness efforts must compete with a variety of pressing needs in 
a state or urban area within the realm of homeland security and disaster preparedness.  
The federal budget for Citizen Corps and Ready are used as a general gauge to indicate 
the level of priority that the issue garners within the DHS budget.  Despite the fact that 
Hurricane Katrina and surveys post-Katrina exposed an alarming lack of personal 
preparedness in the country, the federal budget for FY 2008 does not bode well for 
creating a culture of preparedness based on “profound and enduring” changes.  Congress 
has played a significant role in the lack of funding for citizen preparedness, as DHS has 
                                                 
71 All data for this table was provided by Kristin Gossel, Director, Ready campaign, United States 
Department of Homeland Security, April 3, 2007.  
72 See Citizen Corps, “2007 Funding and Community Preparedness,” March 29, 2007, 
www.citizencorps.gov (accessed April 30, 2007). 
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requested funding for Citizen Corps each year, but approximately only 37% of the 
requested funding is enacted for this most important program.   
D. IS CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS A PRIORITY FOR STATE, COUNTY AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT? ARE THEY ENGAGED IN CREATING A 
CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS? 
1. The State Level 
The National Governors Association has no major policy on the importance of 
creating a culture of preparedness or on the importance of citizen preparedness.  In a 
review of policy statements from 2000 onward, citizen preparedness has not been an 
official priority.  A “Policy Position on Emergency Management” was issued in August 
of 2006.  This policy position states in its preamble:  
Emergency management consists of the coordination of resources at all 
levels of government within an integrated framework based on 
preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and hazard mitigation. 
Effective emergency management involves interaction among federal, 
state, and local governments, the private sector, and volunteer 
organizations.73 [Emphasis added.] 
This Policy Position does state a formal position on Community Involvement in 
Emergency Preparedness: 
13.5 Community Involvement 
FEMA should work with state and local emergency managers to ensure a 
renewed emphasis on family and community preparedness so that citizens 
have the necessary skills to survive a catastrophic disaster. The National 
Warning System, which is maintained by FEMA, has been downsized in 
recent years. This system was designed to provide rapid communications 
and warning capabilities among federal, state, and local emergency 
management agencies. Given the attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
subsequent alerts, Congress should provide funding to rapidly upgrade and 
expand a sustainable national intergovernmental communication and 
warning system. Also, FEMA and other agencies should develop guidance 
                                                 
73 National Governors Association, Policy Position, “HHS-13 Emergency Management,” Section 13.1, 
Preamble, August 10, 2006, www.nga.org (accessed March 1, 2007). 
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on "shelter in place" strategies for biological, chemical, radiological, and 
other weapons of mass destruction events, especially in urban centers.74 
The policy statement suggests skills and “shelter in place” strategies, not supplies, 
as the key to preparedness for citizens and communities.  There is no call for a major 
citizen preparedness effort in the country and the policy position places responsibility to 
prepare and educate citizens on FEMA, not on the governors themselves.     
The NGA has produced three significant guides for governors in dealing with 
disasters, emergency management, and terrorism.  The first document, produced in 2001, 
was Volume One: A Governor’s Guide to Emergency Management: Natural Disasters; 
the second, produced in 2002, is Volume Two: A Governor’s Guide to Emergency 
Management: Homeland Security; and the third, issued on March 15, 2007, was entitled 
A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security. These three documents provide extensive 
advice on preparing for, mitigating against, responding to, and recovering from natural 
and manmade disasters and acts of terrorism.   
Personal preparedness and having a governor place a high priority on establishing 
a robust citizen preparedness program is not addressed in any of the three volumes.  
There is significant attention to mitigation efforts in Volume One (Natural Disasters), 
such as the purchase of flood insurance, but no mention of personal preparedness as a 
major mitigation measure, or trained citizens and prepared households as essential to 
response and recovery efforts.  Most information regarding interaction with citizens falls 
into the post-disaster communications strategies or on applying for post-disaster federal 
financial assistance.75   
Volume Two (Homeland Security) sets forth “The Basics: What Every Governor 
Should Know.”76  Creating a well-informed, well-prepared citizenry is not included as 
essential in preparing for, responding to, or recovering from a terrorist attack in this 128-
                                                 
74National Governors Association, Policy Position, “HHS-13 Emergency Management,” Section 13.5 
“Community Involvement,” bold in original. 
75 National Governor’s Association, Volume One: A Governor’s Guide to Emergency Management: 
Natural Disasters (Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2001). 
76 National Governors Association, Volume Two: A Governor’s Guide to Emergency Management: 
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page guide.  Communicating with the public during a crisis is addressed, but encouraging 
preparedness and engaging in a robust citizen preparedness, awareness, and education 
program is not addressed as a priority for a governor in preparing a state for disaster or 
terrorist acts.  The guide does acknowledge that “the media can play a central role in 
assisting local, state, and federal government prior to a terrorist attack by disseminating 
information about preparedness and response ahead of time.”77  Likewise, the guide 
acknowledges “Homeland security presents a challenge to governors because of the need 
to educate the public without engendering unnecessary fear.”78  However, the guide does 
not address the need for, or how to accomplish, a major effort in citizen preparedness, 
awareness, and education, nor acknowledge the importance of a trained and prepared 
citizenry in response and recovery.   
The newest guide, A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security, states in its 
Foreword:  
The images of flooded homes, lost lives, and stranded survivors on the 
rooftops of New Orleans – and of the debris field that had once been 
Gulfport – haunted America and much of the world throughout the 
autumn…the struggle to recover and the millions of individual stories of 
success – and failure – illustrate most clearly a point that has been made so 
often as to be almost clichéd: all disasters are local… 
The Guide draws heavily on the experiences of governors who have 
managed during emergencies and disasters of all sizes and on the lessons 
learned by states in the years since the September 11 attacks…This 
document focuses on areas governors must immediately be aware of and 
the resources they are most likely to rely on during the initial response to 
an incident.79 
Despite this foreword, and the recognition of the suffering of residents in the 
aftermath of a major hurricane, citizen preparedness is not mentioned in this eighty page 
document as a priority for a governor in preparing a state for a major event.  Prepared 
                                                 
77 National Governors Association, Volume Two: A Governor’s Guide to Emergency Management: 
Homeland Security, (Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2002), 27.   
78 Ibid., 7.  
79 National Governors Association, “Foreword,” A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security, 
(Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2007), 3. 
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citizens should be viewed as a resource a governor is “most likely to rely on.”  
Surprisingly, if the guides are built from experience and lessons learned from governors 
and staff members who have managed disasters, how can citizen preparedness be so 
glaringly absent in a post-Katrina publication? 
Citizen preparedness is mentioned as an aside as part of developing a public 
communications and media strategy in “helping the state’s residents understand what 
they should do prior to a disaster, including guidance on when to evacuate and where to 
go during an evacuation; when to stay where they are and what supplies they should have 
on hand; and the need for comprehensive home and work preparedness plans.”80  There is 
no other guidance or priority placed on citizen preparedness, education, and awareness 
efforts as an integral part of the overall preparedness for a state.  There is no emphasis on 
the important role a governor must take in ensuring a robust program exists to create a 
well educated, well prepared citizenry and the importance of the forward deployment of 
relief assets in homes across a state and the presence of trained citizens as force 
multipliers in times of disaster.  The guide does recognize “state and local government 
share responsibility for preparing their citizens for disasters and helping them recover 
when disaster strikes.”81 However, no guidance is given as to how to accomplish the 
preparation of citizens for disaster, nor is there any priority placed on this particular 
responsibility. 
In searching for a formal policy on the importance of citizen preparedness, the 
glaring lack of a formal policy statement by the NGA, expounding upon the need for all 
citizens to be prepared, is disturbing.  Likewise, the absence of the priority of citizen 
preparedness programs from the essential “how to prepare and respond” guides produced 
by the NGA for America’s governors is equally distressing. 
The NGA “is the instrument through which the nation’s governors collectively 
influence the development and implementation of national policy and apply creative 
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81  Ibid., 12.  
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leadership to state issues.”82  Although individual governors may be engaged in 
supporting citizen preparedness efforts in their states, the recognized, collective voice 
through which the governors speak in unison to DHS and to Congress has not embraced 
the call for creating a culture of preparedness.  All governors must be engaged in this 
effort as a priority for the nation and play an integral part in creating a social contagion 
leading to the type of “profound and enduring” change needed in creating a cultural shift 
throughout the country.  Governors, like mayors, will be held accountable for disaster 
relief and response efforts within the first several days of an event and should view 
prepared households and trained citizens as a forward deployment of relief assets and 
additional responders in a time of crisis. Governors are also influential messengers who 
must be recruited to enhance the efforts to raise awareness of the importance of being 
prepared.  Likewise, the governors, collectively, can play a major role in demanding 
increased funding for preparedness programs at the federal, state and local levels.   
2. The County Level 
Emergency management is usually a county responsibility, with the county 
assisting the towns, cities, and municipalities within its jurisdiction in preparing for and 
responding to a disaster.  It is disheartening to see that in a review of official policy 
statements by the National Association of Counties, citizen preparedness has not been 
embraced as a critical and important component of disaster preparedness.  The 2004 
Policy Agenda to Secure the People of America’s Counties states that its purpose is to 
“assist the President, DHS and Congress as they continue to make investments and 
decisions in local programs to improve homeland security.”83 This document, with 
twenty-four objectives ranging from public health to information sharing and critical  
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infrastructure, border security, safe water supplies, emergency planning, evacuation 
planning, training, and mutual aid to communication interoperability, never mentions 
citizen preparedness. 
The lack of prioritization of citizen preparedness is underscored in a document 
released in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in November of 2005 by the National 
Association of Counties entitled “Policy Agenda for Disaster Preparedness, Prevention, 
Response and Recovery”.84  This agenda sought to enhance assistance to the Gulf States 
for recovery efforts and to partner with the federal government to ensure communities are 
prepared and ready to respond to future disasters.  However, this document, released in 
the post-Katrina world, evidences an absolute lack of appreciation for the importance of 
public preparedness, as the subject matter is not even mentioned in this seven-page report 
of recommendations.  This absence is telling:  even county (local) government, in the 
wake of Katrina, is not making citizen preparedness a priority.  There appears to be a 
fundamental lack of understanding and appreciation for the fact that a prepared citizenry 
will alleviate pressure on the first responders and local government during the acute 
phase of emergency response, when the most pressure is on local government for search 
and rescue operations, medical care and transport, shelter and mass feeding needs, and 
restoring lifelines. 
3. The Mayor Level 
Further evidence of the lack of attention to citizen preparedness and the true 
importance of this vital issue is seen in the current agenda for the United States 
Conference of Mayors issued in January of 2007.  The mayors of America issued a “10 
Point Legislative Agenda on Issues Impacting Cities and Families” as a result of their 
Winter Meeting.85  This Agenda was entitled Strong Cities, Strong Families for a Strong 
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America.  The ten-point agenda includes Energy and Environment Block Grants, Federal-
Local Partnership on Crime Prevention, Community Development Block Grants, 
Affordable Housing, Public Housing, Infrastructure Tax Incentive and Bonds, 
Competitive Workforce, Children and Youth, Unfunded Mandates/Preemptions, and 
Homeland Security.  The homeland security agenda emphasized three areas only: 
interoperable communications, transit security, and improved grant application 
processes.86   
In the past few years, the United States Conference of Mayors has tracked a 
number of grants for homeland security funding and has in some reports looked at CERT 
teams and CERT funding, but the issue receives only a few sentences in these reports.87  
In September of 2002, citizen preparedness had a small highlight in an introduction to a 
report issued one year post-9/11, stating “cities have vastly expanded public information 
and education efforts” (citing no examples or measurements of success or growth of 
programs) as one of the efforts Mayors had taken to prepare their cities for terrorism.  
However, the text of the document, outlining “key concerns” of America’s mayors, did 
not address the issue of citizen preparedness at all.88   
No major policy statement appears to have been made by the United States 
Conference of Mayors with regard to citizen preparedness and its importance in building 
a disaster-resilient community.   In December of 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, the 
United States Conference of Mayors held a summit and issued A National Action Plan for 
Safety and Security in America’s Cities.89  The introduction states: “through the years, 
mayors and public safety officials have consistently attached a high priority to preparing 
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themselves, their personnel and their citizens for the possibility of disasters.”90  This 
Action Plan has four priority areas: transportation security, emergency preparedness, 
federal-local law enforcement, and economic security.  The emergency preparedness 
section focuses on communications, emergency management improvements, equipment 
and training for first responders, and the public health system.  Within the text, the Action 
Plan does mention as an aside and not as a major policy statement: “effective 
preparedness efforts require an empowered community and the involvement of 
community representatives in the development of emergency response plans.  The public 
should be educated in basic lifesaving techniques so that bystanders can provide 
assistance to those injured until help arrives.”91  There are no other statements regarding 
citizen preparedness. 
An effort was made to track the progress of the Action Plan developed in 2001.  A 
working paper from meetings after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was developed with input 
from impacted cities and from other leadership meetings and was issued in October of 
2005, just sixty days after the devastating storms.  This working paper became the actual 
2005 Action Plan Update and was “presented directly to Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff and his top officials, and was sent to Congress.”92  This report set forth 
the key recommendations and priorities of America’s mayors in October of 2005: Fixing 
the FEMA Disaster Response System, Military Involvement in Disaster Response and 
Recovery, Communications Interoperability, Enhanced Transportation Security, First 
Responder Funding – A Better Distribution System is Needed.93  Despite the proximity 
in time to Hurricane Katrina and the direct participation of Gulf State mayors in setting 
the agenda for the priorities, as well as numerous polls and surveys showing the  
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widespread lack of personal preparedness in the country, no mention of the creation of a 
robust and dynamic citizen preparedness effort was made anywhere among the priorities 
or recommendations.  
Individual mayors throughout the country may be working on citizen 
preparedness efforts in their respective cities, and indeed, many are.  However, the 
collective voice of America’s mayors should be placed behind the effort to create a 
culture of preparedness.  Mayors are on the front line of disasters and should be 
collectively calling upon the federal government to allocate significant funding for the 
effort to create a robust program leading to a cultural shift toward citizen preparedness.  
Local officials can be influential messengers in convincing citizens to prepare.  Mayors 
will also be called upon in the first several days of a disaster to miraculously provide 
relief and supplies to citizens before significant outside help arrives.  The prepared 
citizen, prepared households, and prepared communities will play an integral role in the 
survival of a city.  Every point of preparedness should be viewed as a point of forward 
deployment of assets.  Unfortunately, no formal policy exists which shows that 
America’s mayors are taking up the call to create a culture of preparedness or that 
America’s mayors embrace citizen preparedness as an integral part of the preparedness, 
response, recovery, and survival of a city in times of disaster.  
4. Do Governors Think It’s not Their Responsibility and do Counties 
and Mayors Have a False Assumption that Citizens are Actually 
Prepared?  
In looking at the National Association of Governors’ three voluminous guides on 
Emergency Management and Homeland Security and the minimal formal policy on 
citizen preparedness, it appears that perhaps governors, as a whole, do not see citizen 
preparedness as their responsibility or as a priority for them to address.  In the policy 
statement of 2006, cited above, the NGA actually places the responsibility on FEMA to 
educate citizens about the importance of preparedness and what to do in a terrorist event.  
The federal government, at the senior level, is doing an admirable job of promoting 
citizen preparedness in talking about its importance (funding is another matter), as 
evidenced in speeches, national policy, and statements to Congressional committees. 
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However, it does not seem to be resonating with governors, counties, and mayors as a 
collective whole in creating a culture of preparedness.  The institutions through which 
these officials speak with a collective voice have not called for a robust and effective 
national program directed at citizen preparedness and education.   
Two studies may be illuminating with regard to county officials and mayors.  
There is some indication that these groups may believe that their constituents are better 
prepared than what national surveys indicate.   
In August of 2006, the National Association of Counties released a national 
survey (conducted in March and April of 2006) entitled Emergency Management in 
County Government which surveyed 564 counties across the United States.  In this survey 
the question of “the extent to which the majority of citizens” are prepared for 
emergencies was posed to the national emergency management community through the 
county clerks.  Nationally, the results showed that members of this community believe 
(with regard to their county) that 11% of the majority of citizens are prepared to a great 
extent, 47% at a moderate extent, 38% to some extent and 2% to “no extent.”  When 
broken down for the West, the results show that this community believes 0% of the 
majority of citizens are prepared to a very great extent, 11% to a great extent, 54% to a 
moderate extent, 36% to some extent and 0% to “no extent.”94  Thus, the survey suggests 
that the county-level emergency management community believes that, nationally, 85% 
of the majority of citizens are either “moderately” or to “some extent” prepared, with 
only 13% falling in the preparedness category of being prepared to a “great” or “very 
great” extent, and only 2% to “no extent”. As discussed in Chapter IV, infra, 
“preparedness” has many definitions and it is difficult to assess.  This particular survey 
did not look at food, water, emergency plans, and education and skills as preparedness, 
but asked “To what extent are the majority of the people in your county prepared for the 
types of disasters that have hit your county in the past or are likely to affect the county in 
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the future?”95  The results suggest a much more prepared country than what other 
nationwide surveys have shown.  See Chapter III, infra, for a discussion of surveys and 
polls on citizen preparedness.   
America’s mayors, on the front lines of disasters, have not, as a collective whole, 
demanded a robust and effective effort in the country to create a culture of preparedness 
despite knowing that they will be held accountable for providing food, water, and 
assistance in the first seventy-two hours post-disaster.  In July of 2006, a survey of 
mayors showed the level of confidence in FEMA to respond quickly after a major 
disaster: 44% responded with a 5 on a scale of 1 to 10, the average being 5.2.  Larger 
cities (300,000 plus) scored FEMA at 5.7, mid sized cities (100,001 to 300,000) scored 
FEMA with a 5.1 and small cities (up to 100,000) scored FEMA with an average of 5.0.96  
In asking mayors “your level of confidence that your city is prepared to survive on its 
own for up to 72 hours,” over 56% had an astounding confidence rating of 8.  The 
average response was 6.9, with small cities at 6.8, mid-sized cities at 7.4, and large cities 
at 6.7.97  Thus, it appears that in mid-2006, mayors had little confidence that FEMA 
would arrive in time, but had somewhat strong confidence in their own city’s ability to 
survive for seventy-two hours without outside help and assistance.  This confidence runs 
counter to nationwide polls showing consistently abysmal preparedness numbers both 
pre- and post-Katrina. 
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III. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC:  WOEFULLY UNPREPARED 
A. SURVEYS AND STUDIES INVOLVING CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS 
EFFORTS: A DISMAL PICTURE  
In July of 2004, the Council for Excellence in Government (herein “CEG”) 
convened a high-level national symposium in partnership with the American Red Cross 
(herein “ARC”), The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, 
and DHS entitled “Public Preparedness – A National Imperative” (herein Symposium 
Report).  The Symposium Report is a helpful roadmap for local planning.98 The 
symposium was personally attended by then-Secretary Ridge and then-ARC President 
and CEO Marsha Evans.  The forward to the Symposium Report states: “The public 
remains largely disengaged in the very activity that could safeguard their health and 
safety.”99   The purpose of the symposium was to “identify the barriers to public 
preparedness and to begin a dialogue on possible solutions for quickly and effectively 
breaking through those barriers.”100  A number of issues raised during the symposium are 
applicable to any major urban area in addressing citizen preparedness.  
During the symposium, CEG and ARC presented the findings of two surveys.  
The CEG nationwide study was conducted in February of 2004.101  The information, as 
synthesized in the Symposium Report, highlighted the fact that, in general, Americans did 
not know what to do in an emergency.  Many states and cities may have improved plans 
and become better prepared; the problem, according to the Symposium Report, is that 
“Those plans, however, assume that the public knows its role and is ready to act 
appropriately.”  In fact, the research (as presented in the Symposium Report) shows that: 
• 18% of Americans are aware of their state’s emergency plans (1) 
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• 19% of Americans are aware of their local emergency plans (1) 
• About 50% of Americans are familiar with the disaster plan at their 
workplaces (2) 
• About 50% of parents know the disaster plans of their children’s schools 
or daycare centers (2) 
• 34% of Americans have sought information about what to do in the event 
of a disaster or developed a plan for communicating with their families (1) 
• 30% of Americans have taken a training class in civil preparedness, first 
aid or CPR (2) 
• About 10% of American households have a family emergency plan, a 
disaster kit, and training in first aid and CPR (2) 
• About 20% of Americans feel very prepared for a catastrophic event (2). 
Specifically, research indicates that: 
• 76% of Americans believe that there will be another terrorist attack (1) 
• 50% of Americans think that the attack may be where they live or work 
(1) 
• 84% of Americans agree that when all Americans are prepared for all 
types of disaster, it strengthens national security (2) 
• About 67% of Americans say they would volunteer their time to get 
trained and prepare to help, but they do not know how (2)  
 
(1) The council presented data derived from national polls of citizens and first 
responders and town hall meetings that were conducted through the 
Homeland Security from a Citizen’s Perspective initiative in 2003. 
(2) The Red Cross presented findings from a national survey of 1,001 adult 
Americans that was conducted in conjunction with Wirthlin Worldwide in 
2004.102 
 
This CEG study (published in March of 2004) and Symposium Report (released in 
January of 2005) are consistent with more recent surveys conducted on the topic of the 
preparedness of the American public for disaster.   
Professor Paul Light, Founding Director of the Center for Catastrophe 
Preparedness and Response at NYU, conducted two surveys: one in July of 2005, just 
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weeks prior to Katrina, and a second survey in October of 2005, a few weeks after 
Katrina.  His reports (cited in the Introduction of this thesis) found that  
Most Americans are unprepared for disasters, unaware of their local 
government’s plans for response and recovery, and deeply confused about 
what to do in the event of an actual catastrophe such as a bombing of a 
local shopping center or supermarket or the release of a deadly disease or 
virus that spreads across their communities.103   
Light’s report is disturbing in that he states: “Having been told to expect everything, 
many Americans may have concluded that they can prepare for nothing.”104 
Like the CEG study, the July 2005 NYU study clearly indicates that Americans 
understand the threat of terrorism.  The report found that 69% of respondents believed 
that a terrorist bombing at a local shopping center or grocery store was very or somewhat 
likely to occur somewhere in the United States within that next year, and 83% believed it 
would happen in the next five years.  Over one-half (53%) believed the release of a 
deadly virus was very or somewhat likely in that next year, and that number increased to 
73% over the next five years.105  “Despite these relatively high probabilities, most 
Americans do not believe such an attack is likely in their own community.”106 
The July 2005 NYU study looked at the issue of individual preparedness among 
Americans.  The report found 10% of respondents believed they were very prepared, 43% 
believed they were somewhat prepared and 46% were either not too prepared (24%), or 
not prepared at all (22%).  
Explanations for the failure to prepare are informative and provide insight for 
future citizen preparedness efforts: 
• 53% wished they had more time to get prepared 
• 53% wished they had more money to get prepared 
• 49% were not sure where to turn for help 
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• 65% wished they were more organized 
• 78% were not sure what to expect 
• 23% did not want to think about 9/11 
However, 46% said they were aware of their workplace’s emergency plans and 47% of 
parents with children were familiar with their local school’s plans (although those plans 
may consist of nothing more than the closing of the school and pickup of the children).  
Unfortunately, respondents stated that in looking at their pre-9/11 situation and preparing 
for emergencies of all kinds, 54% said their household preparedness remained about the 
same or somewhat less, while 44% said they were either more prepared (17%) or 
somewhat more prepared (27%).107  
The numbers in the second NYU study (October 2005) offer a discouraging view.  
Respondents were asked to compare their current (October 2005) level of preparedness to 
their preparedness before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita arrived.  Only 12% said they were 
much more prepared to deal with emergencies and 21% said they were somewhat more 
prepared.  Shockingly, 57% said they were about the same, with 8% saying they were 
somewhat less or much less prepared.108 
In a poll completed in October of 2005 by ABC news, 40% of those surveyed 
responded that they had created family communication plans.  This was a significant 
increase from 26%, as evidenced by an earlier poll conducted by ABC news in August of 
that same year.  Katrina was cited as the likely factor in the increase.  The poll also found 
that 53% of Americans felt they were prepared for a terrorist attack, but only 44% of the 
women versus 62% of men felt they were prepared.  However, the same poll found that 
only one in ten said they were “very prepared” and most lacked recommended 
preparedness items, particularly bottled water and facemasks. The poll found that of the 
recommended items, only 5% had all eight items on the Ready.gov list.  Excluding  
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facemasks from the list, the preparedness number increases to 21%.  By excluding water 
from the list, that number climbs to 43%, which meant over one half the public was 
without recommended items.109  
The July 2005 NYU survey had similar, though more disturbing results.   
Moreover, even though the vast majority has enough bottled water in their 
house to last for three to four days (63 percent) and canned goods (90 
percent), only 37 percent have a family plan with friends or family about 
who everyone would contact in the event of a terrorist attack. 
When these three questions about the elements of basic preparedness are 
combined, the public’s lack of general preparedness is also clear:  7 
percent had none of the three elements, 25 percent had just one of the 
three elements, 39 percent had two of the three elements and just 29 
percent had all three.110  
An important survey took place in August and October of 2005, conducted for the 
Council for Excellence in Government in partnership with the American Red Cross. Two 
samples compared preparedness in the days immediately before and following Hurricane 
Katrina hitting the Gulf States – “before the full devastation in New Orleans was widely 
known” – and again in late October.111  This report claims “the most remarkable finding” 
was that “Americans’ response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita – indeed even to 
September 11, 2001 – is nearly nonexistent in terms of their personal preparedness for 
disaster.  The lessons the public learned from these most recent disasters appear to be 
extremely limited.”112  The report goes on to state:   
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For many, the answers seem to be a pervasive sense that disasters happen 
in other parts of the country to other people…More than half (54%) of 
Americans say one reason they have not done more to prepare is because 
they do not think another disaster is likely to happen. 
…People appear to remain unmotivated to actively prepare for a disaster 
near their home affecting their family.  Fully two in five (38%) of 
Americans say Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have given them absolutely no 
motivation to prepare for an emergency; an additional quarter (24%) say 
that the hurricanes have given them “just some” motivation.113 
The survey concludes that “Americans are no more prepared now than they were 
before Katrina and Rita hit.”114  In fact, “people in urban areas show no greater proclivity 
to prepare, despite the fact that two major urban areas were disaster locations” and labels 
this “an important and disturbing finding.”115  More than one-third of the public had done 
nothing to prepare, slightly better than the 42% identified in August.  Although only half 
of Americans in both samples say “they have done ‘some things’ but could do more to 
prepare.  We suspect that ‘some’ means less rather than more.”116 
The troubling numbers from the survey continue.  Few people (43%) have 
prepared an emergency kit: “On one of the most basic benchmarks of preparedness, 
Americans fall dangerously short.”117  Communications plans were also lacking with 
36% reporting that they had an established plan and only 25% had an established meeting 
place.118 
The survey found that “many Americans seem to regard preparedness as 
unnecessary or ultimately ineffective” and described the situation as a public that 
“continues to approach preparedness with a detached sense of reality.” 119  A majority 
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believe disaster will not impact them personally – 54% in October, up from 47% in 
August.  More than half of Americans (52%) state that one reason they do not prepare is 
because “they have not thought about it” and 45% cite as a reason not to prepare that 
“nothing they could do would really be effective.”120    
A very important finding in this survey showed that 44% of respondents stated 
they did not know what they should be doing to prepare as the reason they are not 
preparing for disaster.  The cost of preparing was cited by 37% of respondents as a reason 
to not prepare and lack of time was cited as a barrier by 35% of the respondents.121  This 
survey paints a picture of an American public that is woefully unprepared for disaster: 
over half have not thought about preparing, substantial numbers think preparing would 
not ultimately be effective, staggering numbers of citizens state they don’t know what to 
do to prepare, and large numbers of Americans state they do not or cannot spend the 
money to prepare, and a large percentage state they do not have the time.122   
At about the same time that the second sample in the above CEG/ARC survey 
was taking place (October of 2005 – six weeks after Katrina and two and one-half weeks 
after Rita), another survey was being conducted by a contractor for Citizen Corps, ORC 
Macro.  This survey found only 31% of Americans they felt they were prepared for a 
natural disaster (up from 28% in 2003), while 22% felt they were prepared for a terrorist 
attack (up from 20% in 2003).123  According to this survey, “Americans are no more 
prepared for a natural disaster or terrorist attack than they were in 2003.”124 
The Citizen Corps survey shows that, in October of 2005, there had been a 
“significant decline in those who indicate that they have a disaster plan and those who 
indicate that they have an emergency supply kit.”125  Those indicating they had a disaster 
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plan decreased from 58% in 2003 to 43% in October of 2005.  When pushed on the 
question of how thorough a plan was in place, many did not have the basic elements 
prescribed by various organizations, and only 35% had a plan that included a 
predetermined meeting place.126   
Though 46 percent of Americans (compared with 50 percent in 2003) 
indicate that they have an emergency supply kit, only 27 percent have a kit 
that includes recommended basic supplies (i.e., food, water, flashlight, 
radio, first aid kit, and batteries).  Only 9 percent have what can be 
considered a complete kit, including photocopies of personal 
identification, cash, and financial documents. 
Only 17 percent of Americans have both a plan that includes a meeting 
place that has been discussed with family members, and a basic 
emergency kit that includes a supply of food and water, a flashlight, 
battery powered radio, spare batteries, and a first aid kit.127 
In keeping with the sense that Americans are listening to messages, but not taking action, 
the survey found that “Americans are aware of basic steps that they should take, but have 
not carried out those steps.”128 When asked why they thought they were not prepared, 
54% did not “know how to achieve preparedness,” while nearly a third (32%) indicated 
that cost was a factor.  Reasons for not having an emergency kit prepared ranged from 
those who “did not think it was important” (25%) to “time constraints (12%), lack of 
knowledge (10%), and cost (8%).”  ORC Macro asked respondents who indicated that 
they were not prepared for a terrorist attack, natural disaster, and/or household emergency 
why they thought they were not prepared. The most common responses relate to the lack 
of preparedness measures taken, such as not having a disaster plan (61%) or an 
emergency kit (55%).129 
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In this same survey, respondents who indicated they had taken action toward 
preparedness were asked what motivated them to prepare:  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
39%; concern for household or personal safety, 12%; event in their own life 9%; advice 
of neighbors or community, 4%; advice of family and friends, 3%; change in the threat 
advisory level, 2%; and community offering education or training, 2%.130 
In May of 2006, a nationwide Harris poll found 72% of Americans believe 
hurricanes are the most destructive natural or manmade disaster.131  A vast majority 
(81%) stated they were very or somewhat prepared for snow and ice storms, but only 
28% were very or somewhat prepared for terrorism (meaning 72% were not very 
prepared or not prepared at all), 29% were very or somewhat prepared for earthquakes 
(with 71% not very prepared or not prepared at all) and 35% were very or somewhat 
prepared for hurricanes (with 65% not very prepared or not prepared at all).132  When 
broken down by region, only 35% of those who said a hurricane would impact them said 
they were somewhat or very prepared, with only 52% in the South stating they were 
somewhat or very prepared, despite the devastation of Katrina.  
In May and June of 2006, the Council for Excellence in Government conducted a 
study looking at the preparedness of Americans.  Published in December of 2006, the 
CEG also introduced a new measurement tool for citizen preparedness, the “Public 
Readiness Index” (herein the PRI), which is discussed more fully in Chapter IV, infra.  
The PRI measures ten items, three knowledge-based and seven behavior-based, to 
measure preparedness on a ten point scale.  Nationally, the average was a 3.31.   This 
survey showed that 63% of Americans have taken first aid classes, 42% have a disaster 
supply kit at home, 36% have a portable kit, 29% have a communications plan, 21% have 
a set meeting place in case of separation during an emergency, 26% have practiced or 
drilled in what to do in an emergency, and 15% have volunteered to help prepare or 
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respond in an emergency.133  The survey showed that age, education, and income level 
all play a role in preparedness.   Persons over age 65 are less prepared than younger 
people, persons with some high school education (or less) are significantly less prepared 
than those with a high school education (or higher) and households with income of less 
than $40,000 per year are less prepared than others.134 
The preparedness of a workplace or school played a role in overall preparedness.  
“The data indicates that participation in the workplace and having school-aged children 
correlate highly with individual and family preparedness.”135  More importantly, “these 
findings indicate that workplaces and schools provide opportune venues for communities 
to leverage the message of individual and family preparedness.”136 
This survey also looked at the 32% of Americans who stated they were not 
prepared and had done nothing to prepare for disasters.  The reasons cited were consistent 
with other surveys: 45% simply had not thought about it, 34% did not think an 
emergency would happen to them or their family, 25% thought that nothing they could do 
would be effective, 24% said they did not know what to do to get prepared, 18% said it 
takes too much time, and 16% cited cost.137  
Of those who had taken at least one step toward preparedness, 80% cited the need 
to be self-sufficient and not reliant on others, while 49% cited responsibility for children 
as a reason to prepare.  In San Francisco and Miami, high percentages (61% and 62% 
respectively) cited steps were taken to prepare because they were in a high risk area.138 
Another survey was discussed in an article in TIME Magazine in August of 2006, 
entitled “Why We Don’t Prepare.”139  
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…Historically, humans get serious about avoiding disasters only after one 
has just smacked them across the face.  Well, then, by that logic, 2006 
should have been a breakthrough year for rational behavior.  With the 
memory of 9/11, the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history, still fresh in 
their minds, Americans watched Katrina…on live TV.  Anyone who 
didn’t know it before should have learned that bad things can 
happen.…Granted, some amount of delusion is probably part of the human 
condition…But a review of the past year in disaster history suggests that 
modern Americans are particularly, mysteriously bad at protecting 
themselves from guaranteed threats.  We know more than we ever did 
about the dangers we face.  But it turns out that in times of crisis, our 
greatest enemy is rarely the storm, the quake or the surge itself.   More 
often, it is ourselves.140 
The article refers to America as having “A National Culture of Unpreparedness,” 
pointing out that “it’s not just bureaucrats who are unprepared for calamity.  Regular 
people are even less likely to plan ahead.”   Although about half of those surveyed had 
personal experience of a natural disaster or public emergency, only 16% said they were 
“very well prepared” for the next one.  According to the TIME poll, about half of those 
84% who were not very well prepared said it was because they didn’t live in a high-risk 
area.  This is despite the fact that “91% of Americans live in places at a moderate-to-high 
risk of earthquakes, volcanoes, tornadoes, wildfires, hurricanes, flooding, high-wind 
damage or terrorism,” according to an estimate by the Hazards and Vulnerability 
Research Institute at the University of South Carolina.141  
The TIME article synthesizes the findings of a report by Robert Blendon, 
Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health. 
This report was based on a survey of 2,000 respondents in eight hurricane-prone states, 
looking at the reasons why people failed to evacuate and what might motivate people to 
evacuate in the face of another major hurricane.   
Overall, 33% said they would not leave or were not sure whether they 
would leave if an evacuation order was given.  But it was homeowners, at 
39%, who were particularly stubborn.  Lack of funds or transportation 
does play a role for stay-behinds, but according to the poll, a greater 
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consideration is a vague belief their home is well built enough to survive a 
storm – a justification offered by a whopping 68%. 
People cherry-pick the lessons of Katrina to avoid taking action.  Fifty-
four percent of those who say they wouldn’t evacuate are worried that the 
roads would be too crowded, and 67% believe shelters would be 
dangerous. 142  
In another, more recent, survey (unpublished), conducted in August of 2006 by 
Dr. David Abramson, National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University, 
a number of reasons were given as a barrier to having a complete family emergency plan: 
• No time      26.4 
• Not sure what to do     22.4 
• Will not make a difference     13.6 
• Too expensive        5.7 
• Supplies will be provided by government/others   2.4 
• Unlikely there will be an emergency     2.1143 
In this survey, when asked if respondents had taken action (whether gathering 
supplies or developing an emergency plan), 40% stated that they were not planning to do 
anything about preparing, 15% stated they had not prepared, but intended to in the next 
six months, 5% stated they had not yet prepared but intended to in the next month, 12% 
had just recently begun preparing, and 28% responded that they had been prepared for at 
least six months.144  Thus, 60% of overall respondents were unprepared and without the 
basics of preparedness, with a large percentage of overall respondents (40%) not planning 
on taking any action to get prepared, and only 20%  “intending” to take some type of 
action within the next month to six months.  When asked why Americans are not getting  
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prepared and where we are failing to reach people, Dr. Abramson responded: “It 
[preparedness] is not salient at the individual level…we haven’t made a compelling case, 
we just haven’t made it salient.”145 
B. EXCUSES, EXCUSES:  FROM NO MONEY, NO TIME, TO 
UNDERPERCEIVING RISK, FUTILITY AND FATALISM, AND THE 
BELIEF THAT THE CAVALRY WILL ARRIVE  
Many reasons are given for not preparing – no money, no time, or it’s not 
important.  In addition, there are other themes at work: underperceving risk, a sense of 
futility or fatalism (“there’s nothing I can do about it”), and a belief that the cavalry will 
arrive to save the day.  
All of these reasons coincide with the experience of emergency managers across 
the country in promoting public preparedness efforts: 
… Americans have a tendency to be die-hard optimists, literally.  It is part 
of what makes the country great – and invincible.  “There are four stages 
of denial” says Eric Holdeman, director of emergency management for 
Seattle’s King County which faces a significant earthquake threat: “One 
is, it won’t happen.  Two is, if it does happen, it won’t happen to me.  
Three: if it does happen, it won’t be that bad.  And four: if it happens to 
me and it’s bad, there’s nothing I can do to stop it anyway.” 146 
Complacency is an obstacle to preparing citizens for disaster.  In San Francisco, 
this author encountered the attitude that the Loma Prieta earthquake was not so 
disruptive.  The individuals expressing this opinion needed constant reminders that the 
epicenter was sixty miles away from the city and was not our generation’s “Big One.” 
In the ORC Macro survey (conducted October 2005) 31% of respondents agreed 
with the statement “In a disaster, [the] events will likely overtake any preparations you 
and your household may have made.”  This sense of fatalism may play a role in why 
citizens are unlikely to prepare.  “More than half (52%) of Americans who agree that 
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their efforts would be overcome by disaster have done nothing to prepare.”147  The 
CEG/ARC study (cited supra) points to this same phenomenon. 
Others under-perceive the risk.   Dr. Dennis Mileti, a recognized expert in human 
behavior before and after disaster, contends that “We know exactly – exactly – where the 
major disasters will occur…But individuals under-perceive risk.”148   
An interesting and disturbing trend starts to appear in some of these surveys.  
Despite a lack of faith in government, as cited by a variety of surveys and polls 
(discussed more fully in Chapter VI, Section F, infra), and the devastating images from 
Katrina (with Americans in desperate need for basic food, water and supplies days after 
an event) Americans still have an odd faith that help will arrive in time to save them.  The 
above-referenced survey conducted by Professor Beldon found that “ironically, 66% of 
those surveyed were also confident that if they stayed at home, they would be eventually 
rescued – a faith hardly justified by the Katrina experience.  Ours is a strange culture of 
irrational distrust – buoyed by irrational optimism.”149   
Dr. Abramson’s study (cited supra) also showed a trend in believing that the 
cavalry will arrive.  In responding to the question “In the event of a major disaster in your 
community, such as a terrorist attack, a natural disaster or emergency weather event, how 
long do you believe it will take first responders, such as fire, police, paramedics or the 
National Guard to arrive and assist you?”  Forty-seven percent of New Yorkers believed 
help would arrive in less than one hour, with 28% believing help would arrive within 
several hours, followed by 15% believing help would arrive within one day, and 10% 
within several days.  In looking at Louisiana and Mississippi, 33% and 37% respectively, 
believed help would arrive in less than one hour, 26% and 27% within several hours, 
15% for each sampling believed help would arrive within one day, and 25% and 21% 
believed help would arrive within several days.  The nation as a whole was not as  
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optimistic as New Yorkers or residents of the Gulf States.  Nationally, 33% of 
respondents believed help would arrive within one hour, 31% within several days, 18% 
within one day and 18% within several days.150  
These recent numbers are astounding in the post-Katrina world and work at odds 
with efforts to prepare Americans to be self-sufficient for several days in the event of a 
disaster.  If the general population believes help will arrive immediately, then how do we 
make a compelling case to the contrary?   
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IV. CREATING A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS: WHAT IS 
PREPAREDNESS AND HOW DO WE MEASURE IT? WHAT IS A 
CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS? ARE WE MAKING EFFORTS 
TOWARD BECOMING PSYCHOLOGICALLY PREPARED FOR 
TERRORISM AND CREATING RESILIENCY? 
A. WHAT IS PREPAREDNESS AND HOW DO WE MEASURE IT?  
Significant investment is needed to create a culture of preparedness in this 
country. Strategic investment, aimed at elevating preparedness, requires a definition of 
preparedness, a clear vision of what we are trying to achieve, and a measurement tool to 
establish a baseline from which to measure improvements derived from (or the failure of) 
bold new initiatives.  The need for a measurement tool and clear, defined goals is 
highlighted in a recent article revealing serious flaws in the government’s ability to 
measure success in bioterrorism programs.  “More than five years after the Sept. 11 
attacks, the government cannot show how $5 billion given to the public health 
departments has better prepared the country for a bioterrorism attack or flu pandemic.”151   
This article shows the difficulty in measuring success and progress and the CDC cites 
“difficulty getting health departments to agree about what the government should 
measure.”152 
The same debate needs to take place in defining preparedness and what to 
measure in terms of preparedness.  Indeed, the very idea of a culture of preparedness 
needs to be developed and defined.  How will we know when we have achieved success 
when we have not defined the goal and the end state?  Is a culture of preparedness when 
30%, 50%, 90% of the population has food and water stored to survive on its own for a 
minimum of seventy-two hours?  When every American has a family emergency plan in 
place? When the majority of Americans has undergone training and understands how to 
respond to the hazards to that community?  And, more importantly, how are we preparing 
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for terrorism, the purpose of which is to inflict harm with the goal of instilling 
widespread fear and psychological trauma in a population?  What measures are we taking 
and how will we measure success in preparing for the consequences of terrorism?  
1. The Public Readiness Index:  Measuring the Basics 
Myriad websites and brochures from government at all levels and non-profit 
organizations list the things one must have on hand for a preparedness kit and supplies, 
offer checklists for emergency plans and contacts, and encourage residents to “get 
involved” or “get informed” by participating in CERT programs, Red Cross training and 
other community efforts.  These sources provide the basics of personal preparedness. 
The Council for Excellence in Government (CEG), in consultation with many 
entities, has developed the “Public Readiness Index” as a tool for measuring basic 
preparedness.  This tool measures ten items – three that are knowledge-based and seven 
that are behavior-based – to provide a city, community or individual, with their Readiness 
Quotient or RQ.   
Public Readiness Index – 10 Point Scale 
Knowledge Elements (Questions 1-3) 
• Does your local government have an emergency or disaster plan 
for your community? 
• Do you know how to find the emergency broadcasting channel on 
the radio? 
• In the past 30 days, have you seen or heard any messages that 
encourage people to take steps to be prepared for emergency 
situations in your community? 
Behavior Elements (Questions 4-10) 
• Have you actually prepared a disaster supply kit with emergency 
supplies like water, food and medicine that is kept in a designated 
place in your home? 
• Have you actually prepared a small kit with emergency supplies 
that you keep at home, in your car or where you work to take with 
you if you had to leave quickly? 
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• Have you actually made a specific plan for how you and your 
family would communicate in an emergency situation if you were 
separated? 
• Have you actually established a specific meeting place to reunite in 
the event you and your family cannot return home or are 
evacuated? 
• Have you actually practiced or drilled on what to do in an 
emergency at home? 
• Have you actually volunteered to help prepare for or respond to a 
major emergency? 
• Have you actually taken first aid training such as CPR in the past 
five years? 
The CEG’s PRI is a healthy first start in looking at preparedness and measuring a 
baseline of basic preparedness issues from knowledge of where to turn for information, to 
storing supplies, to plans and meeting places, to some basic training in first aid and 
volunteering to help prepare for or respond to disaster.  This scale was intentionally 
geared toward measuring the very basics of personal preparedness.153 
2. The Fritz Institute: Measurements Need to Look Beyond Activities to 
the Quality of Preparedness Efforts and View Preparedness as an 
Ongoing Process 
The Fritz Institute, based in San Francisco, is studying the issue of citizen 
preparedness and developing new programs.  It has recently produced a white paper 
suggesting that a more sophisticated modeling approach be used for measuring 
preparedness. This approach would take into account many years of study and research at 
the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado, Boulder, as well other works, 
databases, and studies focusing on disaster preparedness and measuring preparedness for 
households, businesses and government entities that have been developed over the past 
few decades.  Dr. Kathleen Tierney, Director of the Natural Hazards Research and 
Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado at Boulder, co-authored 
the study. In advocating for a measurement tool, the report states, “The federal 
government has prioritized national preparedness without developing a system to achieve 
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and maintain it.”154  The purpose of the report is to suggest ways to develop a 
“standardized index to measure disaster preparedness.”155  The report looks at the 
question of “What is Disaster Preparedness?” referring to preparedness in a number of 
different ways, including: “developing planning processes to ensure readiness; 
formulating disaster plans; stockpiling resources necessary for effective response; and 
developing skills and competencies to ensure effective performance of disaster-related 
tasks.”  The report recognizes that  
Preparedness is commonly viewed as consisting of activities aimed at 
improving response activities and coping capabilities…However, 
emphasis is increasingly being placed on recovery preparedness – that is, 
on planning not only in order to respond effectively during and 
immediately after disasters but also in order to successfully navigate 
challenges associated with short and long term recovery.156 
In looking at household preparedness, there are six common areas measured or 
studied in past surveys and studies: hazard knowledge, formal and informal response 
plans and agreements, life safety protection, property protection, emergency coping and 
restoration of key functions, and initiation of recovery. According to this report, “the 
main emphasis tends to fall in the area of hazard knowledge, life safety, and property 
protection, with specific attention placed on assembling a disaster supplies kit, mitigation 
activities, and developing a family communications plan.”157 
This white paper looks at the standard measurements and suggests there is far 
more to the issue of “what it means to be prepared for disaster” and makes 
recommendations to look further than measuring simple activities to measuring the 
quality of the preparedness efforts.  As stated in the report, “preparedness is a process, 
not a product.”158   
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The report is meant as a “first step in the collaborative development of assessment 
strategies for household, community, and organizational preparedness.”159  Psychological 
preparedness for the impact of terrorism is not mentioned in the report, but these new 
efforts are moving past just the basics of measuring food, water and supplies present in 
the household to the actual quality of the preparedness efforts; this effort also is moving 
toward measurement of recovery preparedness. 
3. The National Preparedness Goal, the Target Capabilities List and 
Performance Measures and Metrics 
As set forth in Chapter II, the federal government has been prioritizing citizen 
preparedness in speeches and documents including the Townsend Report, HSPD-8, the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Interim National Preparedness Goal, the 
National Preparedness Goal and its accompanying Target Capabilities List.  The 
National Preparedness Goal is based on the requirements of HSPD-8.  “The National 
Preparedness Goal (The Goal) envisions a national preparedness system in which all 
entities have target levels of capability in place and effectively communicate and 
coordinate resources.  Implementing such a system will be a complex undertaking.  To 
guide implementation in the short term, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
8…calls for the Goal to include measurable national priorities to be achieved.”  The 
Goal is designed to address essential capabilities and to “establish measurable priorities, 
targets, and a common approach to developing needed capabilities.”160   The Goal spells 
                                                 
159 Jeanette Sutton, Kathleen Tierney, Disaster Preparedness: Concepts, Guidance, and Research, 37, 
italics and emphasis in original. 
160 United States Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet, A Common Starting Point:  The 
National Priorities,” undated, www.dhs.gov, (accessed March 14, 2007 and October 9, 2007). 
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out the National Priorities (to meet the most urgent needs161) as well as the thirty-seven 
capabilities and associated outcomes from the Target Capabilities List. 
“Citizen Preparedness and Participation” is a target capability.  This capability is 
subject to future revisions as a result of Hurricane Katrina.162  Under the Target 
Capabilities List, a “Capability Definition” is provided for “Citizen Preparedness and 
Participation:” 
Everyone in America is fully aware, trained, and practiced on how to 
prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and 
hazards. This requires a role for citizens in personal preparedness, 
exercises, ongoing volunteer programs, and surge capacity response.163 
There are five activity areas discussed as part of this capability.  The most 
relevant to a discussion of how to measure citizen/individual preparedness falls under the 
activity of “Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas.”  The 
definition states:  “Ensure the public is educated and trained in prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery for all hazards, with specific consideration for high-threat hazards 
for the area in which they live, work, or attend school and for special needs.”164  A 
variety of “Critical Tasks” are listed and detailed “Performance Measures” and “Metrics” 
are provided.   
The TCL sets some very high standards for measuring citizen preparedness.  
Although no common definition of citizen preparedness exists, the performance measures 
                                                 
161 United States Department of Homeland Security, Final National Preparedness Goal, (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 2005), 13.  The seven National Priorities are three 
overarching priorities – Implement NIMS and the NRP, Expand Regional Collaboration, Implement the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan – and four capability-specific priorities from the TCL – Strengthen 
Information Sharing and Collaboration, Strengthen Interoperable Communications, Strengthen CBRNE 
Detection, Response and Decontamination Capabilities, Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis 
Capabilities.  An additional priority was added after Hurricane Katrina: Strengthen Emergency Operations 
Planning and Citizen Protection Capabilities (mostly focused on mass care, shelter, evacuation, or in-place 
protection).  See United States Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina Impact on the 
National Preparedness Goal and Target Capabilities List,” www.dhs.gov, (accessed March 10, 2007 and 
October 15, 2007). 
162 See DHS, “Hurricane Katrina Impact on the National Preparedness Goal and Target Capabilities 
List.” 
163 DHS, Draft Target Capabilities List, September 2006, 107. 
164 Ibid., 109. 
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and metrics provided in the Target Capabilities List do give an indication of what the 
federal government is striving for in developing a robust citizen preparedness effort.  The 
items measured go far beyond the PRI and all of the surveys to date in measuring 
preparedness.  Generally, the metrics call for a 5% annual increase in each area measured 
until 80% of the stated performance measurement is achieved.  The metrics measure 
many things including education and training, awareness, knowledge on a variety of 
subjects, maintenance of skills and knowledge, shelter in place preparations, planning, 
CBRNE training and decontamination, first aid, life-saving skills, and implementation of 
mitigation measures, among others. 
The TCL sets forth the performance measures and metrics as shown in the 
excerpted pages.   
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Excerpt from Draft Target Capabilities List, September 2006 
Common Mission:  Community Preparedness and Participation 











Taken as a whole, the fifteen highlighted areas for measurement provide a 
roadmap for a robust citizen preparedness effort. They represent the most thorough 
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attempt to date in developing a comprehensive scope of what it would take to create a 
highly trained, knowledgeable, prepared, and resilient citizenry.   However, it may be 
unrealistic to expect 5% yearly increases and a goal of 80% of the population prepared in 
these fifteen areas, given the difficulties of just getting the public to store food and water 
or take preparedness measures and the threat of terrorism seriously.  The TCL is an 
admirable first effort to define what a truly prepared public should look like, but the lack 
of resources allocated for citizen preparedness and the lack of attention paid by 
government and citizens to the issue presents an enormous hurdle to creating a culture of 
preparedness. 
4. Reports Show Need for Consistency in Measurement in National 
Studies/Surveys:  Perceived Preparedness Differs from Actual 
Preparedness, Terrorism Preparedness Not Measured 
In reviewing national surveys and polls, it is interesting to note that many of the 
questions asking how “prepared” a citizen is often do not delve into exactly what the 
individual has done to get prepared.  Thus, a respondent’s perception of his or her own 
preparedness may not mean that individual actually has the basics of preparedness. 
A striking finding is that respondents’ perceptions of their preparedness 
for disaster (as measured by those who responded that they were prepared 
or somewhat prepared) are much greater than their actual preparedness, 
given responses to questions on specific preparedness activities such as 
having a plan or preparing a kit.165 
A clear, consistent measurement of preparedness is necessary to accurately reflect 
a baseline of preparedness across the country. The analysis cited above also found that 
“people may report taking steps toward preparedness, but when asked follow-up 




                                                 
165 ORC Macro, “Methodological Considerations,” 1.  
166 Ibid., 8. 
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supported by the studies discussed in Chapter III, supra, where respondents are actually 
asked specific questions about supplies on hand or elements of a disaster plan, versus 
their initial response of being prepared. 
It has been recognized that “the emphasis on a disaster plan and home-related 
supplies limits our understanding of other aspects of preparedness.”167  After reviewing 
preparedness surveys from across the country, conducted over the past several years, a 
recent study concluded that only two main aspects of preparedness were explored – 
disaster plans and gathering supplies.  Only a few surveys or studies went further to look 
at volunteering, training, or knowing what actions to take during and after an 
emergency.168   
This same study also recognizes that preparedness for terrorism has not been 
measured.   
Because terrorism is often used as a monolithic term, it is difficult to 
gauge a citizens’ perceptions of, and preparedness for, specific types of 
terrorism.  Furthermore, research findings on preparedness for a particular 
type of natural hazard do not necessarily indicate preparedness for other 
types of natural hazards or for events caused by terrorism.  This 
complicates the ability to use the results to measure levels of preparedness 
relative to specific threats and to design targeted messages and 
campaigns.169 
Measuring preparedness for the psychological impact of terrorism will be 
challenging.  This may not fit within the current all-hazards approach to citizen 
preparedness, where resiliency, an immediate return to normalcy, and overall 
psychological preparedness for terrorism are needed.  These concepts are more fully 
developed in Chapter V, infra in the context of the Israeli approach to creating a culture 
of preparedness. 
                                                 




B. A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS AS RELATED TO TERRORISM, 
THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PREPAREDNESS  
The term “culture of preparedness” has been used throughout speeches and was 
established as a goal in the Townsend Report.  But what does it mean?  According to 
FEMA’s own definition, “a culture is the special way of life that holds a group of people 
together and makes it different from all other groups.”170  Others define culture as “the 
accumulated habits, attitudes, and beliefs of a group of people that define for them their 
general behavior and way of life; the total set of learned activities of a people.”171  
Culture can also be defined as a set of shared beliefs and values of a group – the beliefs, 
customs, practices and social behavior of a particular nation or people; people with 
shared beliefs and practices – a group of people whose shared beliefs and practices 
identify the particular place, class or time to which they belong;  or shared attitudes – a 
particular set of attitudes that characterizes a group of people.172  Community 
preparedness and individual preparedness are key to creating a true culture of 
preparedness.  
In developing a culture of preparedness can we ignore the aspects of 
psychological preparedness for terrorism?  “Terrorism is about psychology…It is about 
making ordinary people feel vulnerable, anxious, confused, uncertain, and helpless.”173   
Because of its unique characteristics, citizen preparedness for the psychological 
impact of terrorism (fear) may not fit neatly into an “all-hazards” approach.   But in 
creating a true culture of preparedness, the resiliency of individuals and the community to 
deal with the intended impact of terrorist acts must be developed, addressed, and 
measured. 
                                                 
170 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Glossary,” Earthquakes – FEMA, 159, 
www.FEMA/gov/library/file (accessed April 15, 2007). 
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Ignoring psychological preparedness in response to terrorism cannot continue.  
Americans do believe that we will be attacked again.  The government should initiate an 
open and frank dialogue about psychologically preparing the population for terrorism and 
its impact.  In 2005, 76% of Americans believed that Osama Bin Laden was currently 
planning a significant terrorist attack against the United States.  In 2006, this number 
decreased to 70% but still remains very high.  When asked, in 2005, whether Bin Laden 
would be successful in launching an attack, 53% of Americans thought such an attack 
would be successful; in 2006, fewer (42%) thought he would be successful.174  These 
numbers show, as do other studies such as those by Dr. Light at NYU and others cited 
supra in Chapter III, that Americans believe there is a strong likelihood of attack.  These 
numbers may also indicate a willingness on the part of the American people to engage in 
a dialogue about preparing for terrorism. 
As widespread fear is the intended impact of terrorism, efforts must be made to 
take the “terror” out of terrorism.  In a poll conducted in October of 2001, 26% of those 
surveyed agreed with the statement that it is the duty of Americans not to show fear about 
the threat of terrorism, while 71% stated there is nothing wrong with showing fear about 
terrorism.  More recently, Gallup issued a report showing that in September of 2001, 58% 
of Americans were very or somewhat worried that they or someone in their family would 
be a victim of terrorism.  This number has decreased to 45% in 2007, but is still 
significant. 
Americans’ personal concern about terrorism remains significant, though 
it is much lower now than after 9/11…terrorism has faded as a top-of-
mind concern for many Americans when they are asked to say what is the 
most important problem facing our country.  However, the issue still ranks 
near the top of the list when Americans are asked to assess the importance 
of various issues as priorities for the President and Congress or as factors 






                                                 
174 The Gallup Organization, Gallup Brain, “Osama Bin Laden," www.institution.gallup.com 
(accessed on March 1, 2007). 
 80
overtake other issues as the dominant concern for Americans (a position 
that the war in Iraq currently holds) with new attacks or an increased 
threat of attacks.175  
Government and the public must be prepared to deal with the psychological impacts of 
terrorism long before the next terrorist attack.    
A number of recent articles and studies have begun to look at the long term 
implications of terrorism and the need for government, public health, and the medical 
community to prepare for the impact of a terrorist attack.176  This area of study should 
also be explored and developed to find ways to psychologically prepare citizens to 
ameliorate the impact of terrorism, creating a resilient population.  The importance of 
psychological preparedness and resiliency is addressed in the next chapter in the 
discussion of Israel as a culture of preparedness. 
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V. CREATING A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS: ISRAEL AS A 
MODEL, LESSONS LEARNED FOR TERRORISM, THE 
IMPORTANCE OF RESILIENCY AND EDUCATION 
Israel has made preparedness a way of life. Preparedness has been integrated into 
its culture through a variety of means.  Some of the lessons learned from Israel, 
particularly in the areas of preparedness education in all primary schools, using an 
integrated curriculum, as well as education and training for all upper high school grade 
students and requiring these students to perform volunteer work in emergencies, may 
prove helpful in establishing a culture of preparedness in the U.S.  Unlike Americans, 
Israelis live every day with the constant threat and reality of terrorism.  Israel has taken 
extreme measures in education and preparedness, which may not fit with the American 
lifestyle or culture, with a particular emphasis on terrorism.  That is, unless and until 
suicide bombings and/or additional terrorist events take place on American soil and in 
American cities. 
Terrorism is psychological warfare, intended to create fear and panic within a 
citizenry.  Traditionally, actual fatalities and injuries resulting from a terrorist act are 
limited.177  The real impact is the fear and uncertainty that terrorism spreads and the 
feeling that government cannot protect its citizenry.  Resiliency in the face of terrorist 
acts and taking the “terror” out of terrorism has been a hallmark of the Israeli approach.  
Citizens are educated about risks and survival strategies and embrace their personal 
responsibility for knowing what to do in an emergency.  This empowerment serves to 
defeat terrorism.  Preparedness is considered a partnership between government and the 
citizenry. 
Another important factor in the Israeli success in preparedness lies in the 
credibility of the messenger communicating the threat to the citizenry, and what actions 
citizens should take to prepare themselves and their families for disaster.  The Home  
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Front Command (herein “HFC”) is held in high regard and citizens listen to this 
government entity.  Israeli citizens do feel that government is protecting them and have 
faith in this government institution to provide accurate advice. 
In contrast, studies show that the U.S. citizenry believes there will be additional 
terrorist attacks in the U.S., but have little faith in government to protect them from 
various forms of attack.178  The use of a trusted institution and trusted messenger to 
inspire and motivate citizens to be prepared is key to a successful effort in emergency 
preparedness and awareness. 
A comparison of the U.S. and Israel presents several challenges.  The two 
countries differ in government structure (no federalism issues in Israel), the presence of 
enemies on all borders (Americans feel buffered by oceans), demographics (less 
ethnically diverse group than a highly diverse U.S. population), and a vastly different 
geographic and population size.  Israel is 20,330 square kilometers in size (exclusive of 
water), slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey, whereas the U.S. is 9,832,630 
square kilometers (exclusive of water).  The population of Israel is approximately 6.4 
million, compared to the U.S. population of approximately 298 million.179   These factors 
all play a part in the success of Israel’s programs, policies, and strategies and may present 
some challenges to applicability of these programs and policies in the U.S.  However, 
Israel offers several lessons which can be adapted or adopted to enhance U.S. efforts to 
create a culture of preparedness. 
A. ISRAEL AS A TRUE CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS, TERRORISM AS 
A PART OF LIFE, REQUIRED EDUCATIONAL CURRICULUM, A 
PSYCHOLOGICALLY RESILIENT POPULATION  
The Israeli approach to preparedness and communication with the citizenry can be 
seen on the Home Front Command website. 180  The messages to the public are very 
                                                 
178 Paul C. Light, Preparing for the Unthinkable. 
179 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007, 
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“matter of fact” and straightforward.  As the citizens and government live under the 
constant threat of terrorism, its impact is a very real part of everyday life.  Citizens have 
been effectively engaged in the process, however, and preparedness and awareness has 
become part of the culture.   
Standardized preparedness curriculum is integrated into schools at the primary 
level.181  
In Israel, citizen preparedness is a major part of national readiness and 
disaster preparedness.  At the age of 18 most Israelis go into the army.  In 
5th grade every student is taught 2 days of readiness and emergency 
preparedness.  In high school the highest two classes serve as volunteers in 
times of emergencies and assist in response to disasters and 
emergencies.182 
Citizen preparedness and education is approached from an empowerment perspective – 
that citizens can be part of “the cause” in fighting terrorism and a prepared citizenry 
defeats terrorism.  It is also considered a citizen’s responsibility to be prepared. 
Thinking Differently 101 
Looking for details about dealing with terrorism?  Try Israel.  Its 
government updates read like a police blotter: “On Sunday, April 20, 
2003, Fa’ruz Ahmed Mahmud Makhil was arrested in the Balata refugee 
camp, near Nablus. [Makhil], a wanted female Palestinian, intended to 
carry out a suicide bombing inside Israel. [Makhil] was the fifth terrorist 
arrested in the past two weeks, three of whom intended to carry out suicide 
bombings.” 
Israel demonstrates how a country’s populace can simultaneously adjust to 
the dangers of terrorism and bolster security on the home front.  
Elementary school children there learn about chemical and biological 
weapons and how to use a gas mask.  The Israeli government runs TV 
spots advising people how to keep an eye out for explosives in public 
places. “Public awareness of bombs has been an important aspect of 
coping with terrorism here,” says Ariel Merari, director of the political 
                                                 
181 Col. (ret.) Boaz Tadmor, M.D., Webinar (New York: Columbia University Mailman School of 
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violence research unit at Tel Aviv University. “Indeed, in many cases, 
bombs have been found because of people’s awareness.” 
Yet, because the terrorism threat is different in the U.S., the government 
may not want to go as far as to include Gas Masks 101 in the curriculum 
of second-graders.183  
Israel actively engages the public in the war on terrorism.  This approach also 
keeps the public from falling victim to hopelessness and the sense that the individual can 
do nothing about the threat of terrorism.  The HFC website reiterates that terrorism is a 
part of the culture in Israel.  On one page, in the right hand corner, there is a color 
photograph of a silhouette of a man and woman standing together at sunset, a happy 
couple gazing at each other…wearing gasmasks.  This same page describes the IPK 
(individual protective kit) which is distributed to each citizen and replenished by the HFC 
at expiration. Immigrants and newborns are also issued IPKs.  The kit contains syringes, 
masks, and other essential items and may not be opened unless there are explicit 
instructions from the HFC to do so, as “these items may well save your life at the 
moment of truth.”184 
The HFC’s fifty-two page pamphlet entitled “In the Event of a Genuine Alert, 
Information on Civil Defense for the Family” (dated January 2003) has a similar tone, 
treating terrorism as an accepted part of everyday life.  The cover has a photograph of an 
idyllic happy family of four (Mom, Dad, two young children) and the content of the 
preparedness guide covers everything from missile attacks to syringe injection 
instructions and proper establishment of safe rooms (including APS: Apartment Protected 
Space and FPS: Floor Protected Space) and ventilating systems.  Running throughout the 
pamphlet are cheery photographs; color illustrations show a family with small children all 
donning masks and hoods in a safe room equipped with children’s toys and dolls and 
coloring books, as though it’s a typical evening at home. 
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In January of 2002, Redbook published an article describing the life of a mother, 
father, and three small children living in Jerusalem. 
I don’t think of my home as a war zone.  I was born in the U.S., but I now 
call Jerusalem, where I’ve lived for the past seven years, my home.  If the 
Israel of news accounts seems an embattled country, visitors here are 
invariably struck by the persistence of normalcy – open businesses, 
bustling streets, children in schools, parks full of people. 
Yet beneath our adherence to routine lies a not-so-thinly-veiled anxiety, 
the result of terrorist attacks so frequent they themselves have come to 
seem almost routine.   I can’t say that I walk around feeling uptight all the 
time, but when I’m in a public space – especially downtown Jerusalem—I 
am intensely aware of every passerby.  Suicide bombers often perform 
their deadly missions in disguise, dressed as Orthodox Jews or Israeli 
soldiers.  Any man or woman carrying a lot of packages is suspect.  When 
I leave a public place, something in my body relaxes.  Only then do I 
realize how tense I have been, how wary of the crowd. 
Certain security precautions are standard procedure here, and it’s striking 
how quickly one becomes accustomed to them.  Having the trunk of your 
car inspected has become as routine as putting on your shoes.  Your bags 
are not checked for shoplifting when you leave a mall, but for explosives 
when you enter.  My 5-year-old daughter Noa’s kindergarten is protected 
by an armed guard, as are cafes, pizzerias, and movie theaters.  And each 
of the three times I gave birth during the past five years, I left the hospital 
loaded with the usual infant-formula samples, new bottles, and a gas mask 
for the baby (a reminder that chemical attacks are still possible even 11 
years after the Persian Gulf War, when Iraqis were rumored to have 
equipped their Scud missiles with chemical warheads). 
Staying safe – or at least feeling safe – has become a matter of rearranging 
our routines…185      
This woman’s own words reveal a culture of preparedness and resiliency in the face of 
terrorism. 
Israel’s messages and expectation of the public and their role is clear-cut.  In 
looking at preparedness for disease outbreak and medical preparedness:  
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Specific items which Israeli citizens take individual responsibility for 
include: understanding the threat and the potential impact; cooperating and 
collaborating with authorities; situational awareness, suspicion and 
notifying authorities; individual reporting of illness or cases; self isolation; 
determining what kind of protection is required based on the threat; first 
aid and initial treatment; individual follow up with medical authorities and 
individual reporting to health authorities.186  
Messages of reality work in Israel because of the context.  The empowerment of citizens 
– in controlling their destiny despite the great unknown of terrorism and when it might 
strike – provides a resiliency at the community and individual level.  This resiliency 
serves to defeat terrorism. 
In contrast, most Americans seem to feel that terrorism will happen in the U.S., 
but not to them187 and believe there is little they can do about it.  Others simply don’t 
want to think about it.188  The key for the U.S. is “getting people to listen to unsettling 
messages that they would prefer to ignore”189 and moving citizens to take action in 
preparedness efforts to create a resilient community.   
Terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, and Israel defeats terrorism by 
meeting it head on. “Perhaps there’s a lesson to be learned.  Because terrorism is 
psychological warfare, one of the best responses may be to gradually become less afraid 
of it – that is, to prepare for it not just with duct tape but with psychology.”190   The HFC 
website echoes this strategy in defeating terrorism. 
Terrorism does not present an existential threat to Israel, but it is 
becoming a strategic threat, succeeding in spreading fear among the public 
and thus affecting political positions and processes and, of course, the 
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future of  the state and its residents.  We must continue our daily routine 
and not help our attackers in their goal of disrupting our lives.191  
This same sentiment is echoed by a journalist who covered the Scud missile 
attacks on Tel Aviv in Jerusalem in recounting her experience early one morning after a 
Scud missile hit a nearby area as families were preparing for the day ahead. Everyone 
was poised with gas masks and atropine needles waiting for the “all clear” or the “inject 
yourself now” announcement on TV or radio.  After the “all clear” announcement was 
made, children were put on busses to head to school and life returned to normal.  She 
even describes the scene of children with “boxes casually slung over every little 
shoulder…decorated with stickers, glitter, drawings. Gasmask boxes.”192  
That is what I learned in Israel on that morning all those years ago.  I 
couldn’t stand to see those children being put on school busses after the 
missile landed.  I thought, Netanyahu said “all clear” to indicate that the 
bomb wasn’t a chemical or biological weapon.  He didn’t say no more 
were on the way.  What are these people thinking?   I ran up to one mother 
and asked, “Aren’t you afraid?  What if there’s another attack?”  She 
gazed at me with a great deal of pity. “You’re American.  You don’t 
understand how terror works.  It is about changing the way you live, react, 
think, don’t think.  That’s what they love to see, these people.  If they 
make you crazy and stupid with fear they win.  I am more afraid of losing 
my child to that.”193  
In a woman’s own words, she describes how Israelis refuse to allow terrorism to rule 
their lives. 
Preparedness in Israel has a strong basis in psychology.  Hirsch Goodman, a 
senior fellow at the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies and a columnist for Jerusalem 
Report described Israel’s preparedness in a 2003 interview.  “Every man, woman, child 
has a gas mask and the correct type of injections.  They’re in the schools, their shelters.”  
In describing Israel’s preparedness efforts, “the level of preparedness, both  
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psychologically and everything, is very, very high.”194  He cites both equipment and 
psychology as the keys to preparedness for terrorism.   
The citizens of Israel are considered an essential part of the effort in defeating 
terrorism.  “Public participation has been one of the cornerstones of Israeli defensive 
measures against terrorism in the domestic arena.”195  This effort resembles more of a 
partnership with government.   
Much of Israel’s success in thwarting terrorist bombings can be attributed 
to public awareness.  The majority of explosive devices placed in public 
sites such as bus stations, supermarkets, and shopping centers have been 
discovered by civilians who were able to alert the police before the bombs 
went off.  Public alertness has been encouraged by the police 
advertisements on television and other media, but the main reason for this 
high-level awareness has undoubtedly been the Israeli public’s 
identification with the struggle against terrorism.196 
In the U.S., however, this spirit of partnership has not been fostered.  
Addressing the barriers to improving public preparedness is important.  It 
is increasingly understood that citizen participation in disaster planning 
and response is an essential factor in determining actual readiness for 
major catastrophic events.  In fact, optimal preparedness is best 
understood as a partnership between government strategies and individual 
behaviors.  The failure of “both partners” were (sic) painfully evident in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.197  
B. TRUSTED MESSENGERS, FAITH IN GOVERNMENT, AND REGULAR 
AND CONSISTENT MESSAGES 
A critical factor in citizen preparedness centers on the credibility of the entity 
providing the information or instructions.  Several studies from the New York Academy 
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of Medicine, New York University, and ABC polls, all discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter VI, infra, show that Americans have little faith in government as a messenger.  
The combination of these findings is very important to address in a preparedness and 
education campaign.  People will not do what government expects and needs them to do 
before, during, and after an emergency unless there is faith in government.   
In a post-Katrina world, intense effort to restore citizens’ faith in government is 
needed and is critical to emergency response efforts.  Messengers of disaster 
preparedness and education are very important.  The government needs to be seen as a 
trusted resource, with viable emergency plans and strong leadership.  Likewise, 
government needs to team with trusted messengers in every community including clergy, 
neighborhood leaders, and respected non-profits.  
The Israeli government and Home Force Command have great credibility. 
One key to Israel’s success in living with the constant threat of terrorism is 
the government’s credibility on the issue.  When the Israeli government 
announces that, say, it apprehended a terrorist outside a Tel Aviv café at 3 
p.m. last Sunday, the Israeli public doesn’t question the truth of the 
statement, any more than Americans do when their local police 
department announces that it thinks it has solved a murder. 
Government terrorism warnings and announcements have to be credible, 
or the public won’t take them seriously.  Israel’s HFC has enough 
credibility to get away with having as its motto, “You Can Count On 
Us!”…Leno and Letterman would have a field day ridiculing the 
department if it tried to adopt such a motto.198  
The HFC website currently has another motto on the masthead, “You are in Good Hands” 
and refers to its mission as “a command which stands for saving lives.”  Further, the 
website describes the HFC as a “national leader in the field of civil defense in different 
states of emergency, represents a central element in the strength of our country and its 
citizens, a worthy recipient of the full trust of the population.”  Unfortunately, faith in 
government continues to be a major factor in trying to get Americans to take personal 
preparedness issues and the threat of terrorism seriously. 
                                                 
198 Siobhan Gorman, “Fear Factor.” 
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The U.S. should consider moving citizen preparedness efforts to a centralized, 
trusted source for information.  FEMA and DHS have differing preparedness websites 
that must be reconciled.  CDC has its own approach to terrorism and pandemic flu 
preparedness efforts which should blend seamlessly with its federal partners.  
Consistency of message across the country is needed from government and its partners in 
preparedness.  For example, the American Red Cross called for five things one needs to 
do to be prepared,199 Ready.gov has three and California’s OES program has ten.  
Americans tend to distrust and question government institutions.  Federalism is 
also a factor in developing a centralized message and effort.  A serious policy debate 
should take place as to whether one federal agency should “own” the issue of 
preparedness (from education through messaging) and unify the federal voice under one 
program.  This regularity, unity, and consistency of message has been a key ingredient in 
the Israeli success.   See also Chapter VI, infra, “Stovepipes and Silos.” 
C. EDUCATION (INCLUDING A HISTORY OF REASONS TO PREPARE) 
AND MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE AT AGE 17 
Israelis prepare because there is a history of reasons to prepare.  The U.S., as 
diverse and large as it is, also has a substantial history of reasons to prepare for terrorism 
and natural disasters – from the 9/11 attacks to devastating earthquakes, floods, massive 
wildfires, and deadly hurricanes – yet citizens remain unprepared.  Part of the educational 
effort must stress the history of reasons to prepare.   
Discussion of terrorism at a young age is an essential component of the Israeli 
strategy.  In the U.S., many believe that talk of terrorism will “scare the children.”  
Educational efforts need to be sensitive to this aspect of education, but ignoring 
terrorism, its reality and its impact, undermines efforts to create a resilient population.  
Israelis speak openly about terrorism, children are known to draw faces on their gas 
masks, and they are armed with information and education that allows them to cope with 
the issue and provides them the tools to survive an attack.  This resiliency, imbued at a 
                                                 
199 The American Red Cross has since changed to three to be consistent with the Ready campaign. 
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young age, is the underpinning of Israel’s culture of preparedness.  Elementary school 
education involving terrorism must be approached with extreme sensitivity and caution. 
Education in the high school years, with a more intense curriculum, provides a 
cadre of young adults who are prepared for any event.  This continuity of education is 
essential.  Israel’s next step in establishing and sustaining a culture of preparedness is 
required military service at age seventeen for all males and females.  Required military 
service at age seventeen is unlikely in the U.S., but a requirement to participate in Citizen 
Corps or on CERT Teams (Community Emergency Response Teams) might be a viable 
option during the late high school years. 
D. PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING FOR 
IMMEDIATE RETURN TO NORMALCY, RESILIENCY IS KEY 
Israel has developed a psychologically prepared citizenry.  Equipment and 
psychological preparation (as part of educational efforts) have been cited as essential to a 
culture of preparedness.  Psychological preparedness is a key component of resiliency.   
The Israeli people acknowledge the seriousness of, and live with, the reality of terrorism 
on a daily basis.  Embracing the fear of terrorism, taking action to prepare and survive, all 
serve to take the “terror” out of terrorism.  Part of developing a psychologically prepared 
country is addressing the psychology of terrorism -- the terrorists want fear and panic and 
to diminish citizens’ faith in government to protect them.  The Israeli approach is: “don’t 
let them be successful.”   
The U.S. needs to prepare the population for another large terrorist attack.  This 
should be part of the education of children and young adults.  In addition, education and 
awareness campaigns need to stress resiliency and prepare citizens for terrorism.  As in 
Israel, these messages need to be regularized and be normal and routine, not alarmist and 
frightening. 
Major urban areas need to be prepared to return to normalcy immediately 
following an attack.  This is another resiliency strategy of the Israeli government.  This 
type of planning should be required in the U.S. for efforts that are funded by DHS.  In 
Israel, bombings scenes are cleaned up immediately, casualties moved, areas cleaned and 
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boarded, and everyday life returns to normal as soon as possible.  In the U.S., this area 
would remain a crime scene for some time.  Israeli strategies should be considered with 
deference to the needs of U.S. law enforcement and investigation efforts.  However, other 
planning efforts to restore a sense of normalcy to a city and its citizens should be 
emphasized and developed as an essential part of planning.   
E. CITIZEN RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTNERSHIP WITH 
GOVERNMENT 
A significant component of the Israeli culture of preparedness is citizens’ 
willingness to embrace their civic duty to prepare; it is the duty of every individual to be 
prepared and to take responsibility for their families and their community.  Preparedness 
is also viewed as a partnership between the citizens and government.  The Israeli 
government relies on awareness and education programs to make citizens a part of the 
effort in defeating terrorism, as another set of “eye and ears” looking for suspicious 
activity.  This is particularly effective in Israel and having citizens as part of the effort 
serves also to defeat the hopeless feeling that terrorism cannot be stopped.  
The U.S. has had some success in efforts that capitalize on “civic duty” as a 
means to promote preparedness.  Similar efforts include transit safety campaigns which 
stress “If you see something, say something.”   Using Israel as a model, this concept of 
partnership with government and being part of the effort should be fully embraced in 
preparedness programs throughout our country. 
F. LESSONS LEARNED FROM ISRAEL:  SOME POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
There are a variety of policies and strategies at work in Israel that may or may not 
be advisable for the U.S. to adopt.  Others may be tailored to provide a more robust and 
effective preparedness effort in the U.S. and used to promote and foster a culture of 
preparedness.  Resiliency is the cornerstone and overarching theme of Israel’s efforts.  
Resiliency – in the form of an equipped, educated, and psychologically prepared 
community – is the only way to confront and defeat terrorism.    
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Despite the recognized differences between Israel and the U.S., there are several 
key lessons to be learned from Israel which could be applied in developing effective 
policies and strategies to create a culture of preparedness and should be considered by 
policy makers: 
• Develop educational curriculum that is age appropriate and mandate its 
incorporation (through federal legislation and funding) at approximately 
the fifth grade level.  This grade level appears to be effective as evidenced 
by the ten-year-old British girl who had studied tsunamis in geography 
class.  She recognized the warning signs of an impending tsunami while 
vacationing in Thailand in December of 2004 and was able to warn guests 
and hotel staff to evacuate the property.  Her actions saved hundreds of 
lives.200 
• Develop educational curriculum for the eleventh and twelfth grade levels 
which teaches a more comprehensive program of preparedness, first aid, 
and CPR; provide opportunities for actual participation in emergency 
efforts.  This should also be federally mandated and funded and should be 
age appropriate.  Mandated education provides a new generation of 
prepared citizens. 
• Truly effective campaigns for citizen preparedness need to be established.  
Current messaging is not penetrating into the American psyche and most 
Americans remain woefully unprepared. 
• Psychological preparation must be addressed to defeat terrorism.  The U.S. 
population is not psychologically prepared for terrorism and the country 
has not prepared itself for nor planned for an immediate return to 
normalcy.  
• Programs should move toward the concept of resiliency to address 
terrorism.  
• Programs should address terrorism at all age levels, which removes the 
fear of terrorism and provides a sense of empowerment to citizens. 
• Programs should stress the partnership aspect of preparedness and engage 
the public in the effort, which also provides a sense of empowerment.  
These efforts should also stress civic duty as well as preparedness as key 
to assisting first responders.  
• Programs should be based on the use of trusted messengers enlisted to 
help create the culture of preparedness.   
• Programs need consistency and regularity of message. The U.S. has many 
mixed messages on preparedness. 
                                                 
200 News Wire Services, “Bill hails tsunami heroine, 10,” Daily News, November 4, 2005. 
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Israel effectively communicates and motivates citizens to take action to prepare 
for terrorism.  Many of these policies and strategies have collectively created a culture of 
preparedness in Israel and several policies can be adapted for the U.S.  Most importantly, 
Israel has shown that the key to defeating terrorism is resiliency.  Resiliency includes 
making significant efforts to prepare in the form of equipment and supplies and 
psychological preparedness.   
To create a culture of preparedness in the U.S., education is the key and starting 
with children and young adults is essential to any such effort.  Successful recycling, seat 
belt usage, and anti-littering campaigns all focused on changing behavior among children 
and young adults.  It will take a significant investment, sustained and ongoing efforts, and 
substantial policy redirection in the U.S. to achieve a culture of preparedness which may 
require an acceptable adaptation of the successful Israeli approach. 
Reaching a vast and culturally diverse U.S. population will require a multi-faceted 
approach.  A one-size-fits-all approach will not be effective but Israel’s lessons of 
consistency and regularity of message, as well as standardized curriculum in the 
elementary and high school levels, provide an excellent model.  Preparing for an 
immediate return to normalcy and developing a psychologically resilient community are 
also important concepts to replicate.  
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VI. WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO REACH THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC? THE IMPACT OF CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY, 
PSYCHOLOGY, MARKETING, AND MESSAGING ON 
PREPAREDNESS AND EDUCATION EFFORTS 
A. EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGNS TAKE TIME, RESOURCES AND THOUGHT 
An effective effort to create “profound and enduring change” and a culture of 
preparedness will require tapping into a vast array of successful campaigns that have 
effectively changed human behavior.  Experts in the fields of sociology, psychology, 
marketing, as well as public health experts well-versed in successful behavior-change 
campaigns (known as “social marketing”) should be brought together to fuse their 
knowledge and experience in addressing the challenge of citizen preparedness.   
An effective campaign has a simple message, is easily understood, and gives 
succinct actions a citizen can take to become prepared.  Messages should come from 
trusted messengers in the community.  Children have proven to be excellent agents of 
change and often are the catalysts for an entire family adopting new habits (recycling, 
anti-littering, seat belt usage).  Children in urban areas with large multi-cultural 
components are often the “ambassadors” to the family, bringing home important 
information and translating for non-English speaking parents and grandparents.  The way 
in which messages are delivered, how they impact the individual, and whether those 
messages will motivate a citizen to action are all part of the puzzle that concepts from the 
fields of sociology, psychology, and marketing may help solve, particularly in the 
development of messages and targeted audiences. 
Cultural differences may prove to be an important distinction in messaging.  The 
Townsend Report recognizes that many factors must be looked at in creating the new 
culture of preparedness.  
DHS and other Federal agencies should identify both the individual skills 
and capabilities that would help citizens in a disaster as well as the types 
of messages from trusted leaders that would encourage citizens to be 
better prepared.  Public awareness messaging must shift to include more 
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substantive information, as opposed to just telling our citizens that they 
need to “do something.”  For example, the “Stop, Drop and Roll” 
campaign used so successfully in fire safety as part of the “Learn Not to 
Burn” (42) program provided citizens with specific steps to take.  Other 
successful campaigns include the National Highway Traffic 
Administration’s “Buckle Up America” campaign (43)…As with so many 
of these successful campaigns, the Nation’s children can help lead the way 
(44).201 
(42)  The “Learn Not to Burn” curriculum, first released in 1979, teaches 
twenty-two fire safety behaviors and is organized in three learning levels.  
The curriculum is intended for use by teachers in planning classroom 
activities and can be re-used from year to year.  “Learn Not to Burn” 
incorporates fire safety behaviors into regular school subjects, so children 
absorb life-saving information while developing skills in reading, math, 
art, history, and science.  National Fire Protection Association, “Learn Not 
to Burn,” http://www.nfpa.org. 
 
(43)  A 2004 study by the national Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
reported a record 80 percent of Americans wear their safety belts while 
driving or riding in their vehicles.  Transportation Secretary Norman Y. 
Mineta said the 80 percent safety belt usage will save 15,200 lives and $50 
billion in economic costs associated with traffic related crashes, injuries, 
and deaths every year.  Donna Glassbrenner, “Safety Belt Use in 2004—
Overall Results, Traffic Safety Facts,” prepared for the National Center for 
Statistics and Analysis (September 2004).  See also U.S. Department of 
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Safety 
belt use jumps to record 80%,” news release, September 12, 2004. 
 
(44)  Additional advertising campaigns that were successful in helping to 
change citizen behavior include efforts to stop the use of drugs through the 
“Just Say No” message created by First Lady Nancy Reagan and the 
“Drug Abuse Resistance Education” (D.A.R.E.); prevent drunk driving 
originating with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD); help quit 
smoking through the Surgeon General’s campaign to educate people on 
health risks and the American Cancer Society’s “Great American Smoke 
Out”; and stop littering through the “Keep America Beautiful” message 
promoted by First Lady Claudia “Lady Bird” Johnson. 
Dennis Mileti (cited supra), a sociologist and former director of the Natural 
Hazards Research and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado at 
Boulder has written extensively on the subject of human behavior and disasters. 
                                                 
201 Townsend Report, 80. 
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From a theoretical viewpoint, public hazards communication and 
education works best when the public materials and approaches used bring 
about uncertainty in the minds of the people, causing them to wonder 
about their environment, and to question their safety in it.  Good public 
education gives people something to mull over and to discuss with friends, 
family and colleagues.  It sparks interest enough that people generate 
questions, and then seek more information to answer their questions, and 
its specialists are there with additional and clear information when the 
questions are asked (cf. Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1992).  Despite all that, the 
desired changes in the public may take some time to materialize.202  
Mileti looks at effective hazard campaigns, such as seat belt campaigns, anti-
littering, and anti-smoking efforts.  He recognizes that: 
[All of them] began by showing the risks or problems associated with 
particular behaviors. They all have three things going for them: (1) they 
raised questions (created uncertainty) in the minds of their audiences, (2) 
they offered fairly simple answers, and (3) they had authorities available 
over time that were able to provide additional information when people 
sought it and were able to reinforce the message. 
Generous funding by one or more interest groups helped with the latter.  
An effective public education campaign posits a problem and then says 
how to solve it – over and over again.203  
Mileti’s writings confirm that we must understand human behavior and human 
dynamics to structure an effective campaign.  We must take into account that a program 
must be ongoing and sustained over time and that different age groups, education levels, 
gender, and ethnicity all impact a program.  Messages need to be constant, consistent and 
clear, and must come from various and multiple sources. Also important is using simple 
language, great graphics, and multiple languages, and seizing on the windows of 
opportunity provided by media attention to disasters in other parts of the country or the 
world to push people to take action to prepare for disasters.204  
                                                 
202 Dennis Mileti, Public Hazards Communication and Education: The State of the Art (Boulder, 
Colorado: Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado, 
Boulder, undated), 2. 
203 Ibid.  
204 Ibid. 
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Constant and consistent messaging is key.  In a recent interview with Dr. Mileti, 
he put it another way: “It needs to be everywhere, every time you turn around, ever 
present ...like Coca-Cola.”205  Making the task of preparedness seem easy is also an 
important factor.   
Simplicity of the message and simplifying the steps to action are important.  A 
study conducted in the 1960s by social psychologist Howard Leventhal is set forth in 
Malcolm Gladwell’s best-selling book The Tipping Point as evidence that advice that is 
simple, practical, and personal becomes memorable and serves to change human behavior 
into action.  The example used was a study conducted of students, teaching them the need 
for tetanus shots.  One group was given “high-fear” pamphlets, with gory pictures and 
strong language on the ravages of tetanus, while the others received toned down “low-
fear” pamphlets containing the same core medical information.  The group survey 
showed that the “high fear” group would take action and get the tetanus shots.  However, 
on follow up, only 3% actually took action.  The study was repeated, involving a new set 
of students.  After this second presentation, students received directions and a map to the 
on-campus health clinic with the hours of the clinic operations.  The number of students 
taking action rose to 28%, regardless of whether they were in the “high-fear” or “low-
fear” group.  The simplicity of the map and providing clinic hours, making the 
information practical and personal and therefore memorable (by changing the way the 
information was presented) caused a significant difference in the action taken by the 
second group versus the first.206 
This example underscores the need to present preparedness information in a new 
way.  The ARC has been placing preparedness messages throughout the United States for 
many years and has in recent years increased messaging in partnership with DHS.  The 
poll numbers show that preparedness messages are not resonating with the American  
 
 
                                                 
205 Telephone interview with Dr. Dennis Mileti, March 10, 2007. 
206 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point, How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: 
Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 97-98. 
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public.   A dramatic new approach is needed which takes into account the expertise of 
sociologists, psychologists, marketing experts, and others, to find the key to what 
motivates citizens to act. 
San Francisco’s preparedness website, www.72hours.org, indicates that simplicity 
is working.  This effort was designed as a “Disaster for Dummies,” stressing 
simplicity.207  Advertising campaigns need to get past the “clutter” problem of too many 
messages being sent to any one human in a day.  As Gladwell points out: “The New 
York-based firm Media Dynamics estimates that the average American is now exposed to 
254 different commercial messages in a day, up nearly 25 percent since the mid-
1970s.”208  Similarly, in discussing direct marketing, Gladwell states: “reaching the 
consumer with the message is not the hard part of direct marketing.  What is difficult is 
getting consumers to stop, read the advertisement, remember it, and then act on it.”209 
The CEG Symposium Report findings, cited supra, where first responders and 
emergency planners were brought together, are instructive in the area of an effective 
campaign. “The disaster preparedness and response community says that the information 
is available but is aware that it may not be visible, accessible or easily understood.”210  
Given this situation, they recommended that  
The overall unifying message to all Americans be rooted in the concepts 
of personal responsibility and self-reliance.  This message can promote the 
empowering idea that Americans can take steps to save lives and those of 
their families and employees through the preparedness actions they take in 
advance.”211   
                                                 
207 This new website won the International Webby Award for Best Government Website 2006.  In a 
recent poll by CEG in looking at the “Public Readiness Index” respondents in San Francisco were asked if 
they were familiar with websites: Ready.gov (2%), 72 hours.org (26%).  See Council for Excellence in 
Government, Schulman, Ronca and Bucuvalas, Inc., “Public Readiness Index in San Francisco,” August 
30, 2006, not published. 
208 Malcolm Gladwell, Tipping Point, 98.  
209 Ibid., 93. 
210 Council for Excellence in Government, et al., Symposium Report, 12. 
211 Ibid. 
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Secretary Chertoff made similar statements in referring to citizen preparedness as 
a civic duty and the importance of a prepared citizenry:  
For those who say, ‘Well, I can take care of myself no matter what, I don’t 
have to prepare,’ there is an altruistic element – that to the extent that they 
are a burden on government services, that takes away from what’s 
available to help those who can’t help themselves…That is a matter of 
civic virtue.212 
The type of messaging that works to get people to act was explored in the CEG 
Symposium Report.  “The public wants bite-sized, action-based specifics with rationale as 
to why they should do these things.”213  Similarly, the July 2005 NYU poll, cited supra, 
found that simplicity of message in disaster education is very important:  
The fact that between 1/5 and 1/6 of Americans had no response at all 
when asked an open-ended question about the first thing they would do in 
a crisis suggests serious challenges translating abstract emergency plans 
into plain instructions that ordinary Americans can both understand and 
internalize.”214   
The CEG Symposium Report looked at “striking the right balance between 
information and simplicity.”215 It recommended messaging that focuses on the benefits of 
being prepared and the consequences of not being prepared: 
While working to define the message, it is important for stakeholders to 
also come up with an approach for how they will position information to 
elicit public buy-in and engage in preparedness activities.  One effective 
approach is two-pronged, with messages that both: (1) promote self-
empowerment and self efficacy in order to motivate individuals to take 
responsibility for their own health and safety and (2) provide rationale for 
specific preparedness and response activities (why it matters) to validate 
and gain public support and adherence to them. 
The consumer safety industry…offers one good model to follow.  In 
motivating Americans to take precautions against various risks, consumer 
                                                 
212 Lara Jakes Jordan, AP Interview: “Chertoff Says Disaster Preparedness Depends on Public 
Altruism,” Associated Press, 31 October 2005. 
213 Council for Excellence in Government, et al., Symposium Report, 14. 
214 Paul C. Light, Preparing for the Unthinkable, 6. 
215 Council for Excellence in Government, et al., Symposium Report, 21 
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safety advocates increase awareness of a particular risk (e.g., death by car 
accident, home fire) and craft messages showing the public that they can 
mitigate the risk by their own actions (e.g. wearing a seat belt, installing 
smoke detectors).  Explain to the public the benefits and consequences of 
their action or inaction through compelling examples and messages.216 
Messages also need to be communicated by the right messengers.   
Some people distrust two of the disaster preparedness and response 
community’s most used voices – the federal government and the police.  
In many communities, people are more likely to pay attention to trusted 
community leaders…It is important to reach people where they work, live, 
play, pray, and through trusted, local sources/messengers.217 
Messengers are a critical component to preparedness and response.  People are 
more likely to listen to trusted leaders in an emerging event.  In major urban areas, during 
a disease outbreak or other situation, some minority communities may need trusted 
physicians to instruct their community to adopt a Western medicine approach (Asian 
American community) or to trust government to fully disclose side effects from 
vaccinations (reluctance of African American community to trust government in reaction 
to Tuskegee experiments, as set forth in a recent study).218  Trusted messengers speaking 
to the right audiences are essential in moving the population to take action to prepare.   
The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is a voluntary 
accreditation process for states and jurisdictions that has developed benchmarking and 
consistent standards for emergency management at the state and local level.   In October 
of 2005, EMAP convened a working group of emergency managers from around the 
country to review standards for public preparedness programs.219  The working group 
developed “The Commandments” for an outreach, education, and awareness campaign.  
The commandments consisted of: develop an integrated strategic plan for public 
                                                 
216 Council for Excellence in Government, et al., Symposium Report, 20. 
217 Council for Excellence in Government, et al., Symposium Report, 14. 
218 Roz D. Lasker, Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public (New 
York: Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health, New York Academy of Medicine, 
14 September 2004). See pages 51 through 58 for survey methodology. 
219 Author was a member of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program Disaster Public 
Education, Information and Outreach Working Group and Advisory Group. 
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education based on HIRA (Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis); establish citizen 
preparedness as a budget and policy priority; identify the audience and the type of media 
to reach the most persons; identify the roles of different players; develop clear, concise 
messages that are culturally competent; evaluate the sustainability of the plan; evaluate 
the network of stakeholders for the program; build community buy-in; address the special 
needs and underserved community; and develop plans with benchmarks and milestones 
for evaluation and accountability.220  
The group also recognized the need to implement concepts from sociology, 
psychology, and marketing in developing effective campaigns to reach targeted audiences 
and identified this as an area for further development by the emergency management 
community.221  In addressing the issues of citizen preparedness, the return to normalcy, 
resiliency, and psychological preparedness for terrorism were not separately discussed as 
the group was following an all-hazards approach to preparedness. 
B. STOVEPIPES AND SILOS: A CONSTANT CHALLENGE FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
1. Subject Matter Silos and Stovepipes 
An entire body of knowledge and research exists in the fields of psychology and 
sociology and identifying factors which lead to behavioral change.  Every useful body of 
knowledge needs to be fused together to identify the reasons people do not prepare for 
disaster and identify the motivators that move people to action, as well as how to 
overcome barriers to action.  In particular, psychological preparedness for terrorism must 
be addressed in order to create a resilient population.   The ways in which to approach the 
American public on this issue must be thoughtfully and carefully considered and 
significant effort and research is needed in this area.   
                                                 
220 Emergency Management Accreditation Program, Disaster Public Education, Information and 
Outreach Working Group Meeting, October 24-25, 2005, “The Commandments,” unpublished. 
221 Emergency Management Accreditation Program, Disaster Public Education, Information and 
Information and Outreach, Working Group Report, October 2005, Draft #1, unpublished. 
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A document created by Citizen Corps’ contractor presents “Methodological 
Considerations and Key Findings in Preparedness Research” and states that “the events of 
9/11 changed the research climate substantially enough to make prior studies less relevant 
to the current research climate.”222  Prior to 9/11, many years of study have been 
conducted by sociologists in the field of human behavior in disasters and on preparedness 
(mostly in earthquake country) that have applicability to current efforts to create a culture 
of preparedness and should not be overlooked or dismissed.223   
Unfortunately, there appear to be the familiar stovepipes and silos emerging 
around the issue of citizen preparedness (generally by subject matter expertise), a pattern 
which has plagued overall nationwide homeland security planning. This presents a 
serious challenge to the creation of a culture of preparedness which will need a 
comprehensive, multi-disciplinary approach for an effective effort.   All available 
resources and expertise, publications, and products should be used and their findings 
applied to citizen preparedness.  Messaging, sociology, psychology, marketing principles, 
and public health expertise in behavior change and social marketing will all need to be 
incorporated to develop an effective and sustained preparedness effort.  Much work has 
been accomplished in these fields, and recent studies on preparedness reveal that the 
public may be hearing the message of preparedness, but not taking action.   We need to 
find that critical link that turns knowledge into action – using all available resources to 
address this vexing and challenging issue. 
2. Why are the Ready Campaign and Citizen Corps in Different 
Directorates and Separate Programs? A Need for Consistency of 
Messages from the Federal Government 
A number of restructurings have taken place under DHS.  In the most recent post-
Katrina restructuring, Citizen Corps was moved to FEMA as part of a new National 
Preparedness Directorate. FEMA is now its own agency within DHS, led by its own 
                                                 
222 ORC Macro, “Methodological Considerations,” 3. 
223 Telephone interview with Dr. Kathleen Tierney, PhD., Director of the National Hazards Research 
and Applications Information Center, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder on 
March 9, 2007. 
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Administrator.  The Ready campaign, in a prior restructuring, was placed in the 
Preparedness Directorate which no longer exists.  Ready did not transfer from the 
Preparedness Directorate to the new FEMA, but was placed under the Office of Public 
Affairs, a separate entity within DHS.  This means that the two entities responsible for 
citizen preparedness efforts are housed in separate agencies, have different funding 
streams, budgets, and reporting structures.  In the reorganization, each program went 
back to its “legacy” department where it was housed prior to the creation of the 
Preparedness Directorate.  Although representatives of Ready and Citizen Corps both 
state they work together closely, what little resources go into citizen preparedness are not 
being marshaled and unified into a working whole. 
In addition, a variety of federal agencies outside of DHS and FEMA have 
responsibility for disaster planning and engage in efforts to prepare citizens for 
bioterrorism, pandemic flu, and other events, such as the Center for Disease Control and  
the Department of Health and Human Services.  The federal family must speak with one 
voice in creating a culture of preparedness.  Israel, discussed supra, has one central entity 
which deals with citizen preparedness.  A trusted messenger and consistency of message 
is an underpinning of their successful programs. 
As an example of the need for federal entities to work together on messaging, the 
inherent tension between the government wanting to reassure the public that plans are in 
place and that FEMA is on the mend may serve to undermine citizen preparedness 
efforts.  In the 2008 Budget-in-Brief, FEMA announced that response times to disasters in 
the past year have averaged twenty-five hours.  These messages may serve to undermine 
citizen preparedness efforts if the public believes help will arrive within a day.  While 
one part of the federal government is trying to inspire citizens to take responsibility to be 
on their own for a minimum of seventy-two hours in a disaster, other messages are 
contradicting the need for such efforts. 
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C. SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS TO CHANGE HUMAN BEHAVIOR: 
SOCIAL MARKETING AND CAUSE MARKETING  
There are some useful examples of efforts to change human behavior that are 
instructive in the promotion of personal preparedness.  Among those generally cited are 
the seatbelt campaign, efforts to increase the installation of smoke alarms in households, 
and campaigns to stop littering or encourage recycling.  Awareness campaigns such as 
those leading to the dramatic changes in breast cancer awareness may be instructive as 
well.  Seat belt usage represents a successful “social marketing” campaign that also had a 
significant law enforcement component, as well as other factors which raised compliance.  
Breast cancer awareness, known as an example of “cause marketing,” was successful in 
its broad marketing appeal, and the simplicity and regularity of messaging. 
1. Social Marketing 
Social Marketing is well known in the public health arena and is defined in 
several ways. 
Social Marketing is the application of commercial marketing technologies 
to the analysis, planning, execution, and evaluation of programs designed 
to influence the voluntary behaviors of target audiences in order to 
improve their personal welfare and that of their society. (Alan Andreasen, 
Georgetown University, 1995) 
Social Marketing is the use of marketing principles and techniques to 
influence a target audience to voluntarily accept, reject, modify, or 
abandon a behavior for the benefit of individuals, groups, or society as a 
whole. (Philip Kotler, Ned Roberto, Nancy Lee, 2002) 
Social marketing is “…A process for influencing human behavior on a 
large scale, using marketing principles for the purposes of societal benefit 
rather than commercial profit.” (W. Smith, Academy for Educational 
Development)224 
Social Marketing has three components that are “essential” to any definition.  
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First is the role of marketing techniques – which necessitate putting the 
primary audience or target audience (aka customer) at the center of every 
decision.  Second is that the focus of the endeavor is on voluntary 
behavior change.  Third, but not least, is that behavior change is for the 
benefit of an individual, group or population.225 
Social Marketing traditionally relies upon the “4 P’s” of marketing strategy in 
crafting an effective effort.226 These are Placement, Price, Product, and Promotion.227  
The concept of exchange is important in social marketing.  “A distinguishing feature of 
the social marketing approach, exchange is the concept that people adopt/reject or 
maintain a new behavior in return for benefits that they believe outweigh the costs of that 
behavior.”228   
• Place or Placement refers to reaching places where the targeted audience 
exists and accessing the “distribution channels used to make the product 
available.” 229   
• Price refers to hindrances or the barriers to action, the use of incentives or 
disincentives and minimizing the cost, whether financial, emotional, 
psychological or time costs.230  This can also be seen as “the actual cost or 
something the consumer must give up/do in order to obtain the 
product.”231  This is also considered part of the “exchange.”  In order to 
achieve change one must “minimize the ‘price’ the target audience 
believes it must pay in the exchange.”232   
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• Product is the what is being sold – the desired behavior or the “package 
of benefits associated with the desired action.”233  Also known as “what 
the consumer is asked to ‘buy’ (often a behavior).”234  Benefits can often 
be framed as the “positive results, feelings, attributes, etc. that the 
audience will obtain from the desired behavior change….Benefits are what 
you offer the audience in exchange for the new behavior. It’s ‘what’s in it 
for them.’” 235   
• Promotion refers to the communication avenues, messaging, and methods 
of reaching the audience.   
There are some key social marketing concepts regarding moving people to action:  
“action is undertaken whenever target audiences believe that the benefit they receive will 
be greater than the costs they incur…programs to influence action will be more effective 
if they are based on an understanding of the target audience’s own perceptions of the 
proposed exchange.”236   
Another key factor in social marketing is the identification of audiences and sub-
audiences (segmenting the population) and reaching the population through aggressive 
targeting.   
To ‘sell’ healthy behavior, social marketing starts with audience research 
that leads to the segmentation of the target audience into groups with 
common risk behaviors, motivations, and information channel preferences.  
Key audience segments can then be reached with a mix of intervention 
strategies informed by the “4 P’s” of marketing.”237  
This is consistent with the theory herein espoused that a “one-size-fits-all” 
campaign will not succeed in the major urban areas of the country.   
Social marketers are acutely aware that one single program cannot be 
meaningful to all people.  Audience segmentation means dividing targeted 
populations into subgroups that share similar qualities or characteristics.  
Several factors can be used as bases for segmentation including 
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geographics, demographics, physical or mental history, attitudes and 
behaviors (Weinreich, 1999).  Social marketers most often divide 
populations into segments based on psychographics (e.g., values, 
lifestyles), current behavior, intentions, and readiness to change.238   
The process of understanding your audience “is fundamental to social marketing 
(Parsons & McCormack Brown, 2004).”239  In a recent discussion with Richard Earle, 
creator of the famous “Crying Indian” anti-littering campaign, and author of The Art of 
Cause Marketing, he stated the key to success “is to understand the psychology of your 
targeted audience.”240  This understanding is essential: “The most fundamental principle 
underlying marketing is to apply a customer orientation to understand what target 
audiences currently know, believe and do…Marketers know that the marketplace is a rich 
collage of diverse populations, each having a distinct set of wants and needs.” 241  This 
effort is also known as looking at “KAPB” or the knowledge, attitudes, practices, and 
beliefs of a targeted audience.242 A campaign must also remain flexible and respond to 
feedback and have constant reevaluation.243 
a. Center for Disease Control, Public Health and Social Marketing: 
A History of Experience 
Public health has used social marketing to help change human behavior 
since the 1970s.244  The CDC website lists a variety of social marketing campaigns it 
engages in on a regular basis.245  CDC partners with Turning Point and the Social 
Marketing National Excellence Collaborative in developing effective ways to apply 
                                                 
238 Rosemary Thackeray, PhD, MPH, Kelli McCormack Brown, PhD, CHES, FASHA, FAAHE, 
“Social Marketing’s Unique Contributions to Health Promotion Practice,” Health Promotion Practice 6, 
No. 4 (October 2005): 365-368, 366. 
239 Ibid., 366. 
240 Phone interview with Richard Earle, March 15, 2007. 
241 Phillip Kotler, Ned Roberto, Nancy Lee, Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life, 2d Ed. 
(Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2002), 7, emphasis in original. 
242Alan Andreasen, Marketing for Social Change: Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social 
Development, and the Environment, 109. 
243 Turning Point, Social Marketing and Public Health, 9. 
244 Thackeray, et al., “Social Marketing’s Unique Contributions to Health Promotion Practice,” 365. 
245 Center for Disease Control website, Social Marketing. 
 109
social marketing research and practice to public health issues.246  They have developed 
significant research in the area and a compendium of successful voluntary behavior 
change campaigns from across the country from HIV Risk Reduction, Preventing Illness 
Associated with Chitterlings, Breast Cancer Screening, Promotion of Low-Fat Milk 
Consumption, Low-Fat Eating for American Now (Project LEAN), to Air Quality Public 
Education and Incentive Programs, and Breast Feeding Promotion.247   
A publication produced by Turning Point, The Basics of Social Marketing, 
discusses a number of messages delivered by social marketing: Fasten you seatbelt; Eat 
more fruit;  Pull over to talk on your cell phone; Don’t litter; Get a mammogram.248  This 
guide states: 
Social change is a messy process and not the purposeful action of an 
architect.  It is the synergy of efforts of multiple change agents.  Many 
practitioners believe that permanent, large-scale behavior change is best 
achieved through changing community norms – a process that can require 
time and patience. 
Public health professionals understand that people don’t change behaviors 
easily.  In fact, people are more likely to adapt to a new idea quickly if it 
exhibits these characteristics:  It has a relative advantage over what exists; 
It’s compatible with social norms; It’s not too complex; It can be “tried 
out”; You can see someone either doing or using it.249 
Making it easy, simple, and seeing others engaging in the process of 
disaster preparedness will all work to motivate behavior change.  The “synergy of 
multiple change agents” will need to be employed to create a cultural shift in the country 
for citizen preparedness.  This is consistent with earlier discussion of Mileti, the CEG 
Symposium, and the efforts of EMAP; there needs to be a constant, consistent message 
coming from many, many sources. 
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The experience of public health experts in successfully influencing human 
behavior should be an area of further study in addressing the issue of citizen 
preparedness.  Citizen preparedness can easily cross into the public health arena as a 
prophylactic or prevention measure, as we are asking the American public to take self-
protective action, to think about things they would prefer to ignore (just as they do with 
disease, weight and health issues) and to “inoculate” or “vaccinate” themselves and their 
families from the impact of disaster.  The vast experience of a large public agency (CDC) 
in social marketing and successfully changing human behavior should be embraced and 
modeled.  Unfortunately, this significant experience does not seem to be a significant part 
of the conversation and again we see the stovepipes and silos emerge in addressing the 
issue of citizen preparedness.  The attention to pandemic flu may break down this barrier.  
Years of research and experience from public health professionals should be fused with 
current efforts by DHS to create a culture of preparedness.  Indeed, social marketing has 
been used to improve health (curbing tobacco use and fat intake, cancer screening, blood 
pressure awareness, alcohol abuse) and for injury prevention (drinking and driving, 
seatbelt use, domestic violence, fires, household poisons), and has expanded to other 
areas such as protecting the environment (recycling, water conservation) and community 
involvement (blood donation, organ donation, increasing voting).250 
b. Seatbelt Campaigns 
One of the most effective uses of social marketing can be seen in the 
dramatic change in the use of seatbelts by Americans over the past decade.  In 1983, only 
14% of U.S. motorists wore seat belts.251  By 1994, 58% of Americans buckled up, and 
71% wore seat belts in 2000.  In September of 2005 the U.S. reached a new a record: 
overall seat belt use was at 82%.252 Where the “primary goal is to change behavior and 
get people to buckle up” a combination of factors were key to success: “Safety experts 
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state the progress has been helped by such high-profile media campaigns as ‘Click It or 
Ticket,’ stepped up enforcement by police officers and the adoption of primary seat belt 
laws, which allow police to stop motorists who fail to wear their seat belts.”253  In 
addition, the federally required “nagging” from the car – a recurring chime and light – 
was an added factor.254 Several articles reference the tailored efforts in various 
communities.  For example, successful efforts to influence the Hispanic population 
focused on protecting children as the motivating force.255 Educational efforts carried out 
with partners in colleges and in the community are credited for the increase in seatbelt 
usage among African Americans.256  
In order to influence teenagers, fear and shock were used as motivators.  
“Convinced that friendly persuasion has reached its limit” the famous crash test dummies 
used in advertisements were replaced with real life crash scenes in an attempt to reach the 
one third of the population – young males – who had very low numbers for seat belt 
usage.   According to Dr. Ricardo Martinez, the administrator of the highway agency, 
studies showed that people did not wear seat belts because “they believe they are in 
charge and nothing will happen to them.”257  However, as the President of the Air Bag 
Safety Campaign stated: “It’s a tremendous challenge because it involves changing basic 
behavior and deeply ingrained habits.”258  
The placement and targeting of messages at every level were important 
factors in the success of the seat belt campaign, as was segmenting the population, 
targeting specific audiences and understanding each audience.  The “price” “product” and 
“exchange” were all at work – a small effort for significant increase in safety, coupled 
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with continual promotion of an excellent marketing campaign and message.  In North 
Carolina, where the “Click it or Ticket” campaign was initiated, seatbelt usage went from 
65% in 1993 to 80% in the first six months of the program and remains at 84%.259  In 
addition, “fatal and serious injuries were cut by 14%. And as an added bonus, in 1994 
and 1995, North Carolina Auto Insurers asked for a total of $33 million less…”260  
Lower insurance premiums may also have been a factor in the success of the campaign. 
Enforcement had a great deal of influence in changing human behavior 
with regard to seatbelt usage.  Entire states were motivated to have citizens “buckle up” 
as federal highway funds were linked to demonstrated increases in seatbelt usage.  In 
1997, President Clinton threatened to cut off millions of federal dollars in highway trust 
funds to states that refused to toughen up safety belt use laws.261 Adoption of seat belt 
laws was required by the federal government, and stricter laws were rewarded with extra 
highway money.262  And of course, the nagging bell installed in the car which chimes 
until the seatbelt is engaged was an added factor leading to the increase in the use of 
seatbelts.   
Seat belt usage, smoke alarms and anti-littering campaigns all had 
enforcement components (tickets for non-compliance, legal requirements to install smoke 
alarms upon sale of house, hefty fines for littering and enforcement).  They are useful to 
study but may not prove as useful in citizen preparedness efforts, where we are seeking 
voluntary behavior change.  In seeking voluntary behavior change, other campaigns 
which motivate Americans to action – such as donating blood, blood pressure testing and 
awareness, or targeting teens with awareness programs to prevent smoking – may have 
more relevant application. However, the seatbelt campaigns and others are worthy of 
further study, particularly in the education of children as change agents, as well as for 
their overall success as major public awareness campaigns designed to influence behavior 
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in a sustained and meaningful manner.  In addition, these campaigns are useful to study 
as they underscore the fact that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to influencing 
behavior and highlight the importance of segmenting the population, crafting appropriate 
messages, and targeting that segment effectively. 
c. Successful Voluntary Behavior Change Campaigns: Blood 
Donation, High Blood Pressure Campaign & Tobacco 
(1) Blood Donation.  In 2001 the American Blood Centers 
conducted a survey to determine “nationwide attitudes toward blood donation.”263  This 
was done in a concerted effort to look at effective messages and programs to increase 
blood donation.  The reasons for donating blood were mostly altruistic (four of the top six 
answers).  The reasons given for donating blood: wanting to help others, 34%; 
responding to a blood drive, 25%; helping the community, 13%; hearing about a 
shortage, 7%; because “I might need it someday,” 4%; and helping a local child, 2%.  Of 
the reasons for not giving blood, 44% centered around fear of disease.  The remaining 
52% cited: never thought about it (17%), too busy (15%), scared of process (10%), afraid 
of infection (4%), don’t know where/how to give (4%), and don’t know anyone in need 
(2%).  The excuses for not giving blood echo many of the reasons citizens cite for lack of 
disaster preparedness: time and knowledge.264  
The American Blood Centers studied messaging in their effort to 
increase the number of donations.  They found the most compelling message to be that a 
family member, friend, or child was in need.  Overall, “the most effective message in 
multiple regression analysis was ‘four million Americans would die every year without 
lifesaving blood transfusions.’”265  This campaign highlights the importance of 
messaging in moving people to action.  
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(2) High Blood Pressure Campaign.  The National High Blood 
Pressure Education Program (NHBPEP) was established in 1972.  In the first year of the 
program,  
Less than one fourth of the American population knew of the relationship 
between hypertension, stroke, and heart disease.  Today, more than three 
fourths of the population is aware of this connection.  As a result, virtually 
all Americans have had their blood pressure measured at least once, and 
three fourths of the population have it measured every 6 months.266   
This campaign is considered “the longest running behavior-change program to use social 
marketing concepts, processes, and tools…”267 
This effort is an excellent example of social marketing.  There was 
a wide and varied target audience: women taking birth control pills, older persons, 
African Americans, people with diabetes, people with high cholesterol.  The campaign 
used segmentation principles, targeting messages to each audience, and adapted messages 
and efforts to position the desired change as more appealing than current behavior.   
The barriers to action reflect many of the excuses citizens give for 
not being prepared for disaster (time, money, cost, lack of priority, don’t want to think 
about it):  
It’s hard for me to change my diet and to find the time to exercise; My 
blood pressure is difficult to control; My blood pressure varies so much 
it’s probably not accurate; Medications can have undesirable side effects; 
It’s too expensive to go to the doctor just to get my blood pressure 
checked; It may be the result of living a full and active life. Not everybody 
dies from it.268    
The campaign sold its “product” (behavior change consisting of 
having blood pressure checked, losing weight, physical activity, low sodium foods, 
limited alcohol, and taking medication) and focused on “price” (making things easy, 
changing things over time, tracking blood pressure at home, requiring only a little 
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exercise).  The “placement” was effective; people could check blood pressure in malls, 
health centers, and at home.  “Promotion” consisted of using mass media and a myriad of 
other channels to deliver the message – websites, doctors, direct mail, internet, and toll 
free numbers were all employed.269 
(3) Tobacco – Truth Campaign and Massachusetts Tobacco 
Control Program.  There have been several very successful anti-smoking social marketing 
campaigns.  Some have employed extremely powerful and memorable television 
commercials.  Teen smoking is a good example of the need for audience segmentation.  
One is the “Truth” campaign in Florida; another is the Massachusetts Tobacco Control 
Program (“Make Smoking History”).  Both of these campaigns focused on reaching teens 
and teen smokers.  The “Truth” campaign targeted teen smoking and conducted an 
extensive effort to segment the teenage population and find the right conduits for 
messaging.  These campaigns also had the benefit of significant financial assistance from 
tobacco tax initiatives and tobacco lawsuit settlements.  In Florida, the Truth campaign 
consisted of “a two year $200 million youth anti-tobacco education and marketing 
effort.”270 In Florida, researchers found that, before even starting the campaigns, there 
was  
100% awareness [among teens] that tobacco killed… and that smoking 
had everything to do with emotion and nothing to do with rational decision 
making…like piercing an ear or dying hair, using tobacco was a tool of 
rebellion all about sending a signal to the world that the users made 
decisions for themselves.271   
Teachers, counselors, parents, the media, and communities had done their job of 
educating teens about the ill effects of smoking, but it had not changed smoking behavior. 
The last two campaigns highlight the need to understand the 
segmented audience – to analyze their knowledge, attitudes, practices, and beliefs – and 
then apply social marketing principles.  The Massachusetts campaign appealed to the 
                                                 
269 Philip Kotler, et al., Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life, 31.  
270 Ibid., 48.  
271 Ibid., 50.  
 116
vanity of teenage girls, showing the role of smoking in producing wrinkles and other 
signs of premature aging; another focused on adolescent boys, with actress Uma 
Thurman telling young males “the five things all guys should know” with the closing 
line: “nix the smoking.”272 The campaigns had to be “sufficiently intrusive to be talked 
about in the study hall the next day.”273  This is reminiscent of Mileti’s concept that the 
message must be something people “mull over and discuss…[that] sparks interest enough 
that people ask questions.”274  This is the concept behind Malcolm Gladwell’s book The 
Tipping Point: identifying the key factors leading to the tipping point where a social 
contagion happens and a product or idea takes off which, Gladwell finds, depends largely 
upon the “stickiness” of the message.275   
Social marketing is also a long process: 
It took five years to see a decline.  During the period of increased smoking 
among teens nationally (35 percent), the teen smoking incidence in 
Massachusetts fell from 31.4 percent in 1993 to 24.4 percent in 1999.  So, 
statistically speaking, they have bucked the trend.  The youth numbers are 
part of an approximately 35 percent remarkable statewide reduction.  This 
reduction represented a net loss of more than $1.3 billion for the tobacco 
industry.276  
Well-known social marketing efforts took many years, even 
decades, to resonate with the American public and change behavior.  Social marketing 
has been successful in many areas of influencing human behavior.  Famous social 
marketing efforts have also included powerful taglines and memorable images, such as 
Smokey the Bear and “Only YOU can prevent Forest Fires,” the Crying Indian and the 
campaign to stop littering with “Keep America Beautiful” as its message, or the  
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memorable tagline “A Mind is a Terrible Thing to Waste” for the United Negro College 
Fund, inspiring black youth to look toward higher education and to raise awareness of, 
and funding for, the effort. 
2. Cause Marketing 
A major effort to motivate Americans to prepare for disasters, creating a culture 
of preparedness, may require using another increasingly effective tool: “cause 
marketing.”  Major retailers reach consumers every day. They have proven to be effective 
messengers and educators for various causes and have successfully served as conduits for 
raising awareness among their consumer base.  Cause marketing is not just linking a 
cause with a major retailer for fundraising purposes; it also involves leveraging celebrity 
and visibility for awareness of, or education about, a pressing social issue, need, or 
problem.   
According to the Cause Marketing Forum website, social marketing is: “(A) 
strategic positioning and marketing tool that links a company or brand to a relevant social 
cause or issue, for mutual benefit. (From Brand Spirit, How Cause Related Marketing 
Builds Brands by Hamish Pringle and Marjorie Thompson, 1999.)” and/or “a commercial 
activity by which businesses and charity or causes form a partnership with each other to 
market an image, product or service for mutual benefit. (Business in the Community, the 
leading British corporate social responsibility organization…).277 Cause marketing is not 
social marketing, nor is it corporate philanthropy.278 
Avon and Breast Cancer awareness have one of the most successful cause-
marketing partnerships.  The match was natural in that Avon specializes in service to the 
female population. The vast network of Avon’s salesforce and the company’s constant 
contact with women was the perfect means to distribute information and raise awareness.  
Fundraising through product sales and the Avon Walk for Breast Cancer and other efforts 
also played a major factor in the success of Avon’s partnership.  
                                                 




Linking major retailers and corporations with the need to raise awareness of an 
issue and influence human behavior is emerging as a very strong tool for a variety of 
causes and is not just about fundraising. 
The business objective of a cause-branding campaign can be anything 
from increasing sales, forging new business relationships, and improving 
customer loyalty to something as broad as enhancing overall reputation.  
The philanthropic objective could be raising awareness of a critical need, 
inspiring consumers and partners to take action, or raising money.279 
ConAgra foods, another leader in the field of cause marketing, has embraced the 
issue of child hunger.280   The Feeding Children Better program “encourages employees 
to raise money and serve meals, donates products…and leads a national public-service 
advertising campaign to raise public awareness of child hunger.”281 
The visibility of a cause, seeing messages over and over again, and getting people 
to think about taking action are all key components in efforts to change human behavior.   
Today’s consumers wear their values on their sleeves – literally.  From 
yellow “Livestrong,” to blue “Democrat”…wristbands are all the rage.  
Couple this with the popularity of cause-related ribbons stuck on vehicles 
across America, and you have a societal trend.  Americans today are 
putting their passion for various causes on display – on wrists, cars, and 
clothing.  We want others to see us as ethical, caring, good citizens.  But 
this trend goes more than skin deep.  Americans want to align themselves 
with brands, employers and even investments that stand for something we 
can feel good about.”282 
The little pink ribbon has certainly been one of the most effective symbols of a cause.   
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a. Breast Cancer and Cause Marketing 
This successful campaign has been an ongoing and ever growing effort 
conducted over the past two decades.   Breast cancer awareness efforts have involved 
many retailers and corporations (although Avon’s visibility and early support have 
always given it tremendous stature in this cause).  Awareness has experienced a slow and 
steady evolution, built up over many years.    
Successful persuasion campaigns appeal to a person’s willingness to 
change:  explain what they need to do and how to do it and then get them to do it.  Much 
of the success of the breast cancer awareness campaign has been attributed to making 
information widely available, creating high visibility on an ongoing and constant basis. 
Messages and information are in simple language and substantial efforts have made 
mammograms accessible and affordable.  In addition, successful campaigns are targeted 
based on cultural283 and socio-economic factors.284  Targeting women where they shop, 
play,285 work,286 and pray has been highly effective.287   
Segmentation of the population was important in the delivery of the 
message.  The true success of the awareness campaign was the joining of a massive cause 
marketing effort with a large-scale social marketing effort by public health throughout the 
United States. An excellent example of this is the “Florida Cares for Women” program.  
This particular campaign enhanced the “exchange,” offering “peace of mind” as the 
benefit, and marketed free or low cost mammograms to women fifty years of age and 
over as a “special gift” – enhancing the campaign’s message by reminding women that 
“your gift is waiting.”  The campaign lowered the “price” of the product and enhanced 
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“placement” of the service in the community with free transportation and extended 
hours.288  These types of social marketing efforts by public health departments were 
taking place across the country as the high visibility cause marketing effort fueled 
awareness and education among the targeted population.  As an added benefit, cause-
related marketing increased fundraising as well.  
Unlike seat belt campaigns, there is no enforcement aspect to the breast 
cancer awareness campaign, requiring women to get mammograms and look to early 
screening.  Clever partnerships with large corporate entities, combined with substantial 
and sustained marketing over many years, have established the pink ribbon as a symbol, a 
reminder, and a call to action.  Many lessons of this successful campaign can be applied 
to a powerful, national, sustained effort in creating a culture of preparedness in America. 
What was simply another “awareness month” for a cause or issue has 
grown into “Pink October”:   
The Pink Parade starts again in October, the 20th annual Breast Cancer 
Awareness Month.  In Times Square, 3M is building the World’s Largest 
Pink Ribbon using Post-it notes with a ribbon imprint.  There’s Chapstick 
in pink packages, Avon’s breast cancer celebrity nailwear campaign, 
Kitchen Aid’s “Cook for the Cure” effort not to mention pink and white 
M&M’s, pink ribbon silk scarves, socks, stuffed bears and so on.289 
Avon used the sale of celebrity “little black dresses” (Sharon Stone, Kim 
Cattrall, Brooke Shields, Liz Tyler) to launch a new fragrance “Little Black Dress” while 
raising money in Pink October.290   In 2004, Target stores donated 100% of their 
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markets with the pink ribbon.291  “More and more, U.S. businesses see tying their 
corporate identities to good causes as a powerful marketing tool, and breast cancer has 
become the queen of all good causes.”292 
“It sounds like the prescription for a marketing disaster: Link your product 
to a disfiguring and potentially fatal disease that evokes fear in women…yet for leading 
cosmetics and fashion companies, the issue of breast cancer is proving to be a powerful 
selling tool.”293  In the mid-1990s, Avon’s campaign was one of the most visible cause-
marketing efforts ever undertaken by a Fortune 500 Company.294 
b. Cause Marketing and Citizen Preparedness  
A partnership or marketing tie-in to a major industry that in turn “markets” 
citizen preparedness on a national scale may help create a tipping point in the American 
psyche.  Talking about unpleasant things, such as disasters, is much like talking about 
cancer.  With the help of a Fortune 500 company, and the right marketing and 
partnership, a far-reaching and sustained dialogue with the American people is possible.  
Partnerships might be formed with investment firms (we care about your financial 
security and your personal security), the insurance industry (protecting your home, 
protecting your family), or with companies that target women (taking care of the family).   
Cause marketing is extremely powerful.  Citizen preparedness can 
certainly be seen as a cause or an issue.  Businesses or industries partner with causes or 
issues to raise their image and make consumers feel good about that company or industry.  
With regard to charitable causes, three-quarters of consumers say they will switch brands 
to a company involved in a charitable cause if price and quality are equal.295  A study of 
this area may prove helpful in designing a preparedness campaign that partners with a 
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responsible company or celebrity and, through intense and sustained marketing, 
constantly reminds citizens to take action to prepare and reinforces that it is easy, simple, 
and affordable. 
Cause marketing, however, requires long-term commitment.   
Cause marketing was once a company’s promotion with a charitable 
organization in which it donated a portion of its profits to the 
organization’s cause.  However, cause marketing has taken on new 
importance.  The promotion becomes a major, long-term commitment to 
an issue and an alliance that links a company with that issue in the 
consumer’s mind.  Avon’s Breast Cancer Awareness Crusade and Coors 
Brewing Company’s literacy campaign involve a great deal of work and 
investment.  To some, cause-related promotions are tacky and can harm a 
company’s image.  If a company tries to promote sales of its products by 
promising to donate a portion of the proceeds to the Red Cross or AIDS 
research, it risks looking like it is taking advantage of somebody else’s 
problem.  Integrated 5-year programs like Avon and Coors campaigns 
have a measure of built in immunity to charges of opportunism.296   
Recent successes in cause marketing and raising awareness for issues can 
be found in the “color coded causes.”  LiveStrong engaged Nike to sell the yellow Lance 
Armstrong wristbands; over 47.5 million bracelets were sold in 2004.297  The American 
Heart Association has the “Go Red” campaign.  “What started with red ribbons in support 
of fighting AIDS has quickly spread: pink ribbons for breast cancer, a yellow bracelet for 
LiveStrong, a red dress for heart disease, a royal blue bracelet for prostate cancer.  The 
color parade just gets stronger.”298   
The new (Red) campaign, initiated by Bobby Shriver and U-2 lead singer 
Bono, has linked major retailers and their products to fundraising for and increasing 
awareness of fighting AIDS in Africa (supporting the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria) .  Retailers include giants such as GAP, American Express, 
Motorola, Converse, Apple, and Armani.299  The (Red) campaign has benefited directly 
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from proceeds from sales of (Red) products at these retailers. Gap has engaged in a 
massive media campaign to brand the (Red) campaign and join itself to the awareness 
and education efforts.  Celebrities and politicians are part of the major marketing effort, 
raising awareness of AIDS in Africa, and have been featured in ads, magazines, and 
television shows from Vanity Fair to Oprah.   
Raising awareness and providing visibility to a cause or issue through 
these types of efforts has direct applicability to citizen education, preparedness 
messaging, and awareness efforts.  The synergy of social marketing and cause marketing 
could provide powerful new tools to reach the American public, engage the population, 
and help propel the country toward the creation of a culture of preparedness. 
D. TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY AND MORTALITY SALIENCE:  
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REACHING A PUBLIC THAT JUST DOESN’T 
WANT TO THINK ABOUT DISASTERS 
Images of disaster and the suffering of fellow Americans waiting for help and 
assistance did little to inspire Americans to take personal responsibility for the 
preparedness of themselves and their families.  Americans cite lack of time, lack of 
money, and lack of organization (among others) as reasons they have not prepared 
themselves or their families for disaster.300  Many believe that terrorists will strike again 
in the United States, but not in their town or city.  Others prefer to believe that disaster 
will happen, but not to them:   “Ironically, Americans are convinced that catastrophe is 
inevitable.  The vast majority expect a major event to occur somewhere in the United 
States within the next five years.  But many believe catastrophe will strike anywhere but 
in their own communities, and are therefore less motivated to prepare.”301   
The surveys conducted by Professor Light at NYU (discussed supra) reveal that 
the number of people who cited “I just don’t want to think about it” as the reason not to 
prepare actually increased after Katrina.  In the July 2005 NYU survey, 23% cited the 
reason they are not prepared is that they “did not want to think about September 11th.”  In 
                                                 
300 Light, Paul C., Preparing for the Unthinkable, 4. 
301 Ibid., 2.  
 124
the second survey, conducted in  October of  2005 – just five weeks after Katrina – 27% 
cited that they “did not want to think about Katrina and Rita” as a reason for not getting 
prepared.302  
A recent article discussing the failure of Americans to heed the preparedness 
message found that: 
…a critical issue might be the degree to which citizens sense that an attack 
will actually affect them or their community.  We found that while more 
than three-quarters (78 percent) of respondents were concerned that there 
will be more terror attacks in the United States, less than a third (31 
percent) believed an attack would happen within a year.  Likewise in New 
York City, which was actually attacked by international terrorists twice 
within the last thirteen years, more than three-quarters (76 percent) of New 
Yorkers were concerned that there will be more terror attacks, but less 
than a quarter (23 percent) believed an attack would happen within a year.  
Thus we see a population with a belief in future acts of terror, but a failure 
to see the threat as immediate.303 
Although Americans say they comprehend the threat of disaster and believe 
terrorists will strike again, they have not taken the most basic and fundamental steps to be 
prepared to be self sufficient for a minimum of seventy-two hours, despite witnessing the 
inability of government agencies (local, state, and federal) to reach those most in need 
after Katrina.   
In two seminal textbooks on social marketing, overcoming a human’s natural 
tendency to ignore health messages or to deal with unpleasant topics is not thoroughly 
addressed from the psychological standpoint of mortality salience.304  Fear is addressed 
as an emotional appeal and using fear as a motivator should be approached with caution.   
There are a number of circumstances under which an emotional appeal 
may serve to move a target audience member to the Contemplation Stage 
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(Monahan, 1995).305  Fear appeals have long been suggested as a way to 
get customers’ attention and interest (Janis, 1967; Averill, 1987; Peter and 
Olson, 1993).  The difficulty here is that fear can have two competing 
effects (Hale and Dillard, 1995). On the one hand, when attended to, fear 
appeals can be motivating in encouraging people to think about taking 
precautionary actions (Rogers, 1975, 1983; Kunreuther Sanderson, and 
Vetschera, 1985).  On the other hand, fear can serve as a powerful force 
preventing attention from taking place….if fear is used, it should be 
coupled with some mechanism for its reduction…”306 
The concept of “mortality salience” provides some interesting insight into the 
reasons Americans don’t want to think about disasters and terrorism and choose not to act 
on, or simply ignore, public information campaigns designed to educate the public about 
the importance of preparedness and survival post-disaster.  Why is it we cannot seem to 
sell preparedness as a means of safety and survival?  New avenues for reaching the public 
in applying concepts of psychology may prove useful in re-orienting how we target and 
message certain segments of the population. 
Mortality salience looks at the phenomena that humans prefer to not think about 
death and mortality; we naturally prefer to think about other things or are reluctant to 
think about things that are upsetting.  Humans have a tendency to avoid things we don’t 
want to deal with.  
Humans are gifted with the ability to contemplate their own demise, and 
this weird blessing infuses every moment of life with the inevitability of 
death.  That said, we’re remarkably good at making our date with death 
seem so far away we doubt we’ll have to keep it.  If an event pierces our 
defenses and makes our mortality vivid, we quickly return to living as we 
usually live, as if the odds against death are stacked in out favor.   
…Most people aren’t so calm in the face of “mortality salience” – modern 
science-speak for the moments when we realize death awaits us.  
According to studies, pointed reminders of death are more likely to trigger 
unsavory behaviors, including a puritanical conformism that drives us to 
defend our worldview and to punish others who threaten it – if only in our 
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minds.  Curiously, an awareness of death also drives us to seek out ways 
to bolster our self esteem.  Researchers say that even little ways of feeling 
better about ourselves (like flattery or shopping) are strangely effective in 
lulling us back into forgetting our ultimate fate.307 
This effort to bolster our self esteem as a response to mortality salience may prove a 
fruitful beginning in reshaping preparedness messaging.   
A recent study explored the role of self esteem in consumer responses to mortality 
salience.  One part of the study focused on food choice, the other on charitable donations 
and making socially conscious decisions.   
Individuals display a wide variety of behavioral responses to reminders of 
the possibility of their own death.  In the laboratory, making mortality 
salient has increased intentions to engage in physical fitness activities 
(Arndt, Schimel, and Goldenberg 2003), preference for luxury goods 
(Mandel and Heine 1999) and materialism (Arndt, et al. 2004), interest in 
sex (Goldenberg et al. 2000), and aggressive driving behavior (Ben-Ari, 
Florian, and Mikulincer 1999).  Public events can also make mortality 
salient and influence behaviors.  After September 11, 2001, for example, 
people reported increases in overeating and going off diets, drinking, 
smoking, time spent with family and friends, shopping, and church 
attendance (e.g., Barnes and Petersen 2001). 
Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski 
1997) provides a framework for understanding such behaviors.  Events 
that remind individuals of death engender existential anxiety, leading to 
the use of two main coping strategies to alleviate this anxiety, defense of 
one’s cultural worldview and attempts to bolster and enhance self esteem 
(Pyszczynski et al 2004).  We focus on the strategy of 
bolstering/enhancing self-esteem as a buffer against existential anxiety.  
Terror Management Theory argues that, when mortality is made salient, 
individuals increase their efforts to live up to the standards upon which 
their self esteem is based…When mortality is salient, individuals will 
focus attempts to bolster or increase areas of self-esteem that are central to 
them and in which they can live up to standards. 308  
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In the above mentioned study (Ferraro, et al.) the behavioral domain of virtuous 
behaviors, such as donating money to charity or engaging in socially conscious behavior, 
were studied as a source of self esteem.  The experiment found that “among individuals 
high on virtue as a source of self-esteem, the decision to give to charity, the amount 
contributed to the charity, and intentions to engage in socially conscious consumer 
behaviors were higher when mortality salience was high than when it was low.”309 
Zeroing in on self esteem as a coping mechanism for existential anxiety about 
death may be instructive in moving Americans toward preparedness.  Perhaps 
preparedness messages should begin to focus on an individual’s action in becoming 
prepared as an altruistic act or charitable act (promoting self esteem) – looking at 
preparedness as protecting one’s family, civic duty and responsibility, pride in doing 
something good, assisting the community, or as assisting first responders in being 
prepared and alleviating pressure on first responders in the first 72 hours post disaster.   
Under this theory, the individual must find this domain of participating in strengthening 
“family” and the “community” an important source of self esteem.  DHS senior officials 
have stressed civic duty as a reason to prepare in various statements and speeches.  
Preparedness messages that are based on fear and death alone are unlikely to 
move individuals to action and should be used with caution.  In fact, fear messages may 
cause maladaptive behavior and push people further into denial and avoidance.  However, 
messages that make mortality salient and are linked with efforts capitalizing on known 
coping mechanisms such as bolstering self esteem may prove a useful endeavor for 
further study in moving Americans to action in preparing for disaster.   
Another study looked at the impact of mortality salience on consumer behavior 
and looked at impression motivation “which refers to the desire to be socially acceptable 
and this motive may link to the striving for self-esteem.”310  Impression motivation may 
be an important key in persuading Americans to become prepared.  
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According to Terror Management Theory, coping with death leads 
individuals to attempt to validate their self worth.  In general, self-worth 
comes from seeing oneself as a valued part of social reality.  Thus, the 
need to enhance self-worth is likely to motivate individuals to satisfy 
social goals and manage impressions.311 
Therefore, adjusting preparedness messaging to accommodate the feeling of self worth 
and enhancing social goals where mortality is salient may be a promising endeavor 
because “…when mortality is salient, people are more willing to act in concert with the 
opinion of others…impression-motivated individuals are more sensitive to the opinion of 
others and their subsequent attitudes reflect a bias toward social goals.”312 
As shown in so many surveys, current preparedness efforts are simply not 
working.  Mortality salience should be further studied in the context of citizen 
preparedness, recognizing that humans do not want to think about disasters and death.  
Additional study is needed, looking at fear-based messages and whether such messages 
might work within the right context of mortality salience and Terror Management 
Theory.  This study may lead to a redirection of preparedness campaigns to capitalize on 
the anxiety coping mechanism of self esteem – with preparedness marketed as a virtue 
and something that is of high social value that translates into the individual taking action 
to become prepared.  To this author, the excuses for not preparing, such as lack of time or 
money, or “wish I was more organized,” all sound as though they are part of a continuum 
of a human’s natural tendency to “not want to think about” 9/11, Katrina, death, disaster, 
or terrorism.  The importance of using psychology to help solve the vexing issue of why 
people do not prepare for disaster cannot be over stated, yet it appears, over the past five 
years, to have been left out of serious efforts to solve this complex problem.  
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E. A NEW MODEL: “CITIZEN CORPS PERSONAL BEHAVIOR CHANGE 
MODEL FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS,” A HOPEFUL START IN 
DRAMATIC CHANGE  
Citizen Corps recently released an elaborate new model, the “Citizen Corps 
Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness” (called PDP) for addressing 
citizen preparedness aimed at using social science theory to change behavior.  It is based 
on two theoretical models.  First is Prochaska’s Stages of Change/Transtheoretical Model 
which looks at stages of changes and when persons are most accepting of messages and 
change.  There are five stages: Precontemplation, where the individual is not intending to 
change or even thinking about change; Contemplation, where the individual is not 
prepared to take action immediately but within the next six months;  Preparation, where 
the individual is actively considering taking action in the immediate future; Action, 
where the individual has actually taken action; and Maintenance where an individual has 
taken action, maintained a change in behavior, and is working to sustain the change.313   
The other theoretical model is the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), 
“chosen because it addresses how individuals process threat as well as their ability to take 
protective action.”  As set forth in the Citizen Corp report:  
The PDP Model applies the EPPM’s description of factors that influence 
two types of responses to threats (i.e., danger control or fear control 
processes).  
1.  A person’s perception of a threat is composed of two components:  
1) threat severity (e.g., How severe will the effects of a disaster 
be?) and  
 
2) threat susceptibility (e.g., How likely is it that the disaster will 
happen to me?) 
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2.  A person’s assessment of the value of a recommended protective action 
is also composed of two components:  
1) self-efficacy (e.g., Am I able to protect myself from a disaster?) 
and  
 
2) response efficacy (e.g., Will the recommended preparedness 
actions help me in the event of disaster?)314  
In this model, persons take one of two actions when threatened: danger control or 
fear control.   
1. Danger control focuses on a solution to the threat (e.g., preparedness or 
protection).  For danger control to be selected, a person needs to believe 
that an effective response is available (response efficacy) and that he or 
she is capable of using this response to reduce the risk (self-efficacy). 
2. Fear control is not solution-oriented and can be represented by denial, 
rationalization and escapism.315 
The new model defines groups by one of three “Threat/Efficacy Profiles.”  The 
first is the “Low Perceived Threat Profile,” where the person is “unaware or dismissive of 
the threat because of perceived low susceptibility, urgency and/or severity.316  This 
person is deemed “unreceptive to preparedness messages.”317  The next is a “Low 
Perceived Efficacy Profile,” where the person understands susceptibility to and the 
severity of the threat, but perceives barriers to preparedness and is therefore 
unprepared.318  The third group is prepared, understands the threat and has become 
prepared.319 Each of these profiles is examined to determine the type of outreach, 
messaging, and social marketing that is most effective in promoting preparedness.  The 
new model also looks at the Stages of Change Model to identify where individuals are in 
                                                 
314 ORC Macro, et al, “Citizen Corps Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness,” 3, 
italics in original. 
315 Ibid., italics in original. 
316 Ibid., 3 and 6. 
317 Ibid., 3. 
318 Ibid., 3 and 8. 
319 Ibid., 3 and 10. 
 131
the process of change and how to move an individual in a current stage through the 
remaining Stages of Change to the Action Stage and Maintenance of Change Stage.320 
This new effort in using social science theory is admirable and is a start in the 
right direction for creating a culture of preparedness.  The report also recognizes that the 
current one-size-fits-all approach is not viable.  In acknowledging the continuing abysmal 
numbers in citizen preparedness, and an actual decline in preparedness in 2005 from 
2003, the report states:  
To achieve higher levels of personal disaster preparedness throughout the 
country, government officials, emergency responders, nonprofit 
organizations, educators, and community leaders must gain a better 
understanding of the motivating factors and barriers to personal 
preparedness.  A greater range of personal factors that might correlate with 
these motivators and barriers must also be examined, including basic 
demographic variables, such as age, education, and income, but also 
factors that cut across levels of socioeconomic status and geographic 
location.  By understanding these issues, the preparedness community will 
be able to design targeted social marketing and outreach programs to 
increase awareness of the need for individual preparedness and to motivate 
behavior change.321 
Whether this model is the most effective way to create a culture of preparedness remains 
to be seen, and the report makes clear that further research and extensive testing of the 
model is needed.   
F. IS GOVERNMENT THE BEST MESSENGER? FAITH IN 
GOVERNMENT – A FACTOR TO CONSIDER 
A study produced by the New York Academy of Medicine in September of 2004 
demonstrated that Americans lack faith in government to give them correct information 
during an emergency.322 The study focused on two scenarios: one was a smallpox 
outbreak, the other a dirty bomb.  The purpose of the survey was to determine if all of the 
planning engaged in by government for these types of events would actually go according 
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to plans when put to the test.  In other words, would people follow instructions and would 
members of the public do what was expected of them in an emergency?   
In focusing on the dirty bomb scenario, only three-fifths (59%) of the American 
people would cooperate fully with instructions to stay inside their office building and 
shelter in place after an explosion.323  There were several reasons for the other 41% not 
cooperating, but the study found that more members of the public would follow 
instructions if the American people’s lack of trust in official institutions was addressed 
and there was a higher confidence in their community’s preparedness plans.324 The study 
found that emergency planners could improve public response in emergencies by 
strengthening people’s confidence in the community preparedness plans and enhancing 
people’s trust in official instructions and actions.325  
The July 2005 NYU survey report did not give high marks for confidence in local 
government to deal with a bombing in a grocery store or shopping mall (only 30% 
believe local government is very prepared) or an outbreak of disease (19% believe local 
government is very prepared).326 
The answers suggest an important disconnect between knowing about a 
plan and believing in the institution that produces it….Having watched 
closely as Hurricane Katrina unfolded, it is not clear how Americans will 
react to messages from their local institutions in the wake of future 
disasters.  Much as one might hope they will heed the evacuation orders 
more quickly, confidence in government and its leaders was badly shaken 
by the widely-televised images of evacuees who followed orders only to 
be stranded at the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center.327 
The October 2005 ABC news poll (discussed supra) found that overall, 52% of 
Americans express confidence in government’s ability to respond effectively to a nuclear 
or radiological attack.  However, that number was down significantly from a prior poll in 
August of 2005, where 78% of Americans expressed faith in the government’s 
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capabilities.  The October poll also cited that fewer than three in ten citizens know what 
to do in the event of an attack of this type, half would not know where to get information, 
and three-quarters believe there would be panic.328 
These findings, in combination, must be addressed in a preparedness and 
education campaign.  People will not do what government expects and needs them to do 
in an emergency unless there is faith in local government.  Likewise, an educated 
citizenry that knows what to do in an emergency is essential in creating a culture of 
preparedness.  
In a post-Katrina world, a concerted effort to restore citizens’ faith in government 
is needed and is critical for effective emergency preparedness and response efforts.  
Messengers of disaster preparedness and education are very important.  Local 
government needs to be seen as a trusted resource, with viable emergency plans and 
strong leadership.  Local government needs to team with trusted messengers in every 
community from clergy and neighborhood leaders to respected non-profit agencies.  
These messengers must be identified and employed in the effort to improve citizen 
preparedness.   
Creating a culture of preparedness will require using a wide variety of conduits to 
reach the American people – employing many agents of change.  The continued lack of 
faith in government reveals that perhaps government is not the best messenger (or “front 
person”) for preparedness messages, awareness efforts, and education.  This is an area for 
further study. 
G. FINDING, DEFINING, AND BRIDGING THE PREPAREDNESS DIVIDE 
The images of stranded fellow Americans in New Orleans made it obvious that 
there is a preparedness divide329 in any major American city.  The question becomes how 
to bridge that divide.  Given that every city has citizens with limited funds, limited 
education, and limited access to information and the internet, how do we prepare our 
                                                 
328 ABC News Poll: “Confidence in Anti-Terror Response Drops.” 
329 The phrase “preparedness divide” was identified by Dr. Paul Light in the report of his survey 
findings from October of 2005. See Paul C. Light, The Katrina Effect on American Preparedness. 
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vulnerable populations for disaster?  Is disaster preparedness a top priority for a mother 
with a limited income trying to clothe and feed her children?  Can we realistically expect 
it to be?  How do we plan, as a city and community, for this reality?   
The July 2005 NYU poll clearly demonstrated a preparedness divide exists.  
According to the study “socioeconomic status has a profound impact” on preparedness, 
with significant differences in preparedness between rich and poor and educated and less 
educated citizens.330 Most importantly, the study found that:  
Less educated, lower income Americans are more likely to report 
problems getting resources to be prepared.  Fifty-seven percent of those 
with a high school degree or less say they strongly or somewhat agree that 
they are not sure where to turn for help, compared with 39 percent of those 
with a college degree or more.  In turn, 64 and 62 percent respectively of 
those with a high school degree or less say they wish they had more time 
and money to focus on preparing.331 
The study showed that high percentages of less educated, lower income Americans did 
not know what to do in the event of an emergency and the same group has little 
confidence in all but the fire department to assist people in need.332 
The report states that this situation “presents a serious policy challenge as 
government, business, and charitable organizations look for ways to convince all 
Americans to prepare for the inevitable.”333  This situation presents significant policy and 
strategy challenges in preparing any major urban area for disaster and must be addressed 
as an integral part of creating a culture of preparedness. 
                                                 
330 Paul C. Light, Preparing for the Unthinkable, 8. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid., 2. 
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H. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE IDEAL PROGRAM -- BRINGING IT ALL 
TOGETHER 
As seen in the surveys exhibiting the wholesale lack of preparedness among 
Americans, the impact of 9/11 and Katrina was “nearly nonexistent”334 in inspiring 
citizens to prepare. The creation of a culture of preparedness will largely rest on the 
ability to create a preparedness program that is well funded, sustainable and well crafted.   
More importantly, the creation of a culture of preparedness will require a complete 
overhaul of current efforts that are having minimal, if any, impact.   
Israel provides interesting options for preparedness efforts, particularly in the area 
of education at the grammar and high school levels.  Israel’s approach also provides a 
starting point for a thorough discussion of preparedness for responding to terrorism and 
the concept of resiliency based on partnership with government, an immediate return to 
normalcy, and the psychological preparedness of the citizenry.    
Important concepts from social marketing should be applied to new efforts.  The 
success of various social marketing campaigns, coupled with the power of cause 
marketing, should be adapted for a nationwide effort to create a culture of preparedness.  
Celebrity power should not be overlooked.  The (Red) campaign has benefited from the 
involvement of Bono and many celebrities to raise awareness for AIDS in Africa.  Major 
retailers have been successful in using their messaging conduits to raise awareness for 
other issues such as breast cancer and child hunger.  Trusted messengers, including 
celebrities such as Oprah, should be utilized.  Oprah can place a book on the bestseller 
list, or turn a product into a “must have” item for Americans, simply by mentioning it on 
her show.335  Star athletes, musicians, and others can all be used to push the message of 
preparedness within their spheres of influence.  At the local level, trusted community 
leaders must be enlisted as part of the messenger brigade.   
                                                 
334 Council for Excellence in Government and the American Red Cross, The Aftershock of Katrina 
and Rita: Public Not Moved to Prepare, 2.  
335 Hardy Green, “Why Oprah Opens Readers’ Wallets: She offers the guidance and sense of 
community bookstores no longer provide,” Commentary, Business Week Online, October 10, 2005, 
www.businessweek.com (accessed March 1, 2007). 
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Diverse experts from around the country, representing various schools of thought, 
need to be brought together to solve the complex and vexing issue of why citizens will 
not take action to prepare.   Concepts from psychology, sociology, and marketing should 
all be used, and subject matter silos and stovepipes, as well as those that exist within the 
federal government, should be fused into a workable whole.   
A complete and thorough analysis of the barriers to preparedness, as well as the 
motivators to action, is the key to success.  Programs must be based on a thorough 
assessment of the target audience and the segmentation of the audience for messaging.  
Gender, age, ethnicity, education level, and geographic location all impact messaging for 
a population.  Consistency and regularity of message is essential, with adaptations of an 
overall message to meet each targeted audience’s knowledge, attitudes, practices, and 
beliefs.  The use of trusted messengers to reach the population, as well as compelling 
taglines, are equally important to an effective campaign.  Significant research, testing, 
and modeling at the federal level is needed in this area, with results then shared with 
urban areas to address their populations. 
All of this will take a substantial investment.  Government, in the face of survey 
after survey showing the abhorrent lack of preparedness in the country, can no longer 
short-change citizen preparedness efforts. 
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VII. GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO MAKE A RADICAL SHIFT.  
VIEWING EVERY POINT OF PREPAREDNESS AS A FORWARD 
DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS, URGENCY & IMPORTANCE MUST 
BE STRESSED AND GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO RE-EVALUATE 
ITS STRATEGY AT EVERY LEVEL 
The population in urban areas is complacent.  Citizens are unwilling to take 
measures to protect themselves and their families from disaster by being prepared to 
survive on their own for a minimum of seventy-two hours, to learn basic survival and 
rescue skills, and to have family emergency plans in place.336  As shown in the many 
surveys cited herein, current efforts are ineffective and there are dwindling resources for 
citizen preparedness efforts.  The Ready campaign is under-funded and understaffed.  
Citizen Corps is as well.  Government at all levels is not viewing citizen preparedness 
with the urgency and importance of an entity that sees a prepared citizenry and prepared 
communities as an invaluable asset in a time of disaster. 
First responders generally are not supportive of citizen preparedness programs if 
programs detract financially from other high-priority issues such as equipment, training 
and personnel.  Preparedness programs are treated as a low-priority issue among the 
competing needs of homeland security programs across the country.  In addition, UASI 
funding and other homeland security grant dollars cannot be used to purchase caches of 
food and water, so the responsibility for providing caches of these vital supplies falls to 
mayors of major cities, as well as governors, and their General Fund budgets, lest they 
rely on the federal government for assistance.  Whether mayors and governors fully 
understand and agree that this is their responsibility is not clear. 
In the Bay Area, for example, FEMA maintains a 100,000 square foot warehouse 
at Moffet Field which houses relief supplies.  This warehouse is not dedicated to the Bay 
Area, and supplies move in and out of the center for distribution throughout the country 
on a regular basis.  The Bay Area is likely to experience a major earthquake, with a 
debilitating impact on the region and the national economy.  The Bay Area has been rated 
                                                 
336 Paul C. Light, The Katrina Effect on American Preparedness, Executive Summary. 
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in the Tier I category for UASI funding alongside New York, Washington, D.C., Los 
Angeles, Chicago, and Houston as the areas at highest risk for acts of terrorism.337  
Despite these facts, there is no set level of preparedness and relief supplies stationed in 
the Bay Area by the federal government.  The American Red Cross maintains some 
limited supplies at their facility in Dublin, California.  Recently, ARC has augmented 
supplies for Northern California in a warehouse just over the state line in Nevada.   In the 
Bay Area, San Francisco and the major cities of Oakland and San Jose store extremely 
limited emergency supplies (mostly geared toward sustaining first responders only) and 
very limited care and shelter supplies (such as cots and blankets), relying mostly on the 
ARC for assistance.338 Cities such as Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. also maintain 
only limited supplies.339 
The post-Katrina Townsend Report called for the creation of a “Culture of 
Preparedness”340 – with citizens taking personal responsibility for their own preparedness 
-- which has yet to be fully described, vetted, and adequately funded.  As Americans 
remain woefully unprepared for disaster, caches of supplies stored by local government 
in urban areas are limited.  Mayors and governors must choose to take on the 
responsibility for providing food and water for their citizens after a disaster or get serious 
about citizen preparedness.   
Devastating natural disasters will leave urban areas without help or assistance, 
with thousands of unprepared citizens looking for assistance.  As an example, according 
to the CAPPS Report (Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety), a repeat of the 1906 
Earthquake in San Francisco will lead to the destruction of over 80,000 housing units and 
                                                 
337 United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of Grants and Training, “Overview: FY 
2007 Homeland Security Grant Program,” January 5, 2007, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 2007). 
338 Some caches of first aid and other shelter supplies are currently being purchased in the Bay Area, 
but are of limited quantities. 
339 Telephone interviews with Barbara Childs-Pair, Director of Emergency Management Agency, 
Washington, D.C., and Ellis Stanley, Director, City of Los Angeles, Emergency Preparedness Department, 
November 2005.  
340  Townsend Report, 79.  
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over 60,000 displaced persons within the city.341  A quake of this magnitude will impact 
the entire Bay Area, which has a population of over seven million, two major ports, three 
major airports, and a large economy.  According to the Association of Bay Area 
Governments (ABAG), a major quake on the San Andreas fault or a rupture of the 
Hayward fault (debilitating the entire East Bay and severely impacting San Francisco) 
will render major roads impassable, disruptions of major utilities will occur, overpasses 
will collapse, hospitals will be severely impacted or collapse, bridges will be impacted, 
transportation will shut down, rail service will be disrupted, airports and runways will be 
out of service, and first responders and disaster service workers will be unable to reach 
their places of work due to the severe curtailment of travel.342  Movement of supplies and 
rescue and relief workers will be an incredible challenge.  San Francisco, as a peninsula, 
will be essentially cut off from assistance.    
As was shown in the Gulf States, entire urban areas can be cut off from assistance 
for a significant period of time due to damage to the terrain.  The lack of citizen 
preparedness will have devastating consequences in future disasters.  Ninety percent of 
the nation’s population lives in areas with a high risk for at least one major hazard or 
threat.  The majority (58%) of the nation’s population lives in metropolitan areas with 
one million or more residents.343  Given these numbers, the continued state of an 
unprepared citizenry, left unaddressed, will be a repeat of the Gulf States when a major 
disaster occurs. 
Those first responders who are on site and available must prioritize and respond 
to the most acute needs of the population and the city as a whole.  A population that 
needs water and food will lose patience within the first forty-eight hours of a disaster.   
 
                                                 
341 San Francisco Department of Building Inspection, Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety 
(CAPPS), San Francisco’s Earthquake Risk: Report on Potential Earthquake Impacts in San Francisco 
(Draft), prepared by the Applied Technology Council, April 5, 2003. 
342 Association of Bay Area Governments, Taming Natural Disasters, Multi-jurisdictional Local 
Government Hazard Mitigation Plan for the San Francisco Bay Area (Oakland, CA: Association of Bay 
Area Governments, March 2005). 
343 United States Department of Homeland Security, Draft Target Capabilities List, September 2006, 
116. 
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The responsibility to care for citizens in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and before 
federal aid arrives will fall to the mayor and state governor.  How does an urban area and 
state realistically prepare for this time period?   
A. CHANGING THE MINDSET OF GOVERNMENT TO SEE EVERY 
POINT OF PREPAREDNESS AS A POINT OF FORWARD 
DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS -- FINDING A BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY 
The best selling book, Blue Ocean Strategy, reveals that new ideas, and looking at 
issues from another vantage point, often have the effect of dramatically changing an 
approach to solving issues, presenting ideas and opening up entire new markets.344  This 
book is instructive in two ways.  First, it points to ways of altering the mindset of 
government to view citizen preparedness and every point of preparedness as the forward 
deployment of assets and an essential component in disaster preparation, response, and 
recovery efforts. Second, it suggests dramatic new ways to approach the American public 
in getting them to prepare.  According to the concepts of a Blue Ocean Strategy, 
attracting new customers and non-customers (citizens) to become prepared is an essential 
step in creating a “tipping point” toward a culture of preparedness.  The issue of 
government mindset is discussed in this chapter; the issue of preparedness campaigns and 
the need for dramatic new approaches has been discussed in Chapter VI.   
Government can be inspired to change its view of citizen preparedness through 
the application of Blue Ocean Strategy concepts.  These include: a value proposition; the 
creation of true community preparedness efforts (as a forward deployment of assets) 
through established delivery systems (for messaging and for distribution); a strategy 
canvas showing the current system and the value of a new approach; the identification of 
key organizational hurdles; and the need to drive the plan.   
 
                                                 
344 W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space 
and Make the Competition Irrelevant, (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 2005). 
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1. Value Proposition 
Citizen preparedness is the key to the survival of a community in the event of a 
catastrophic disaster.  It is incumbent upon federal, state, and local officials to focus on 
citizen preparedness as a valuable asset in the response, recovery, and resiliency of 
communities.   
Is the right answer to have caches of supplies strategically placed by FEMA 
throughout the country near high threat/high risk cities?   Is the expectation that the 
federal government will bring in adequate supplies within seventy-two hours a realistic 
assumption?  Do mayors want to rely on this proposition after Katrina?  What about the 
acute phase of the first seventy-two hours, when there is no promise of support?  Should 
mayors be expected to spend millions of General Fund dollars to invest in food, water, 
and supplies, alongside the cost of warehousing and staffing seismically-sound and 
climate-controlled buildings, and be ready to move supplies through a chain of 
distribution with disaster service workers and first responders?  Will the workers be there 
to distribute the supplies?  Will roads be passable and equipment available to distribute 
supplies?  How will priorities for supplies be handled?  Is this a workable and cost 
effective strategy when there are immediate pressing demands for General Fund dollars at 
the local level for homelessness, health care, crime, and education?  
Despite FEMA’s efforts to increase the amount of supplies on hand in the post-
Katrina era, the current system is doomed to fail again.  It still relies on the ability to get 
supplies moved into a devastated area.  This system is especially precarious when 
disasters strike without warning, such as major earthquakes and acts of terrorism, where 
the possibility to pre-stage and “lean forward” with supplies and relief teams does not 
exist.    
Investing in a prepared citizenry, armed with supplies for a minimum of seventy-
two hours, and with the education and training needed to survive the acute phase of 
disaster, is a far more effective strategy for building a resilient community.  A prepared 
citizenry knows what to do and takes care of itself when disaster hits.  First responders  
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and local officials are able to focus on response efforts and the restoration of lifelines and 
caring for those most in need.  Fear and panic are held to a minimum when citizens are 
educated and prepared for disaster.  
An effective community-based preparedness program will help alleviate the 
enormous pressure on first responders and local officials post-disaster.  The investment of 
dollars in preparing individuals and communities, so that supplies are present in the 
community and within the neighborhoods of a city, will help lessen the need for locally 
warehoused supplies.  A prepared citizenry will also lessen the demand – during the acute 
phase of response, rescue, and recovery – for a city to move and distribute supplies, and 
allow authorities to give priority to immediate response efforts (mass casualties, fire 
suppression, restoration of utilities and transportation) with the limited number of 
available workers and responders.    
Storage of food and water is a costly venture.  A recent study in San Francisco 
showed that the cost of purchasing Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) and water packs to care 
for 30,000 people for three days would well exceed $12 million over a ten year period.  
This is exclusive of warehouse rental or real estate purchase costs, personnel, and other 
costs associated with this type of program.345 
It is important to have some caches of supplies, but it is unrealistic to (1) expect to 
cover everyone who will be in need after a major event and (2) believe that immediately 
following a major event an effective distribution system will be in place.  The creation of 
a culture of preparedness in every urban area is essential in order to allow a mix of 
cached supplies and prepared citizens to carry an urban area through the first seventy-two 
hours of a disaster.  Caches of supplies are needed to address the issue of the 
preparedness divide. These supplies should be available to challenged communities, as 
there is no feasible way for government to store food and water for the entire population 
of an urban area. 
                                                 
345 City & County of San Francisco, Food and Water Study, December 2006, unpublished. 
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2. Building an Effective Community Based Program:  Every Point of 
Preparedness Becomes a Forward Deployment of Assets, Using 
Existing Delivery Systems for Preparedness Efforts 
The current DHS campaigns for individual preparedness represent a one-size-fits-
all approach to preparedness which is not resonating with the general public in major 
American cities.  Urban areas have the ability to mobilize around pressing social issues 
and to take action.  Most urban areas have extensive community-based and community-
focused programs, from public health issues to community policing to issues of 
homelessness and housing.  School communities, religious communities, volunteer 
groups, and trade associations are all part of the fabric of the community.  Culturally 
competent, community-based preparedness programs, based on mass mobilization 
strategies, are the most effective way to prepare an urban area. These types of programs 
capitalize on the already existing “delivery” systems from which citizens seek and obtain 
information, where they find trusted messengers they are willing to listen to – in the 
workplace, at school, in churches, and at community centers. Under a system where 
every neighborhood and community is prepared for disaster, every point of preparedness 
becomes a point for forward deployment of survival supplies, negating the enormous 
costs for massive warehousing and the unrealistic expectation that in a major disaster a 
distribution system will be easily created.  Preparing communities, neighborhoods, and 
individuals to be educated, have supplies, and follow established plans all work toward 
the creation of a true culture of preparedness.  
Urban dwellers value and respond to a system that creates empowerment and 
strengthens communities and neighborhoods.  They will rise to the occasion if they 
understand that being prepared and taking financial responsibility for themselves and 
their family in a disaster would allow General Fund dollars to go to social programs, 
rather than to the exorbitant cost of warehousing food and water.  Likewise, a desire to 
help first responders – alleviating pressure on those responders in a disaster – plays 
strongly to the values of the community.  Empowerment is valued by urban area 
residents; creating preparedness programs which stress empowerment may resonate 
within many communities.   
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3. Strategy Canvas:  A Better Approach 
A Strategy Canvas comparing the current DHS model to a proposed community-
based model is set forth below.  The current system relies on minimal resources provided 
for citizen preparedness efforts, a traditional “hub and spoke” distribution of supplies 
post-disaster from warehouses outside the impacted area, and the assembly of relief 
teams from outside the impacted area for deployment after disaster strikes.   The reach 
and effectiveness of the current DHS preparedness campaign is questionable. Supplies 
within communities and individual households (a true forward deployment) remain at 
extremely low levels.   FEMA and ARC supplies, stored in large caches, may not be 
reliable in a disaster, thus leaving urban areas at risk during the seventy-two hours 
immediately following a disaster.  Massive warehousing strategies (whether implemented 
by the federal or local government) are expensive – especially in costs for transportation, 
rental of facilities, and the procurement of the supplies themselves.  As a result, under the 
current strategy, the seventy-two hour gap will most likely remain unfilled and enormous 
pressure will be placed on local authorities during the most acute response phase – where 
attention should be focused on the highest priorities for rescue, fire suppression, saving 
lives and property, and the restoration of lifelines . 
An article in The Washington Post revealed that FEMA is still experiencing 
significant problems with logistics, and new programs for improved tracking, as well as 
logistics support, are substantially delayed.   As the old adage states “Wars are won and 
lost on logistics.”  According to Senate investigators, “After Katrina, FEMA could not 
meet Mississippi’s requests for food and water for 10 days.”346  The article shows that 
279 truckloads of MREs and other food worth almost $43 million were simply discarded 
for lack of proper climate controlled warehouse space.  FEMA and DHS had increased 
supplies of food, water, and ice, “storing enough to feed 1 million people for a week” 
prior to the last hurricane season. 347  As a result, according to this article, FEMA is now  
                                                 
346 Spencer S. Hsu, “FEMA Food Went to Waste:  More than $40 million worth of supplies tossed 
out, scavenged for re-use,” The Washington Post, April 13, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com (accessed April 
13, 2007). 
347 Ibid.   
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cutting overall inventory and will increase its reliance on the military for cold storage 
facilities.  The agency will respond more quickly with supplies, with assistance from the 
military and private contractors.    
The alternative community-based model, founded upon an aggressive community 
education and preparedness campaign, allows for the forward deployment of supplies 
within individual homes, communities, and neighborhoods.  The aggressive campaigns 
break through the barriers to preparedness and find the motivators that push citizens to 
prepare – attracting traditional “non-customers” of the preparedness message (discussed 
infra).  It also allows for trained volunteers within communities, acting as relief teams, to 
be immediately available within the impacted area.  In this manner, the seventy-two hour 
gap is better handled and the pressure on local authorities and first responders during the 
acute phase of response is substantially relieved. This type of effort capitalizes on 
established and successful community-oriented efforts and provides a sense of 
empowerment for the community as a motivating force.  Likewise, this model requires 
that federal, state, and local government are clear in answering the question of who 
“owns” the seventy-two hour gap. Mayors and governors either take dramatic action to 
prepare their residents for disaster, or rely on a system that makes no promise of support 




Figure 1.   Strategy Canvas for Citizen Preparedness Programs 
4. Organizational Hurdles  
In looking to new strategies, organizational and other hurdles are often 
encountered.  First is a cognitive hurdle – breaking down the status quo.  Elected officials 
need to fully understand the importance of public preparedness.  The big question is 
“who owns the issue” of preparing the community?  Is it a local, state, or federal issue?  
All disasters are local – and it is the mayor who will be on television in the first seventy-
two hours, being asked why food and water are not available for the citizenry.  FEMA’s 
standard is seventy-two hours – but is it wise for a mayor to rely so heavily on outside 
assistance?  Realistically, a mayor and governor should look to the citizenry itself as a 
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partner in preparedness – and to the communities, neighborhoods, and individual 
households as the repository of supplies.  Without a prepared citizenry, chaos is certain in 
disaster.  Local and state government must embrace the need for a strategic shift in how it 
views citizen preparedness – and why it is critically important. 
Another hurdle is resources.  An aggressive community planning and 
preparedness program is less costly than massive warehousing.  A warehousing system is 
also doomed to failure if roads are impassable and there are limited workers and 
equipment.  Also, post disaster, identifying the “needs” of various communities is easier 
if the communities themselves are prepared with supplies. 
Motivation can be another hurdle to overcome.  The Bay Area is at high risk for 
earthquakes and for acts of terrorism.  Other urban areas face the same threat of terrorism 
and natural disasters.  The failure to effectively prepare the community will further 
traumatize a community in crisis.  The country can no longer fail to invest in, plan, and 
prepare for resilient communities.   
Politics always plays a role.  The big question remains:  Who owns the seventy-
two hour gap?  Who owns the issue of citizen preparedness? Whether they like it or not, 
the answer is local government and its officials.  All levels of government have a major 
part to play in citizen preparedness, but mayors and governors are best suited to 
delivering the preparedness message, to understanding the proper conduits to reach their 
constituencies, and to find the right messengers to motivate citizens to take action.  
Katrina should have been enough harsh reality for any civic leader – providing the 
“urgency and emotional impetus”348 needed to stimulate change in the political body to 
take citizen preparedness seriously.  When executives have been asked “…what prompts 
them to seek out blue oceans and introduce change, they usually say that it takes a highly 
determined leader or a serious crisis.”  A mayor or governor can choose to be highly 
motivated on this topic ahead of time, or face serious crisis in a disaster, risking a repeat 
of the experiences of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast.    
                                                 
348 W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 154.  
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The federal government does have a significant role to play in citizen 
preparedness.  Most immediately, this role is one of providing substantial financial 
resources, structuring campaigns for an aggressive nationwide effort to create a culture of 
preparedness, engaging in the baseline research that is essential to messaging, and 
effectively targeting the population.  These tools should be provided to urban areas to 
then craft, tailor, and adjust programs, based on sound and extensive research and 
development of effective messages for their populations.   It is up to mayors and 
governors to implement programs in their jurisdictions (using the valuable tools provided 
by the federal government), to identify barriers to preparedness, and to find what 
motivates their particular population and targeted audiences to prepare – in addition to 
identifying and bridging the preparedness divide.   
The federal government has created significant expectations in calling for the 
creation of a culture of preparedness.  The Target Capabilities List, in setting forth 
performance measurements and metrics, is unrealistic in its scope for citizen 
preparedness unless the federal government makes a dramatic shift in providing financial 
resources and other support to local and state government.  The federal government has a 
limited capacity in the FY 2008 budget to foster a culture of preparedness, having cut 
Citizen Corps and Ready funding; yet the Target Capabilities List places an enormous 
burden and expectation of performance on local and state government.349 
5. Driving the Plan: The Key is Effective and Aggressive Community 
Preparedness Programs at the Local Level  
Serious efforts to study and create new ways to reach the American public are 
essential to the creation of a culture of preparedness.  According to Blue Ocean Strategy 
concepts, driving a successful plan and preparedness campaign will require reaching out 
to “new customers” and “non-customers”350 of the preparedness message – those who are 
                                                 
349 Funds may be used from other federal grant sources, but are not required to be spent on citizen 
preparedness.  The language in UASI, SHSGP, and other programs is permissive and not mandatory.  See 
also Citizen Corps, “2007 Funding and Community Preparedness,” March 29, 2007, www.citizencorps.gov 
(accessed April 30, 2007). 
350 W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 28, 88, 102-04. 
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not listening to the message and those who choose to ignore the message – and finding 
out why they do not listen to or ignore the message.  The simplicity of the message or use 
of “a compelling tagline”351 is essential to reaching the population.  New efforts are 
needed in analyzing what types of campaigns and messages truly motivate people to 
prepare. “Challenging an industry’s conventional wisdom about which buyer group to 
target can lead to the discovery of a new blue ocean.”352  Current efforts are largely 
ineffective.  Engaging every level of the community – from young to old, large to small 
businesses and merchants, large ethnic populations, community based organizations, and 
religious organizations and large congregations is an absolute necessity.   
UASI and other homeland security funding must be tied to an urban area’s 
demonstrated efforts at achieving a comprehensive citizen preparedness program, with 
metrics for measuring success.  The current TCL creates an ideal state of readiness for the 
American people.  Yet, it sets an impossible goal and an unreachable bar given the 
overall lack of funding and attention by the federal government for this most important 
issue.  The TCL should be revised to more realistically reflect the current status of citizen 
preparedness in the country and provide realistic goals. The federal government needs to 
provide far more resources for achieving the end state in the current TCL. 
Local and state governments need incentives.  In the seatbelt campaign, only upon 
the threat of loss of highway funds for states not meeting the 85% usage rate did 
Governors take the law seriously and implement aggressive campaigns and enforcement 
efforts.  Mayors and governors must understand that they “own” the seventy-two hour 
gap.  They can choose to fill the gap with cached supplies or embrace the importance of 
citizen preparedness programs (viewing prepared households as a forward deployment of 
assets and trained volunteers as a force multiplier) and embrace both as essential 
components of the survival of a city in a disaster.   
A pilot program, in partnership with DHS in each of the highest risk cities, should 
be initiated with a steady steam of funding over a five-year period with a long-term 
                                                 
351 W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 37.  
352 Ibid., 61. 
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vision for sustained efforts.  Overall federal efforts must focus on researching and 
working with experts in public health with social marketing expertise, marketing experts, 
sociologists and psychologists, and others to create an effective and aggressive national 
effort.  Focus groups in each of the urban areas should be established to develop specific 
and compelling messages that resonate with the various communities housed within the 
urban area, ensuring cultural competency. The messages created, whether based on fear, a 
sense of civic duty, altruism, empowerment, responsibility for family, or other aspects, 
should all be evaluated for their motivational and persuasive value and success in moving 
citizens to action.   Similarly, the community outreach efforts (partnerships with 
congregations, schools, community-based organizations, neighborhoods, businesses, 
apartment complex owners, and non-profit agencies) should be evaluated for their 
effectiveness. Preparedness and the resulting forward deployment of supplies within the 
community should be measured. 
The federal government, in partnership with state and local partners, must build 
on the successes of Citizen Corps, Ready, and other efforts across the country, in 
individual cities or states, to prepare citizens for disaster.  A new approach must be taken 
to meet the urgent need to prepare urban areas for disaster.   No longer can the federal 
government rely on under-funded Citizen Corps programs and the under-staffed Ready 
campaign as its citizen preparedness efforts.  There must be a wholesale change in 
government’s approach to the issue of citizen preparedness.  It must begin to see citizen 
preparedness (including trained and educated volunteers) as a serious, full-scale plan for 
the forward deployment of supplies and assets in a disaster, based on a partnership of all 
levels of government working together with the citizens and the communities they serve.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
A culture of preparedness can be created in America. It will require dramatic 
changes in government at all levels, coupled with a profound shift in the American 
people embracing the importance of preparedness.  Despite the urgency of improving 
preparedness numbers, this shift will entail a long, steady process, as has been the case in 
any major cultural shift in America. 
In order to create a culture of preparedness, several substantial issues must be 
addressed and resolved, and several large steps will need to be taken, as indicated below. 
“Ownership” of citizen preparedness must be established.  A clear vision of 
who “owns” the responsibility for citizen preparedness must be resolved.  Is it the 
responsibility of the federal government to run a national program, or is it the 
responsibility of governors, county-level officials, or mayors to ensure citizens are 
prepared to be on their own for seventy-two hours?  Mayors, governors, and county 
administrators have not acted as a unified and collective voice to demand a well funded, 
comprehensive, nationwide effort to create a culture of preparedness.  It is unclear 
whether mayors and governors see citizen preparedness as their obligation or 
responsibility, or fully understand the impact of an unprepared citizenry.   
Formal policy must be adopted by national organizations to prioritize citizen 
preparedness.  It is unclear whether mayors and governors accept citizen preparedness 
as their responsibility given the absence of formal policy statements on the importance of, 
and need for, a robust nationwide citizen preparedness effort from the National 
Governors’ Association, the United States Conference of Mayors, or the National 
Association of Counties.  These organizations, as well as America’s mayors, governors, 
and county administrators, need to adopt formal policies endorsing a culture of 
preparedness and embracing citizen preparedness as a top priority. 
Government at all levels must recognize the vital importance of citizen 
preparedness, viewing each point of preparedness as a forward deployment of assets.  
Government at all levels must prioritize, both in budgets and written policy, the 
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importance of citizen preparedness, viewing prepared citizens and communities as a 
forward deployment of assets and trained citizens as force multipliers.  This requires a 
radical shift from viewing citizen preparedness efforts as “feel good” actions to 
embracing the importance of citizen preparedness as a vital component in the 
survivability and resiliency of a city after a major event.  Local government will be 
charged with the care and feeding of its citizens during the acute phase of a disaster if its 
citizenry remains unprepared, untrained, and without basic essentials.  Such a burden will 
place enormous stress on first responders and disaster workers whose attention should be 
focused on caring for those most in need and the restoration of lifelines.  
The traditional first responder community must embrace citizen 
preparedness as a vital part of the “first response.”  Unfortunately, the traditional first 
responder community has treated citizen preparedness as a “second-tier” need.  Training, 
equipment, and exercises have all been given a much higher priority in competing for and 
distributing federal grant funds for homeland security.  Until the first responder 
community embraces citizen preparedness as part of the “first response,” as a forward 
deployment of assets with trained citizens as force multipliers in a disaster, a major 
hurdle will remain in the prioritization of grant dollars. 
Funding for citizen preparedness programs must be revised and augmented.   
Citizen preparedness competes for funding with many pressing needs in the world of 
homeland security – improving prevention efforts, securing our borders and coastlines, 
aviation security, transit security, information sharing, improving communications 
interoperability, improving CBRNE detection and response, training and exercises for 
first responders, infrastructure protection, and mass casualty and mass prophylaxis 
planning and response, to name a few.   Citizen preparedness can no longer fall among 
the lowest priorities for funding.  Current grant programs provide small baseline funding 
for citizen preparedness efforts.  Although the larger grant programs (UASI, SHSGP and 
others) allow for the use of funds for citizen preparedness efforts, it is permissive and not 




Substantial investment in future efforts will be needed to create a “profound and 
enduring” transformation of citizen preparedness and establish a culture of preparedness 
in America. 
The federal government must use its vast resources to fuse the experience and 
knowledge base currently existing within the various federal agencies and other levels of 
government, the private sector, public sector, and academia, and move toward a 
comprehensive approach to address the issue of why Americans don’t prepare, determine 
how to motivate people to prepare, and identify and overcome barriers to preparedness.  
No local or state government is going to solve this complicated issue on its own.  As was 
evidenced in the research, changing human behavior is a complex undertaking.  Despite 
admirable efforts, Americans remain woefully unprepared.  Dramatic changes are needed 
in the messaging and approach to citizen preparedness, to identify barriers to 
preparedness and motivators which inspire the adoption of the preparedness message and 
lead to action on the part of the American people.   Substantial new research, along with 
the significant existing bodies of knowledge (from sociology, psychology, marketing and 
public health expertise in social marketing, as well as other subject matter expertise), 
must be fused into one unified effort to create a nationwide effort.  This collective 
expertise and research must be used to create a model program to inspire a cultural shift 
in which the American people embrace the message of preparedness and act on it.    
Children have proven to be effective agents of change.  Many agents of change 
must be employed to penetrate the American psyche and move people to action.  Many 
different messengers and adaptations of messages for targeted audiences must be used to 
reach the American population, as a one-size-fits-all approach will not be successful.   
All levels of government must work together on this issue, and a major federal 
investment in (1) synthesizing and building upon current and past preparedness efforts; 
(2) fusing the silos and stovepipes of marketing and behavioral sciences, among others, 
as well as all federal partners; and (3) bringing top experts in various relevant fields 
(from think tanks to academics to practitioners) into one cohesive whole to develop 
effective means to reach the population with the preparedness message and provide 
useful, hands-on guidance for local and state government in developing tailored efforts in 
 154
their communities.  Given the vast resources of the federal government, it should act as 
the “convener” in bringing the necessary experts together and funding intensive study of 
what works in persuading Americans to prepare.  Using this research, the federal 
government (working side-by-side with local and state government) should pilot 
programs in a few urban areas, tailored to each urban area (within guidelines), over the 
next five years.  There should be guaranteed funding to constantly test, adjust, and 
validate the programs.  If results are successful, the program should then be rolled out 
nationwide.  
It should be noted that federal efforts have been admirable in the creation of 
Citizen Corps and its programs and the development of the Ready campaign.  These 
important programs remain understaffed and under-funded.  The necessary level of 
funding and access to resources for this type of undertaking is required at the federal 
level to create a “profound and enduring” change in the nation as called for in the 
Townsend Report. 
Psychological preparedness for terrorism and creating a resilient population 
must be addressed.  The country, as a whole, has taken an “all hazards” approach to 
citizen preparedness.  One of the main purposes of terrorism is to instill mass fear and 
create uncertainty in the population about its government’s ability to protect its people.  
In order to defeat terrorism, a population must be resilient in response to terrorism and be 
psychologically prepared to handle terrorist events, returning immediately to a sense of 
normalcy.  Psychological preparedness for terrorism and creating a resilient population 
are largely absent from citizen preparedness efforts, yet they are essential in creating a 
culture of preparedness.  Israel has a culture of preparedness and several lessons can be 
adopted from this culture to help infuse Americans with the responsibility and duty to 
prepare.  Israel provides a model for psychological preparedness for terrorism, which the 
United States must begin to address as a part of citizen preparedness efforts.  A 
psychologically prepared, resilient community should be the end state of citizen 
preparedness efforts and a culture of preparedness.   
Consistent messaging, a definition of preparedness, and measurement tools 
must be established.  There is wide disparity in the definition of “preparedness” and 
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what it means to be prepared.  “Preparedness” and “culture of preparedness” must be 
defined and efforts for preparedness must be measured for progress and accountability.  
As part of the suggested fusion of efforts, a definition of preparedness is an essential first 
step.  Measurement tools, based on accepted definitions, are necessary to establish a 
comprehensive baseline and track progress and areas for improvements.  In order to 
create a culture of preparedness there must be a common understood goal, consistent 
message, and a defined end state for preparedness programs and efforts.  
In order to create a culture of preparedness much needs to be done.  There are two 
major hurdles:  government and the American people.  The federal government must 
prioritize citizen preparedness through a substantial increase in resources and 
development of a large-scale national effort.  Federal, state and local governments must 
be clear on who “owns” the seventy-two hour gap.  State and local government must 
embrace the importance of citizen preparedness, view every point of preparedness as a 
forward deployment of assets to alleviate the seventy-two hour gap, and view trained 
citizens as immediately available “force multipliers” in relief and rescue efforts.  In turn, 
the American people must embrace their role and responsibility to be prepared for 
disaster.  The nationwide effort, based on a dramatic new approach, using myriad 
expertise and research efforts brought together to address the complex issue of why 
citizens do not prepare, must start to take hold and move citizens to action.  As the 
government at all levels changes its perception of the importance of citizen preparedness, 
and as Americans begin to respond to a dramatic and effective new message of 
preparedness, this synergy may lead to the cultural shift and tipping point needed to 
create a culture of preparedness. 
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